The JCPOA Gordian knot
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which is the official name of the Nuclear Deal signed in 2015 by the international community and Iran, is the main legacy of Obama's foreign policy and perhaps that is why it was unilaterally denounced by Donald Trump in 2018 as "a lousy deal" that "gives a lot for nothing". The result has been bad: the Middle East has become more insecure as Tehran has resumed uranium production beyond authorised limits, and its radicalisation and destabilising interference in the region has increased at the same pace as US sanctions have had a devastating effect on its economy.
Iran has always said that it was in its interest to maintain the JCPOA, the requirements of which the UN Atomic Energy Agency has said it complied with, although its desperation over US sanctions and Europe's inability to alleviate their impact have led it to violate uranium enrichment limits of late, probably for domestic political reasons and as an element of pressure on the international community. And now Biden is willing to return to what Toni Blinken has called "a key achievement of multilateral diplomacy" that not only prevented Iran's nuclearisation, but also prevented an arms race in the Middle East. But doing so is not easy for reasons that have to do with domestic politics in both the United States and the Islamic Republic. The situation is reminiscent of the party parties of yesteryear when the 15-year-olds stood on one side of the room and the girls on the other, looked at each other and took a long time to get up the courage to dance because no one dared to take the first step.
The American offer has been met with scepticism in Tehran, which demands as a precondition that Washington first lift all the sanctions imposed by Trump's "maximum pressure" policy that have stifled its economy and prevent it from selling oil, which is its only wealth. Iran is unlikely to relax this stance because it will hold elections in the summer, anti-Americanism sells well in the Islamic Republic and no one will want to appear weak or soft. But the parliament elected last August and dominated by "hardliners" has made a small positive gesture by extending by three months (reluctantly and with certain conditions) the deadline of 23 February for the UN to continue monitoring (with limitations) its nuclear facilities.
For his part, and without actually dismantling sanctions, Biden has also made limited conciliatory gestures such as facilitating the movements of Iranian diplomats accredited to the UN, not opposing an IMF loan of 5 billion dollars to Iran destined to help the country's nuclear programme. Biden has also made limited conciliatory gestures such as facilitating the movement of Iranian diplomats accredited to the UN, not opposing a $5 billion IMF loan to Iran to alleviate the effects of the pandemic, and renouncing the snap back of all 'UN' sanctions (something that Donald Trump had proposed and which always had very little chance of success), while also allowing South Korea to release Iranian funds frozen there as a result of US sanctions. But Biden's problem is that the US not only wants to return to the 2015 JCPOA, but also to put other issues on the table, such as the extension of the sunset clauses, Iran's development of ballistic missiles, and also the destabilising actions that it believes are being carried out in the region by Tehran's allies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen. And Tehran, an old empire and a proud country if ever there was one, is not about to mix the wheat with the chaff.
The irony is that both governments, American and Iranian, would like to return to the JCPOA, but neither wants to take the first step and both are awaiting the parliaments in both countries that reflect broad opposition to the agreement. Thus, the State Department will be closely watched by Congress in any steps it takes in this area, and Biden does not want to alienate the will of Iran, which he needs to move forward with his top priority, which is a gigantic economic plan (almost 2 trillion dollars) to fight the crisis caused by the pandemic, while all Tehran's eyes are on next summer's presidential elections.
Washington's change of heart has made Israel (whose nuclear arsenal no one is talking about) and Saudi Arabia very nervous. Israel believes that Iran has never abandoned its goal of a nuclear weapon, that it is only four months away from having 90% enriched uranium in sufficient quantity, and less than 24 months away from being able to turn it into a nuclear bomb. So says its chief of staff, who has announced military plans to prevent it by force if necessary. And the Saudis want a bad relationship between Washington and Tehran because they fear Iran and because it increases their strategic value in the region and ensures the flow of American arms. Both actively lobby in Washington against a US return to JCPOA and their influence is very high in Congress, even if Riyadh's has been diminished by recent accusations of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's involvement in the brutal murder of journalist Jamal Kashoggi.
Negotiations are more complicated if they are between two parties with opposing positions than if they also involve other stakeholders who can help to iron out differences. For this reason, the EU's initiative to convene a meeting of the signatories of the agreement plus the US with the intention of helping to unblock the situation was initially welcomed. Unfortunately, Iran has just declined the invitation in protest at French and German statements condemning its production of enriched uranium above the permitted limits, and after Washington's recent bombing of pro-Iranian militias in Syria in retaliation for a previous attack on an American base. We are back to square zero. Both the US and Iran want an American return to JCPOA, but do not seem to know how to get there. We are faced with a Gordian knot that needs to be cut decisively, as Alexander the Great did, in order to move forward, and the problem is that none of the interested parties seem to be in a position to do so.
Jorge Dezcallar Ambassador of Spain