Western Sahara: a solution to the dispute over territorial integrity, not a process of decolonisation

Contrary to what certain Algerian sectors and pro-Polisario elements maintain, Security Council Resolution 2797 does not represent a ‘shift in the legal framework’ of the Western Sahara conflict. This assertion is based on a biased interpretation that insists on considering the territory as still awaiting decolonisation, erroneously describing Morocco as an ‘occupying power’ and maintaining the legally untenable thesis that Spain remains ‘de jure’ the administering power.

For these sectors, the solution lies in the hands of the Polisario Front, a single-minded political -military organisation with a single ideology, created in 1973 by the regimes of Gaddafi and Boumediene with the aim of curbing Morocco's claim to the Sahara — a claim that Morocco has maintained since the end of the Spanish-French protectorate in 1956 — and at the same time creating a fictitious servile state controlled by Algiers. The Polisario, which in 1973 proclaimed itself the sole representative of the ‘Sahrawi people’, unilaterally declared the creation of the ‘Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’ (SADR) in February 1976, with its capital in Tindouf, an Algerian territory outside Western Sahara.

The current president of the SADR, a former soldier in the Nomadic Troops of the Spanish colonial army, secretly regained Spanish nationality in 2004, as revealed by lawyer Antonio Urdiales during the scandal of his entry into Spain with an Algerian diplomatic passport and false identity. This figure embodies the contradiction of a self-proclaimed republic that exercises ‘sovereignty’ over unregistered and unidentified refugee camps, while claiming to exercise it over the Sahara through a tailor-made referendum. At the same time, it shares with Algeria, in addition to part of its national territory, the budget items that appear in the Algerian Ministry of Defence's budget, and on official trips, the president of the SADR uses the Algerian presidential plane. 

The Algerian narrative seeks to regularise a self-determination already exercised unilaterally, as was attempted in the African Union. This time at the level of the UN, which represents the international community. However, it deliberately ignores the fact that Morocco has already recovered its Sahara through the Madrid Agreement of 14 November 1975, registered with the UN Secretary-General. In that agreement, ‘Spain ratifies its resolution to decolonise the territory of Western Sahara, terminating its responsibilities and powers over that territory as the administering power.’ The General Assembly took note of the agreement on 10 December of the same year through Resolution A/RES/3458B, which reaffirms the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination, without invalidating the transfer of responsibilities. This process was suspended due to the armed conflict. According to Swedish Ambassador Carl Rydbeck, personal representative of the UN Secretary-General, the war situation prevented a free and valid consultation. The Polisario, armed and financed by Libya and Algeria, had already committed to imposing its ‘independence’ project through revolutionary violence. 

While suffering the wear and tear of war, led by ‘revolutionary’ Algeria, together with Libya, Iran, Cuba and Venezuela, Morocco undertook the development of a desert territory, integrating it into its economic, social and cultural fabric. At the same time, it built a retaining wall almost three thousand kilometres long to prevent incursions from Tindouf (Algeria), which put an end to terrorist acts against Spanish fishing boats, including murders and hostage-takings to Tindouf. 

However, during the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit held in Nairobi in 1981, King Hassan II proposed holding a referendum on self-determination, even accepting the possibility of independence as a legitimate outcome, with the aim of ending the conflict. The response was outright rejection by Algeria and the Polisario Front, which demanded recognition of the self-proclaimed ‘Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic’ (SADR) as a sovereign entity on the ground, as well as the handover of the Saharan territory. 

Faced with Morocco's refusal, Algeria succeeded in February 1982 in securing the admission of the SADR to the OAU, even though it had no effective territory and had not held the referendum it itself had called for. The Moroccan proposal was reiterated in 1984 before the United Nations General Assembly, where Hassan II himself, from the podium, denounced the artificial nature of the conflict and renewed his offer of a referendum in accordance with international law. 

It was only after the diplomatic isolation of Muammar Gaddafi and the serious internal crisis in Algeria that the so-called Settlement Plan, promoted by then Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, was achieved in 1988, but it did not come into force until September 1991 with the deployment of MINURSO. However, during the following decade, the referendum became a series of failed attempts, exploited by the Polisario Front as a means of unilaterally imposing independence. This drift responded to the strategic objective of the Algerian military regime: to obtain access to the Atlantic and encircle Morocco by establishing a friendly regime in Western Sahara. Faced with the deadlock, Kofi Annan and James Baker proposed a third way: autonomy as a form of self-determination in accordance with international law. The first Baker Plan was described by the UN as ‘the last chance’. Morocco agreed to negotiate it; Algeria and the Polisario rejected it, proposing the partition of the territory. The second Baker Plan attempted to reconcile extreme positions, but this time it was Morocco that rejected it. In 2007, Morocco, in an attempt to break the deadlock, presented its Autonomy Initiative to reach a final solution. Since then, all Security Council resolutions have welcomed it. 

