Tunisia, the scourge of terrorism
In late 2010 and early 2011, the so-called Arab Spring, in the case of Tunisia, "Jasmine Revolution"1, will take place This was mainly due to the abuses of authoritarian regimes during the Bourguiba and Ben Ali dictatorships. Within the differences between countries, it is possible to see some common minimums such as the violation of human rights, restrictive legislation, evident gender inequality and serious economic crises.2
The revolts that took place were mainly led by young people, constituting 60% of the population3 and 19% in terms of unemployment rates, in their search for rights and freedoms with a view to their future. Due to the characteristics of the population that integrates and promotes these movements, there are often discrepancies with the Islamists4, who follow more pragmatic lines that clash with the claims on the protection and guarantee of rights, the updating of unemployment benefits, stimulating job creation and the participation of young people and women in political life5.
The Ben Ali government responded to the protests with a harsh police repression, which had an antagonistic effect, promoting the expansion and increase of the protests6, using the police as a political means of repression7.
The Arab Spring has led to a wave of sectarian violence throughout the Arab world, increasing instability in all areas. The appearance of the Daesh has been the most destabilising factor. Following the establishment of the Caliphate, Tunisian organisations such as Jund al-Khilafa (JAK-T) and the Soldiers of the Caliphate (Algerian-Tunisian) swore loyalty to it, considering that AQIM had strayed from the true path, in addition to the propaganda and use the organisation made of the media and internet, calling on the Tunisian people that same year to join the Jihad in Syria. This led to a widespread belief in the need for the armed Jihad to impose the Shariah as the only way of saving the Ummah. Salafism-Jihadism took advantage of society's frustration with the political system and its derivatives to offer them a religiously guided path of assistance, providing Tunisian youths, particularly those on the margins, with a reason to fight, introducing a purpose into their lives that would give them hope for the future. A solidarity struggle for the liberation of all Muslim brothers and sisters oppressed in the Arab world, both by Western invaders and by their own governments. Finding in Syria and Iraq the best scenario to express this solidarity motivation8 . The long period of dictatorship in Tunisia resulted in a population easily influenced 9.
The pockets of radicalisation were mainly concentrated around economically affected areas and close to the borders of Algeria and Libya. The Tunisian government, followed by the government of Sidi Bouzid, in addition to Ariana, Jenouba, Medenine and Bizerte, are particularly noteworthy. The main reasons for this include having been a refuge for amnestied prisoners and prison escapees, being a haven for weapons from various organisations such as AST, having a weak economy revolving around smuggling and the proximity of the borders of conflictive countries such as Libya and Algeria.
However, it has been proven that economic or educational marginalisation is not the only aggravating factor towards radicalisation, as many young Tunisians from the upper-middle class, students at private universities, engineers, technology experts and translators have also joined the Jihadists, and it is evident that marginalisation or dubious future prospects affect all kinds of individuals. Studies conducted by CTERT (2016) and Sterman and Rosenblatt (2018)10 conclude that 98 per cent of foreign fighters in Syria were Tunisian, 70 per cent of them trained in camps in Libya and 75 per cent were under 35. Seventy percent of them had secondary education and only three percent had been unemployed, thus breaking the common patterns of radicalisation and Jihadist recruitment11.
An example of these data is the author of the attack in Nice on 29 October, Brahim Aouissaoui, 21, who belongs to a lower-middle class, working class family and is the brother of eight sisters and two brothers. He had dropped out of school to start working at a young age and had become socially isolated in recent years, during which time he focused entirely on religion. With problems with alcohol and drugs and a police record in 2016 for a knife attack. The attack has not been claimed by any terrorist organisation, although his relationship with the Ansar al Mahdi group, allegedly linked to Daesh, is known12.
In Salafism-Jihadism they find an alternative to gain recognition, authority and social influence13.
With the rise of radical Islamism, terrorism emerged in Tunisia, endangering mainly the economy of the country, which lives off tourism, which is under direct attack, in addition to driving away investors. Aware of the need for international co-operation, particularly with its neighbouring countries, Libya and Algeria, attempts have been made to carry out counterterrorist plans, particularly with the help of the United States, which have not been very successful owing to Libya's political instability14.
Among the focuses of radicalisation are the mosques, environments related to the world of drugs or people with psychological problems, where people with a history of alcoholism and drug dependency, both conditions contrary to Muslim morality, have been frankly weak for radicalisation; and the prisons, in which, during the Bourguiba and Ben Ali governments, members of Jihadist organisations, radicalised individuals who have served to establish networks between the different organisations, as well as a means of attracting followers, have been brought together. Taking the amnesty of 2011 as a key factor, releasing prisoners belonging to the global jihad who were pursuing rearmament plans16.
The Jihadist returnees and the mosques are the main concern about the terrorist problem in Tunisia. Not to mention the over 11,000 inmates who have escaped from Tunisian prisons following the fall of Ben Ali18, in addition to the 2,460 released by the 2011 amnesty.
A particularly relevant point is the fact that 99 percent of the Tunisian population is Sunni, and the sectarianism that characterises Jihadism has come to light, with many of them being forced to leave for Syria or Iraq to combat Assad's regime after attacking this community, in addition to helping to eliminate any apostate society.
In only six years, over 30,000 Tunisians attempted to march into Syria and Iraq, of the actual number of around 6,00020, most of whom were helped or encouraged by the Libyan route and links mentioned earlier21.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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3-Edad comprendida entre 14 y 24 años.
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