Saudi Arabia's relations with the Islamic Republic represent a breakthrough in security, economic and international prestige, while the Israeli state looks on with suspicion

Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the war in Yemen as the keystone of the Middle East

PHOTO/ Agencia de Noticias Saba vía REUTERS - The head of the Houthi Supreme Political Council, Mahdi al-Mashat, meets with the Saudi and Omani delegations at the Republican Palace in Sanaa, Yemen, 9 April 2023

In the latest edition of "De cara al mundo", on Onda Madrid, we had the contribution of José Ignacio Castro Torres, Colonel of the Spanish Army, senior analyst at the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, who in an interview with Javier Fernández Arribas, made a brief analysis of the scenario of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia with reference to the war in Yemen and the possible effects that the rapprochement of Saudi-Iranian relations could have for Israel.

War in Yemen since 2014, largest humanitarian crisis in the world, can we finally expect peace in Yemen?

I would say yes, and it is to be celebrated, but with great caution. Of course, when we reach a situation in which these armed clashes cease, we should celebrate it because the humanitarian situation has been terrible. This conflict has taken around 400,000 people out of a population of more than 30 million. This shows the horror that has been experienced. Moreover, the humanitarian situation is deplorable and is making it difficult for humanitarian agencies to work much better and to get aid to the civilian population that needs it so much.

It should be borne in mind that Yemen, due to its holographic characteristics, tends to divide power. It is a country in which, as you go deeper into the intricate valleys, power is lost and is left in the hands of different factions. So there will always be disputes in Yemen. What is seen as necessary is to defuse these tensions as much as possible, which is very difficult. Will there be a ceasefire? We will have to try to somehow contain this ceasefire in the best possible way, but we will have to be very vigilant because it is possible that there will always be some kind of flare-up, not between government forces, with the Sufis or with the Houthis, with the former Southern Transitional Council, but we have to bear in mind that in the region there is al-Qaeda, Daesh and many other factions and armed groups.

Yemen could be the temperature of the agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia, because, as you explained, there may be some kind of confrontation, but if, for example, Iran stops financing and sending weapons to the Houthis, we understand that this type of armed confrontation will not take place. 

Yes, of course they will. First of all, we will have to see how it affects these two major regional actors. For the Saudi area, the region is a hornet's nest from which it has received attacks throughout the Arabian Peninsula, in which it has been involved and where it has lost economic and military resources, and, in addition, the international community has often put pressure on Saudi Arabia for its actions in Yemen, which has led to a significant loss of prestige and weight at the international level.

What is happening to Iran? If for Saudi Arabia it was a hornet's nest, for Iran it could become a mousetrap, because it is leaving a significant amount of economic and arms resources to support its proxies or allies in the region, such as the Sufis, at a time when the situation in Iran is not good economically.  Socially, the internal situation in Iran is very delicate. There is a large part of the population that feels disenchanted because they are worried about their internal problems and, in a way, because there is a very strong social criticism that Iran is using a lot of resources outside the country, when it really needs them. So I think that the balance of power between these two actors is a temperature rise between these two agreements.

And also to guarantee the total safety of the navigation of supertankers throughout the region, right?

Indeed, it should be borne in mind that often when we talk about the conflict in Yemen, we are talking about what is happening in the territory, but Yemen's coasts are a transit route for the main maritime routes. Indeed, those leaving the Strait of Hormuz pass through the coasts of Yemen, and go to cross the Strait of Bab el Mandeb and the Suez Canal, as well as all those that reach Africa and border the entire African continent, which means that the Yemeni coast is a very important area for maritime traffic.

At a time when Saudi Arabia is leading a peace process in the Middle East, resuming relations with Iran and Syria, and peace between Bahrain and Qatar, and maintaining relations with the United States, which may not like this agreement with Iran, while it continues to buy arms from the United States and continues to have agreements with them. What interests are behind it?

Indeed, there are many things to deal with. I think the main thing is that Saudi Arabia sees itself as a regional power, within the Gulf. Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has his Vision 2030 and sees his country as a hub of interconnected operations within the Greater Middle East region. Relations with Iran take away an important problem in the security sphere, in the economic sphere, in international prestige, and it is also important because both Iran and Saudi Arabia are part of China's Silk Road and Belt and Road strategy for both countries.

