Western Sahara: clarifications on Spain's change of position
The war in Ukraine and its economic consequences in Spain, translated into higher prices for raw materials and fuel, as well as strikes and protests in key sectors such as agriculture and transport, have been joined this month by a new destabilising factor: the prime minister's decision to change his position on Western Sahara, legitimising the Moroccan autonomy proposal as "the most serious, credible and realistic basis for the resolution of this dispute"1. Spain thus changed the consensus it had maintained until now in this dispute - which was to sponsor a referendum on self-determination under the auspices of the United Nations - to recognise Moroccan aspirations over Western Sahara.
At first glance, the reaction to this change of position in the political and social spheres was to condemn the shift as a betrayal of the Saharawi cause. The media are full of opinion articles and manifestos accusing the government of betraying the Saharawi people, there have been protests against it, and the Spanish turn has been rejected by the entire political spectrum except for the Socialists2. It seems that there is discord between the government and society on this issue, which - a priori - could influence the government to revert to its decision before 18 March, the date on which the change was announced.
Why is the Sahara so important for Spain? Are we the only country to have made this shift? What benefits can we draw from the Spanish government's change of position?
Let us begin by outlining why Western Sahara is so important for Spain.
This region, located south of Morocco, east of Algeria and Mauritania and west of Spain - 500 kilometres from the Canary Islands - was a Spanish colony. Rather than a Spanish colony in the classical sense of the term - a territory not incorporated into the colonising country - Western Sahara was the Province 53 and its citizens were treated as Spaniards. Proof of this are the stamps of the time with allegories of the area and the photos and insignia of personnel who spent time there, both active military personnel and conscripts doing their military service, as well as their families who recall with nostalgia the years they spent there. These ties grew stronger after the more than questionable Spanish withdrawal from the territory in 1976, which was forged in the heat of Franco's death throes and exploited by Morocco through the Green March to launch its sovereignty in the area. This hasty departure degenerated into a conflict between the Polisario Front, which wanted full independence for the Sahara, and Morocco. The war lasted until 1991, when an agreement was reached to establish a referendum on self-determination under the auspices of the United Nations, which maintains a mission on the ground for this purpose: MINURSO. Since then, the referendum has not taken place, the Saharawis languish in refugee camps in Algeria or are repressed in the Moroccan-controlled territory. In Spain, the Sahara remains alive thanks to the sympathy that the Saharawi cause - perceived as a legitimate struggle between oppressed and oppressors - has in Spanish society. Examples of this are the reception of Sahrawi children from the refugee camps in summer, the political sympathies at national and regional level for the Polisario cause, as well as its echo of solidarity in the world of culture, with the Bardem brothers at the forefront.
While it is true that this sympathy explains the broad political and social rejection of the prime minister's decision, it must be acknowledged that the geopolitical situation of this conflict has changed, and that we must adapt to it.
Whether we like it or not, Spain has to get along with Morocco.
To do so, we have to assume that they see the Sahara as their territory - the Southern Provinces - and that any gesture of criticism of that position is viewed with great disfavour. Especially if we bear in mind that Rabat uses migratory pressure towards Spain - which in most cases has to pass through Morocco, due to its obvious proximity to Spain - as an effective weapon of blackmail to influence bilateral relations. And yes, this gives the impression that we are Morocco's puppets, calling into question our already diminished capacity to defend our foreign policy interests. But Morocco is a key partner in the fight against terrorism and there is fluid cooperation here. It is also a key trading partner. A fact that has been little talked about is the importance of border trade between Ceuta and Melilla with Morocco. The Alawi decision to close the borders in March 2020, at the beginning of the pandemic, was a severe blow to the economy of the autonomous cities, which depend on this trade for their livelihood. To give you an idea of the importance of trade in 2020, Ceuta and Melilla lost 18 million and 50 million euros respectively in the equivalent of VAT as a result of the closure of the borders3. It is therefore understandable that both regional presidents, well aware of the reality on the ground, are cautious but optimistic about the president's decision, which will most likely allow them, with the reopening of the border, to heal their fragile economies4.