Resolution 2797, adopted on 31 October 2025 without any votes against, enshrines this proposal as a framework for negotiation within Moroccan sovereignty. It states that ‘the autonomy proposal presented by Morocco constitutes a serious, credible and realistic basis for achieving a mutually acceptable political solution.’

Furthermore, it ‘expresses its full support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy in their efforts to facilitate intensive and substantive negotiations between the parties, on the basis of the autonomy proposal presented by Morocco, with a view to achieving a mutually acceptable political solution.’ This Resolution does not contradict the principle of neutrality, as some claim, but reflects a realistic evolution of the process. It does not mention the referendum because it was distorted by the exploitation of the conflict and has since been dead and buried. Nor does it refer to the status of the Sahara as a ‘non-self-governing territory’ because the UN approaches it not as a matter of decolonisation but as a dispute between parties who must negotiate a just, lasting and realistic political solution. It therefore ‘urges the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General, on the basis of Morocco's autonomy proposal.’

The Polisario Front does not have a solid legal basis to justify its recognition as the ‘legitimate and sole representative’ of the Sahrawi people. Its claim to legitimacy has been based on a failed armed struggle and on the unilateral self-determination of the SADR, which is outside the agreed framework of international law. The repeated invocation of Resolution 1514 (XV) and the 1975 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice reveals a partial and decontextualised reading. Indeed, Resolution 1514 cannot be cited without considering Resolution 1541 (XV), which states that ‘for a territory to be considered non-self-governing, it must present geographical, ethnic, linguistic, historical or religious differences with the country administering it.’ None of these criteria are met between Western Sahara and Morocco. Therefore, since Morocco regained its Sahara in 1976, it has ceased to submit information to the Secretary-General in accordance with Article 73(e) of the Charter of the United Nations. 

It is incumbent upon the UN General Assembly, in the exercise of its powers, to update the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories when circumstances so require. In this regard, the former Spanish Sahara —registered by Spain on 15 December 1960 through Resolution A/1542 (XV), after repeated requests from the Secretary-General since its admission as a Member State on 14 December 1955— should be formally removed from that list, in line with the legal and political developments of the conflict. 

Article 103 of the UN Charter states that ‘in case of conflict between obligations (...) the obligations imposed by the Charter shall prevail.’ Likewise, Article 25 provides that ‘the Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.’ Therefore, we are not dealing with an ‘ignored hierarchy,’ as some claim, but rather with a coherent normative evolution. Resolution 2797 does not impose unilateral autonomy, but rather urges the parties to negotiate a consensual solution within the framework of the autonomy proposed by Morocco, which has been praised by the international community as serious, credible and applicable.

Autonomy, when it is the result of a free agreement, endorsed and in accordance with international law, does not contradict self-determination: it realises it. In the case of Western Sahara, it represents the balance between existing legality, regional stability and dignity. 

In this sense, the autonomy proposal is not presented as an imposition, but as a path to agreement in accordance with the international regulatory framework. Its virtue lies in the fact that it does not exclude, but rather integrates: the principle of self-determination, state sovereignty and the requirement for regional stability. 

Thus, international law is not overwhelmed, but updated. Far from being contradicted, the Charter of the United Nations finds in this normative evolution a concrete expression of its peacemaking vocation. Negotiated autonomy, in the case of Western Sahara, does not close history: it directs it towards reconciliation and the shared construction of a common future. 

This horizon is not foreign to Maghreb memory. In the first sentence of the Manifesto of 1 November 1954, the Algerian Revolution proclaimed its goal as ‘national independence within the North African framework’, thus affirming a regional vision of Algerian nationalism. The struggle against colonialism was not conceived as fragmentation, but as an impetus towards Maghreb unity.

Today, that hope must be renewed. The peoples of the Maghreb region — Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania and Libya — are called upon to overcome inherited divisions and together lay the foundations for a democratic, stable and open Maghreb union. Resolution S/2797 (2025) is not only a promising territorial solution, but it can also be the key to reviving the Maghreb dream, reconciling sovereignties and dignities, and paving the way for a region that engages with its history and cooperates for a better future for its peoples.