Both are important because they have communication routes running through them, because they are controlling maritime communication routes and, in a way, because they are rich countries with huge amounts of hydrocarbon resources, Iran has gas and oil, and Saudi Arabia has mostly oil, but also gas. In a way, China is a tempering factor in that Saudi Arabia also always has special relations with the United States, which is its main arms supplier. Relations not only with the big players, such as the United States and China, but also with the countries surrounding Saudi Arabia, which is interested in being the country that brings together the interests of the countries that are close to it. It is the largest actor in the Arabian Peninsula, and tends to be the point of reference on many occasions, which would confirm its status as a regional power.

What is Saudi Arabia looking for? Saudi Arabia already overcame a very important crisis it had with Qatar in 2017 that is behind it, and with which it now has good relations, both with Qatar and Bahrain. But Bahrain and Qatar, so to speak, could be the link or the weakest link in this whole link in the chain of the Arabian Peninsula that Saudi Arabia would like to have unified. So I think Saudi Arabia is looking for some kind of pragmatic arrangement there that would tend to unify both actors like Bahrain and Qatar. We will have to wait and see what, if in a way, the positions between other actors between Bahrain and Qatar are tempered a little bit. Bahrain should consider Qatar as an extremist actor in that it supports the Muslim Brotherhood, and in a way Qatar through its subtle power, its soft power, through its radio stations, such as Al Jazeera, should consider Bahrain as radical as it does, and by tempering all of that, a relationship could be reached.

Can the Middle East be seen as another stage in this cold war between China and the United States? This struggle between the two superpowers right now for world hegemony.

To get a glimpse of the current situation one would have to see and understand geopolitics from a nature's point of view, as nature will always have a horror for the vacuum. We must first look at the strategies of China and the United States in the region. First of all, Xi Jinping announced his "The Silk Road" initiative in 2013, in which he is betting on moving into the region and expanding. At the same time, Obama also announced in 2014 his strategy that takes him into the Asia-Pacific region, thus beginning a power shift that he is trying to fill in.

It can be seen that China is increasingly interested in these communication routes and in the enormous energy resources in the area, because China craves energy in order to grow; and yet the United States is not so concerned about this energy in the Gulf region, because it is becoming less and less dependent on it. Although I think the United States will always be interested in controlling the region, even if it gives up some of its power it can have a number of anchor points, or footholds from which it can control what happens in the region.

What about Israel's role now? With this agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, how do you see Israel's situation? Is it or is it not threatened by the possible nuclear weapons that both Iran and Saudi Arabia could obtain?

Israel's problem in the region is dangerous or at least worrying for them. Israel has recently enjoyed a period of détente following the signing of the Abraham Accords, which, as far as the Gulf region is concerned, both the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain were the countries in the region that recognised it, and relations with Saudi Arabia have so far been quite cordial, bearing in mind that they have a common adversary: Iran.

What is happening with this announcement of the establishment of relations fostered by China between Iran and Saudi Arabia? This rapprochement that Iran could have with Israel is very complicated and seems to me to be a long way off, sometimes it even seems impossible, although in the Gulf nothing is impossible, or in the Middle East nothing is impossible. The disappearance of the State of Israel, but not of the Jewish people, nor of the Israeli religion, has been a constant for Iran since the Ayatollahs' regime came to power, and here comes the emergence of China as a great power that seems likely to temper relations somewhat, so we will have to follow it very carefully.

I think Israel is very cautious and waiting to see what happens, because it is afraid of how events might evolve and, if the Gulf countries' rapprochement with Iran were to intensify, it is possible that the ties between the Gulf countries and Israel would weaken. I think we should take this with caution and see what will happen in the coming months with these two links. Right now, with the vision we have of the tension in the Greater Middle East, if there is a rapprochement between the Gulf countries and Iran, there should be a weakening of the link between the Gulf countries and Israel, pending the factor that China can contribute and how, in theory, these relations could be tempered.

Is it daydreaming to think that freedom and a degree of democracy could come to Iran right now?

Nothing is impossible. I believe that such a change would still have to wait at least a generation. We have to bear in mind that there is one factor that still holds a generation together, which was the generation of the Iran-Iraq war. That generation still exists and maintains the strong bond they had with their revolution and the Ayatollahs' regime. At the same time, we are seeing a second generation of young people trying to fight for their rights, but I think Iran still has a long way to go before change can happen.