We must also understand that we are not alone in this change of position. I do not mean that we are following in the footsteps of the United States, France and Germany, but also African countries, which are also engaged in diplomacy.
Morocco's return to the African Union in July 2016 - coincidentally at the same time as Brahim Ghali's appointment as Polisario leader - was made possible by a shift on the continent towards Morocco's thesis on the Sahara. While this shift is not unanimous - Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa still support the Polisario - regional heavyweights such as Senegal did support the motion tabled that month calling for the suspension of the Polisario's membership of the African Union, as did politically and economically prosperous Ghana and Zambia. This is evidenced by the opening of African countries' consulates in Western Sahara in recent years, indicating that economic opportunities (solar energy, trade) outweigh passions in African diplomacy5.
In the West, if France and Germany adopted the African position of prioritising long-term economic benefits over short-term political interests, it is logical that Spain, which enjoys an enviable geographical position to invest in Morocco, should change tack. The benefits would not only be international, but also regional. Remembering that Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands are poor regions with fragile economies dependent on sectors subject to global political instability - tourism and trade - the opportunities for economic diversification, land, air and maritime connectivity, educational, cultural and linguistic improvements (let us not underestimate the power of Arabic, Berber and French in doing business in Morocco) will benefit Spain.
In conclusion, the Spanish government's decision to legitimise the Moroccan position as the best option for Western Sahara, overturning the hitherto held consensus on the primacy of the UN to resolve the conflict, met with widespread political and social rejection. While this rejection is legitimate, so is the fact that we have to get along with Morocco, whether we like it or not. Rabat is a key partner in the fight against terrorism as it is in trade. Moreover, we are not alone in legitimising Moroccan theses: in addition to France, Germany and the United States, economically stable African countries such as Senegal, Zambia and Ghana have opened consulates in the Sahara. If they were able to look beyond political passions and see the enormous economic potential of Western Sahara, so can Spain. If we do so, not only the entire nation will benefit, but also the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, which border Morocco and have fragile economies, because in addition to diversifying their economies, they will gain much in air, land and sea connectivity and cultural exchanges.
Let us accept the reality and seek the benefits they can bring us.
1 La carta de Pedro Sánchez a Mohamed VI: “Debemos construir una nueva relación que evite futuras crisis”, El País, marzo del 2022, https://elpais.com/espana/2022-03-23/la-carta-de-pedro-sanchez-a-mohamed-vi-debemos-construir-una-nueva-relacion-que-evite-futuras-crisis.html
2 See: Más de un centenar de abogados de Canarias firman un manifiesto en defensa del pueblo saharaui, Canarias Ahora, marzo del 2022, https://www.eldiario.es/canariasahora/internacional/centenar-abogados-canarias-firman-manifiesto-defensa-pueblo-saharaui_1_8863058.html y Pedro Sánchez traiciona al pueblo saharaui, La Provincia, marzo del 2022, https://www.laprovincia.es/opinion/2022/03/28/pedro-sanchez-traiciona-pueblo-saharaui-64373023.html
3 Sáhara: El miedo al incontrolable vecino marroquí en Ceuta y Melilla, El País, marzo del 2022, https://elpais.com/espana/2022-03-31/ceuta-y-melilla-el-miedo-a-un-vecino-incontrolable.html
4 Los presidentes de Ceuta y Melilla celebran el acuerdo con Marruecos: “La presión migratoria bajará sin duda”, El Mundo, marzo del 2022, https://www.elmundo.es/espana/2022/03/22/623a30b5fdddff98208b458a.html
5 See: “Consulados” abiertos en los territorios ocupados del Sahara Occidental, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, marzo del 2022, https://www.usc.gal/es/institutos/ceso/Consulados-en-el-Sahara-Occidental-.html