Is the Israel-Hamas conflict fuelling anti-Semitism in Spain?

Since May 10, when hostilities broke out between the Israeli government and Hamas, and while waiting for data from the Observatory of Anti-Semitism in Spain to reveal whether these events have increased anti-Semitism in Spain in the coming year, everything suggests that both the Israeli state and the so-called "pro-Palestinian" organisations will make strategic moves to win international support and consolidate a favourable public opinion.

On the one hand, "pro-Palestinian" positions are unlikely to have much impact due to the weakening of the BDS campaigns. This movement, which since its creation in 2005 has sought to "revive popular mobilisation as part of the strategy for changing the balance of power with Zionism at the international level" through boycott, divestment and sanctions against the State of Israel, has been weakened despite its heyday since 2014. Such splendour was shaped by the rise of representative forces such as Podemos¹, Izquierda Unida and other organisations (Unadikum among others) and political parties of the radical extreme left that have governed at local, regional, autonomous and state level.

The decline of BDS and similar movements is largely due to the events of July 2020 when Spain's vice-president, Carmen Calvo, endorsed the government's willingness to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) definition of anti-Semitism.

Following the recommendations of the European Union, the Spanish state endorsed the operational definition of "anti-Semitism", which is not legally binding:

"Anti-Semitism is a certain perception of Jews that can be expressed as hatred of Jews. Physical and rhetorical manifestations of anti-Semitism are directed at Jewish or non-Jewish persons and/or their property, the institutions of Jewish communities and their places of worship".

Contemporary examples of anti-Semitism are observed, in public life, in the media, in schools, in the workplace and in the religious sphere and, taking into account the general context, could consist of:

• - Calling for, supporting or justifying killing or harming Jews, in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
• - Making false, dehumanising, perverse or stereotypical accusations about Jews, as such, or about the power of Jews as a collective, for example, but not exclusively, the myth of a global Jewish conspiracy or Jewish control of the media, the economy, government or other institutions of society.
• - Accusing Jews as the people responsible for harm, real or imagined, committed by a Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.
• - Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people in National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
•   Timermans, A. (2015). ¿Podemos? Madrid, España: ultimalínea.
• - blaming the Jews as a people or Israel as a state for inventing or applying double standards by asking Israel to behave in ways not expected or required of any other democratic country.
• - Using symbols and images associated with classical anti-Semitism (e.g. slanders such as the murder of Jesus by Jews or bloody rituals) to characterise Israel or Israelis,
• - Drawing comparisons between Israel's current policy and that of the Nazis.
• - Holding Jews responsible for the actions of the State of Israel.
• - Anti-Semitic acts are considered criminal offences at the time of their criminalisation (e.g. Holocaust denial or distribution of anti-Semitic material in some countries).
• - Criminal acts are considered anti-Semitic when the targets of the attacks, whether persons or property - such as buildings, schools, places of worship and cemeteries - are selected because they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or Jewish-related.
• - Anti-Semitic discrimination is the denial to Jews of opportunities or services available to others (including boycott campaigns) and is illegal in many countries.

For all these reasons, and despite being considered anti-Semitic today, it is expected that there will be an increase in academic boycott campaigns (residual compared to what has happened in recent years) organised by the main "pro-Palestinian" organisations, and BDS itself. Something similar to the campaigns that took place years ago through stable collectives in different universities such as the UAM, Taula per Palestina in the UIB, Asamblea Universitaria Palestina in UAIB, Asamblea Universitaria Palestina-AUPA in the University of Alicante, the solidarity collectives of the Polytechnic University of Catalonia, the University of the Basque Country and other more recent ones such as those produced in the Public University of Navarre.

Moreover, it would be nothing new if all kinds of economic boycotts (also to a lesser extent) against "Brand Israel" were to resume. Focusing mainly on attacking Israeli businesses in Spain linked to agriculture, energy, chemistry, technology, armaments or the famous boycott campaigns by RESCOP (Spanish Network of Solidarity with Palestine). These campaigns, under the slogan "Don't buy apartheid", were based on boycotting five specific products: dates, Ahava and Premier domestic products, Imaginarium, Rumikub and SodaStream^2. 

