Opinion

Tunisia, a booming jihadist hotbed

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Updated: 13/11/20

The Tunisian state "has prioritised the prevention of attacks and the dismantling of terrorist cells but has failed to develop systematic approaches to curb radicalisation and the conditions which facilitate it"ⁱ.

The gathering of Jihadists in Tunisian prisons during the first decade of the 2000s made it possible to establish links between three generations of terrorists: those who had joined the transnational Jihad in Afghanistan under al-Qaeda and those who had taken part in the Iraq war, in addition to the political prisoners condemned by Ben Ali's government. During this period Tunisian prisons became a hotbed of Jihadism and radicalisation.ⁱⁱ

In 2011, after Ben Ali's fall, an amnesty was established, releasing almost 2,500 political prisoners, many of them now radicalised. Among them were Abu Lyad, Khamis Essid and Mehdi Kammoun, who founded the first legal radical Islamist-salafist organization in Tunisia, Ansar al-Sharia (AST), composed of individuals with experience abroad. This group's vision was to act through the dawwa and social action, avoiding the use of the Jihad, establishing relations with Libya and growing from 2,000 to 10,000 members in just one yearⁱⁱⁱ. It took on particular strength in the southern areas of Tunisia, areas where the main members of Ennahda had been imprisoned, and areas of the midwest, near Algeria.^iV

In 2012 al-Qaeda entered the fray, accusing the Troika government of being traitors by allowing itself to be manipulated by the United States and betraying the Tunisian people, encouraging them to fight through the Jihad for the implementation of the Sharia, and supporting and financing AST. From this moment on, the number of members of the Tunisian organisation increased to 70,000 in 2014^V, as did the number of foreign fighters AST sent to Syria^Vi.

Despite the fact that Ansar al-Sharia had publicly established the dawwa as his course of action, the Troika government blamed them for the attacks on the US embassy in 2012, against the American school in Tunis^Vii and the murder of Anis Jelassi, an officer of the Tunisian National Guard^Viii , resulting in the splitting of Ansar al-Sharia Tunis (AST) and Ansar al-Sharia Libya (ASL), which discredited the Tunisian branch for its violence^iV . That same year the government identified KUBN for the first time as one of the perpetrators of the 2012 attacks, linking it to AQIM and al-Qaeda's attempts to establish itself in the country^x.

The turning point in AST came in 2013, after it was declared a terrorist organisation by the government and a major operation was conducted to persecute and dismantle the group and all its networks as a result of a series of murders of political personalities. Many of the members of AST left the country to join the ASL, KUBN or the Jihad in Syria by joining the al-Nusra or Daesh front. However, the connections established in the past with the GICT and therefore al-Qaeda enabled AST to receive economic and logistic funding, helping it to establish itself in the Chaambi Mountains and with the recruitment and sending of militants to the conflict zones^xi.

Following the declaration of AST as a terrorist organisation, there was a rise in the ranks of KUBN, which led to the idea that they were one and the same organisation, with AST being the political branch and KUBN the militant, providing foreign fighters in Algeria, Mali and areas of the Sahel^xii.

Among the focuses of radicalisation are mosques, people with psychological problems, environments related to the world of drugs and prisons. During the Bourguiba and Ben Ali governments, members, especially returnees, of various jihadist organisations with plans to rearm, have been brought together in these mosques; this has favoured the creation of a system of networks between various organisations, thus promoting the recruitment of followers^xiii. The turning point in this problem comes in 2011, with the aforementioned amnesty of 2,460 prisoners^xiv, in addition to the over 11,000 prison escapees following the fall of Ben Ali^xv.

A relevant fact to bear in mind is the fact that 99 percent of the Tunisian population is Sunni, facilitating Jihadist sectarianism and its march towards Syria or Iraq^xvi. In only six years over 6,000 of Tunisia's 30,000 foreign fighters managed to reach their destination^xvii, most of them aided or abetted by the Libyan route^xviii.

The reason for the current problem lies in the mismanagement of the returnee flows by the Tunisian government, which has turned Tunisian prisons into a hotbed of Jihadism and has failed to implement prevention and reintegration measures, as its action is focused solely on mass and arbitrary arrests, and the state itself is the driving force behind the radicalisation of its citizens.

The profile of the returned foreign fighters could be summarised as follows (Sample of 82 individuals arrested by the Tunisian authorities in 2017 for terrorist implications -The Royal Institute for International Relations^xix)

63.4% of those detained in 2017 were returnees from Syria and Libya, of whom 55% were aged 20-29 and were single men. 36.6% belonged to cells on Tunisian soil.

EDUCATION: Educational dropout: +40%; Reasons: 25% school failure, 4% expulsion from the centre and 14% lack of hope for the future.
ECONOMY: 9% unemployed (lower ratio than the national one); 78% had a monthly salary: 25% around 220 euros and 22% between 60-90 euros. Illegal business; State aid: only 19.5%.
RELIGION: Mostly Islam as a form of identity. Having obtained family recognition once the jihad was launched.
TROUBLES: Situation of multi-sector insecurity: feeling of injustice (90% of them); geographical, family and social factors^xx; alcohol and drug consumption from an early age^xxi; +50% depressive disorder, before or after its radicalization (post-traumatic stress disorders in returnees).^xxii

In addition to including among the main grievances the measures carried out by the Government of Tunisia^xxiii:

- Returnees in the 1990s: 95% of returnees were detained or placed under surveillance. Only 35% were sent to prison. Many without being tried: arbitrary system. Many escaped or were released.

- From 2015: Criminalisation of membership of or co-operation with a terrorist organisation inside and outside Tunisia, ordering the arrest of any suspect in a conflict zone. Massive arrests that led to the concentration of Jihadists in prisons lacking programmes of de-radicalisation or social reintegration. Measures of intimidation and social isolation (radicalisation offences). Measures after release: 4-5 year surveillance, making a return to daily life and re-socialisation and economic improvement impossible. Ban on children born outside Tunisia to foreign fighters and ban to leave the country to Libya or Turkey for those under 35. Construction of an anti-terrorist wall on the Libyan border and its militarisation; in parallel: increase in corruption in the area by military institutions.

- 2018-2019: Increase in the Ministry of Defence's portfolio by 31 per cent (20 times that of Culture). Excessive investment in defence that has left educational programmes, religious institutions, cultural programmes and women's development programmes without resources. Decrease in development processes, especially in the area of economic opportunities for the young population.

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