The Iranian uprising: a shift from social protest to challenging repressive sovereignty?

1. Conceptual framework: State, violence, and obedience
2. From protest to asymmetrical violent confrontation
3. Radicalization as a structural, not ideological, phenomenon
4. The situation of pre-dual power
5. The collapse of obedience
6. Analytical synthesis

Has the ongoing uprising in Iran moved beyond the stage of “social protest” and entered a phase that political science refers to as a “qualitative transition of the uprising”? Signs of this transition—such as the disarmament of the forces of repression, direct clashes with special units, and the collapse of the deterrent effect of state violence—are now visible almost everywhere. Drawing on classical and contemporary theories of the state, revolution, and social movements, it can be argued that this phase is not simply a temporary escalation, but the beginning of a structural situation that simultaneously challenges the legitimacy, effectiveness, and monopoly of state power (violence).

1. Conceptual framework: State, violence, and obedience

The theoretical starting point for this analysis is based on Max Weber's classic definition of the state: a state whose existence is based on the monopoly of legitimate violence. As long as this monopoly is maintained—even in a context of widespread social discontent—protests remain at the level of a “political challenge” and do not lead to fundamental change.

But once the instruments of repression slip from the hands of government forces and pass into the hands of the population, state violence ceases to be a deterrent and exclusive.

Dozens of examples of the disarmament of the forces of repression have been observed in recent days in Iran. In Tous, in the province of Khorasan, young insurgents intercepted a bus carrying forces of the Islamic Republic, disarmed them, and tied them up. Several similar cases have been reported in Isfahan (Si-o-se-pol Bridge), Shiraz (Ma'ali Abad district), and Tehran. When a young insurgent in Naziabad (Greater Tehran) snatched a stun gun from an officer and used it against him, it became clear that the security forces were suffering losses on the ground.

Similarly, on January 6, in the city of Malekshahi (Ilam province), special units suffered losses, fled in fear, and the city virtually fell under the control of the insurgents. The same scenario occurred on the same day in Abdanan, also in Ilam province. The regime is thus entering a phase that can be described as an erosion of the state's coercive capacity.

2. From protest to asymmetrical violent confrontation

In social movement theory, a protest “changes phase” when it moves from symbolic action to material action directed against the power structure. This stage is generally interpreted as the result of a transformation in the collective cost-benefit calculation: in other words, the cost of obedience to the regime becomes higher than that of resistance.

An example widely shared on Iranian social media illustrates this shift. In response to a friend who advises him not to participate in the protests, a young man declares:

"Why shouldn't I go and protest? My income doesn't cover my expenses. I work from morning to night. What do I have to fear losing? My parents are wasting away before my eyes and there's nothing I can do about it. My mother's dream is to see me in a wedding suit, but my own dream is to die tomorrow. Why shouldn't I go? Let me go, at least so I don't go to sleep every night with a guilty conscience. So that tomorrow, if my child asks me, ‘What did you do?’, I won't have to answer, ‘Nothing.’ Every night, the thought that it's already too late torments me until morning. Why shouldn't I go? It's really too late. We have endured too much. I've had enough [he points to his throat]. I can't take it anymore. I'm going. If you come too, great. If not, at least don't forget me."

Social fear gives way to collective boldness.

Whether it is the young woman who stood alone in front of a water cannon to stop a military column, the young people who sat down in the middle of the street to block the advance of the forces of repression, or the insurgents who, through collective action, freed some of their arrested comrades, all these acts clearly illustrate the replacement of social fear by collective courage.

This means that state violence is losing its function. At this stage, the uprising enters what can be called an insurrectionary phase of confrontation—not necessarily a conventional armed war, but a direct and asymmetrical clash with the apparatus of repression.

3. Radicalization as a structural, not ideological, phenomenon

Contrary to official discourse, which attributes “radicalization” to foreign influences or ideologies, academic literature most often considers it a structural reaction. One theorist shows that revolutions do not begin with the radicalization of the people, but with the state's inability to exercise its power—in other words, with the growing ineffectiveness of repression.

In Iran today, despite the expansion and diversity of its repressive forces (multiple intelligence services, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Basij, police forces, etc.), particularly after the regime's regional setbacks and the 12-day war with Israel, this apparatus appears functionally worn out and fragmented, incapable of providing a lasting deterrent.

This situation has made direct action by the population possible. Although many people are being arrested, families are no longer intimidated: they gather in front of prisons and detention centers to demand the release of their children. Thus, the disarmament of the forces of repression is a clear indicator that the uprising has entered a new phase.

4. The situation of pre-dual power

In political literature, the notion of “dual power” refers to a moment when two rival centers of authority coexist simultaneously in the same territory. But before that, there is an intermediate phase that can be described as follows:

• official power remains in place;
• but its authority is not exercised everywhere or permanently;
• in certain areas, it is society that takes the initiative.

This situation is referred to in contemporary literature by concepts such as contested sovereignty or pre-dual power phase. An example of this was observed on January 6 in the cities of Abdanan and Malekshahi, in the province of Ilam. The disarmament of the repressive forces and their de facto withdrawal are classic signs of the onset of this phase.

5. The collapse of obedience

Another theorist makes a fundamental distinction between power and violence:

power arises from collective obedience, not from weapons.

When the population, without centralized leadership or official orders, but through coordinated action, manages to repel the forces of repression, this signifies the collapse of the balance of fear—a moment that can be described as the Collapse of the Fear Equilibrium.

Analytical synthesis

Within a coherent theoretical framework, the “phase change of the Iranian uprising” can be formulated as follows:

1. Erosion of the state's monopoly on violence;
2. Transition from protest to direct confrontation;
3. Radicalization resulting from the regime's structural incapacity;
4. Entry into a situation of pre-duality of power;
5. Collapse of obedience and the psychological barrier of repression.

In any case, this phase does not mark the end of the uprising or a guaranteed victory; but in the historical experience of revolutions, it constitutes the beginning of an uncontrollable crisis for the regimes in power.