However, these movements do not seem likely to have the reach they had in previous years (2017-2018) because of the limitations imposed on them by the new definition of anti-Semitism and the practices they are accustomed to developing. A clear example of the frustrations this entails was the intervention of Íñigo Errejón Galván. The MP for Madrid from Más País, in the Plural parliamentary group, which under the provisions of article 185 of the Rules of Procedure of the House, presented a series of questions in which he questioned whether this series of examples of anti-Semitism could collide with the right to freedom of expression and opinion. It argued that these rights protect the public expression of political opinions, including those relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict³.  

What is worrying, however, is that the events in Israel in recent weeks are increasing the (re)emergence of anti-Semitism, new anti-Semitism or neo-Antisemitism - no longer by the aforementioned political parties or certain "pro-Palestinian" organisations - but by individual actors promoting hatred via the internet.

"This new form of "Jew-hatred" is justified by the arrival of refugees, the creation of the state of Israel, the radicalisation of the left in relation to the discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the political reconfiguration of the European right and the emergence of radical Islam... along with the denunciations of Israel's alleged genocidal tendencies towards the Arab population of the occupied territories.
 

Thus, such a reconfiguration of anti-Semitism or anti-Zionism⁴ - also known as anti-Zionist anti-Semitism or anti-Zionist anti-Semitism - has increased in recent decades, taking place in new contexts such as social networks. Thus, in the aftermath of the conflict (if the conflict is ended), repercussions are expected to move away from the old personal confrontations, damage to property and goods (more linked to extreme right-wing movements) - without being eliminated - to move into the technological sphere under the cover of anonymity.

In contrast, the "pro-Israeli" response in Spain is expected to hold firm to the model adopted in recent years but with one point in its favour, the much talked-about new definition of anti-Semitism, which will limit the actions and statements of "pro-Palestinian" political parties and organisations.

Thus, Israeli propaganda (known in Hebrew as hasbara) does not even attempt to discuss BDS. Nevertheless, there are organisations such as ACOM which, through the courts, is dedicated to overturning anti-Semitic motions of socialists and communists in Spain (a total of 79) and other new trials against bigots such as Isabel Peralta.

Israel's hasbara-based strategy will continue to project, internationally and therefore in Spain, the image of a normalised, developed and civilised country, with culture, along with the university and science, being one of its favourite channels. They will increase their efforts to conquer spaces in cultural events, festivals (the much-attacked pinkwhasing and gay tourism), production companies, professional organisations and the media⁵.
 

The consolidated diplomatic relations established since 1986⁶ will hardly be affected, mainly due to the diverse and growing economic cooperation between the two countries. There are many Israeli companies established in Spain and numerous joint ventures operating mainly in the fields of agriculture, chemicals, renewable energies, telecommunications, software, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals. In addition, these economic relations are overseen by institutions such as the Spain-Israel Chamber of Commerce and Industry and its Catalan branch, the Sedarad-Israel Centre and the commercial offices of the respective embassies. 

As if that were not enough, Spain and Israel have a growing relationship in technology and armaments since a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation was signed in 2010.  All this without forgetting the strong Spanish investment in Israel through companies such as Sacyr, Dragados, Renfe, Adif, Solaer, Abengoa, Izizar, Seat, Cremades ¬ Calvo Sotelo, Inditex, and tourism.

Jacobo Salvador Micó Faus, researcher on anti-Semitism and analyst in international terrorism.
 

1. Timermans, A. (2015). ¿Podemos? Madrid, España: ultimalínea
2.   Gómez, L. (2014). BDS por Palestina. Madrid, España: Ediciones del oriente y mediterráneo.
3.   Errejón Galván, I. (22-02-2021 a las 16:46). Pregunta Escrita IHRA. Madrid, España: Congreso de los Diputados Secretaria General.
4.   Klenicka, L. (2018). Fundamentos Metafísicos del antisemitismo, Zaragoza, España: Certeza Riopiedras
5.   Gómez, L. (2014). BDS por Palestina…op.cit.,
6. Lisbona, J. A. (2002). España e Israel, Historia de unas relaciones secretas. Madrid, España: Temas` de hoy.