Post-Maduro: what changes in Morocco's forecasts and the Western Sahara issue?
From this perspective, the post-Maduro era is of particular importance to Morocco with regard to the Western Sahara issue, as it could reshape the landscape of positions that have been used for years to counter Morocco's stance on the matter. The question today is not what will become of Caracas, but what will change in the diplomatic map on which the Polisario Front relies, especially in Latin America and among its allies in Morocco's neighbourhood, and what possible gains Morocco can make in the post-Maduro era.
Historically, there have been no disputes between Morocco and Venezuela, and relations between the two countries have remained normal. But with the rise of Hugo Chávez, Venezuelan foreign policy gradually shifted towards supporting separatist movements beyond its borders, a trend that has continued under Maduro since he came to power in 2013. Support for the Polisario Front has become a constant feature of his political and diplomatic discourse. As a result, Rabat decided to close its embassy in Caracas in 2009. This measure was not so much an escalation on Morocco's part as a reaffirmation of its sovereign principles regarding a conflict that has persisted for more than 50 years between Morocco and the Polisario Front, a conflict recently resolved by UN Resolution 2797 in favour of the Moroccan autonomy initiative.
From my personal perspective, I believe that recent events in Venezuela represent an indirect gain for Morocco, opening an important window of strategic opportunity. This is not simply due to the fall of an adversary, but to the elimination of a voice that actively defended the separatist cause. The first potential benefit of this change is the weakening of Venezuela's role, considered the Polisario's political gateway to Latin America and a prominent voice within the leftist blocs that promoted the separatist cause under the pretext of self-determination. Therefore, the absence of Maduro's Venezuela today does not necessarily mean that all countries on the continent will become pro-Morocco, but it significantly reduces the intensity of alliances against it and limits the separatist cause's ability to find political support there.
The second benefit relates to Venezuela's own future. Any new leadership will face enormous economic and social challenges, forcing it to focus on rebuilding the state and achieving internal stability, rather than pursuing a geographically distant conflict. Consequently, this provides Morocco with room for manoeuvre, without direct intervention, to realign regional and international diplomatic priorities in a manner that favours its interests and national cause.
The third benefit, in my view, will be reflected in Morocco's relations with some neighbouring countries that had opted for a separatist stance on the Western Sahara issue for reasons rooted in outdated ideologies, rather than a realistic assessment of international developments. This stance is gradually losing its effectiveness and declining in a world now driven by pragmatism and flexible interests. From this perspective, the loss of an ally for the Polisario Front and its supporters in the region creates a more favourable environment for the negotiations envisaged in UN Resolution 2797 last October. This resolution supports the proposal for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty and urges all parties — Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and the Polisario Front — to engage in negotiations without preconditions to resolve the conflict politically and definitively.
The fourth benefit is that the absence of Venezuela's voice against Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara leaves a vacuum that Morocco can exploit. This can be achieved not only through direct political pressure, but also by strengthening its economic and diplomatic influence in the region and consolidating its relations with Latin American countries facing economic, social and security challenges. These countries are currently seeking investment, development and stability, and these circumstances could enable Morocco to make progress that was previously impossible.
For me, the fifth and most important benefit relates to Morocco's image in the world. While Morocco was expanding recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Sahara, opening consulates in Laayoune and Dakhla, and establishing major projects in the southern provinces, such as the Morocco-Nigeria gas pipeline, the Atlantic Initiative and the Grand Port of Dakhla, the Venezuelan regime was facing isolation, sanctions and an economic crisis. This provided Rabat with an opportunity to strengthen its position as a reliable partner, particularly with the United States, which considers it a stable country capable of managing sensitive regional issues. It also gives Morocco greater influence in the region and allows it to leverage its position in practical and tangible ways.
Ultimately, Maduro's downfall does not represent a direct victory for Morocco, but it transforms the Latin American political landscape and removes one of the most important obstacles that sustained the Polisario Front after its immediate sphere of influence. Morocco now has a strategic opportunity that it can seize by repositioning its diplomacy in line with its interests and principles, and by building a new network of economic and diplomatic relations that serves its strategic interests, with a focus on strengthening its position on the Sahara issue.
Dr Amal Jabbour, journalist from Jordan