The Iranian quagmire. The art of agreeing as well as disagreeing

The destruction of the Ukrainian passenger plane by the Iranian armed forces proves once again that the former Prussian Chief of Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, is right when he said that no military plan survives contact with the enemy. If this was already true at the time when artillery had a range of a few kilometres, and was dragged along by horses, in these times of intelligent weapon systems with a global reach, the expectation that the results of a war such as the one raging in the Persian Gulf can be contained does not seem overly realistic.

Especially since, as a corollary of the "maximum pressure" strategy of the Trump administration, Tehran has redirected its commercial flows towards the east, establishing agreements with Russia and China, which have led to an incipient military collaboration, shown in the recent naval manoeuvres of the three countries in the Gulf of Oman. 

The potential medium-term consequences of this Iranian strategic adjustment, together with the volatility of the situation in Libya, have not fallen on deaf ears in European chancelleries, and have led Angela Merkel to take the initiative by meeting with Vlamidir Putin, shortly after Donald Trump announced from the White House that he would push for NATO's more active involvement in the Middle East, thus lifting the suspicions of the Kremlin, where any expansion of NATO activities is perceived as an affront to Russian geopolitical interests, especially at the Black Sea apex. Donald Trump's presidency has evolved to lack any meaningful strategic alliances in the Persian Gulf, apart from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, while on the other side of the Suez Canal, Turkey has distanced itself from the US orbit to move closer to Russia, while aiming to restore Ottoman-era dominance over the Muslim world, so we cannot be surprised by Trump's sudden interest in involving NATO in Middle Eastern affairs. 

But precisely when the EU is faced with the need to develop its defensive autonomy, it seems unlikely that its member states will be inclined to align themselves with the US in the Middle East, in an effort for which neither NATO is adequately equipped, nor the partner countries have the political backing to embark on a military adventure that involves a 360° turn to the international initiative to denuclearise Iran, and which would make Europe the primary target of an asymmetrical war, and a destination for displaced persons. If we add to all this the geostrategic importance of the territories where Russia, Iran and China are located, in terms of commercial traffic and hydrocarbon supplies, it seems that the only substantive, as well as sensible, asset that the EU can play is the diplomatic route, following to some extent the Chinese trail, which has sided with Russia in the United Nations by blocking a Security Council resolution - which had previously been agreed upon - to condemn the attack on the American embassy in Baghdad after the US carried out the liquidation of Qassem Soleimani. 

Today, Xi Jinping has as little interest in a conflagration in his backyard as Ursula von der Leyen; both are aware that the benefit Russia and Trump would derive from the chaos in the region would be inversely proportional to the damage it would cause to China and the European Union, both of which are in need of stability so that they do not derail their respective political projects.

This is particularly true in the case of China, which has made huge strategic investments in the region. Although there is a more or less explicit bipartisan consensus in Washington based on the premise that the power of China - which lacks the energy resources supplied by Iran - must be contained and disputed, it is doubtful that the US State Department will succeed in dragging the Arab countries into its struggle for hegemony, given that China is by far the largest foreign direct investor in the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as the main buyer of crude oil, and is also the largest trading partner of the Arab states, with turnover rising to around 200 billion, and whose jewel in the crown is the telecommunications infrastructure, which is vital for the industrial development of the region to bring prosperity. 

It is possible to find parallels in the US reaction to this Chinese regional pre-eminence between the policy of harassment through sanctions against China and US policy towards Japan in the 1930s, when Japan's rapid industrial and economic growth, which depended on the import of raw materials that Japan lacked, led the Roosevelt government to impose economic sanctions to hinder Japan's progress in the Asian region, then dominated by the Western colonial powers. According to this approach, Iran would be another piece on the board, rather than a player, because the real game at stake has Washington and Beijing as players.

However, the similarities end here. Today's world is much more complex, dynamic, transparent and multilateral than that of the first half of the 20th century, so Donald Trump would make a miscalculation if he thought he could move Arab and NATO countries like chess pawns. In reality, however, Trump is most likely aware of the limited number of options available to him, among which he does not seem to favour the war solution.  On the contrary, the US president's compromise mentality would be more inclined to a negotiated solution with Ali Khamenei, which in itself opens the door for Vladimir Putin to pick the nuts off the tree that Trump has shaken by killing Soleimani. Both the White House and the Ayatollahs need a graceful way out of the situation created, especially after the death of the 176 Ukrainian passengers.  It seems unlikely that the conditions for direct negotiations between the two sides will be met, so it would not be surprising if Vladimir Putin were to take advantage of the situation to enhance his international stature by running for the post of mediator. There is no doubt that with every passing week, the chances of Trump risking war in an election period, after having made the banner of troop withdrawal, diminish. This being the case, if Putin were to extract sensitive concessions from Iran - concerning the duration of the agreement, the inspection mechanisms, and the destruction of facilities - in exchange for the lifting of the economic blockade, it would be possible to redress the situation by signing a new nuclear agreement, which would give Trump the chance to face re-election by presenting himself as a better negotiator than his predecessor. Who knows whether we will still see the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Putin, Trump and Khamenei.