Xi Jinping gets his international agenda back on track

Strengthened after the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress last November and with no one to overshadow him despite the demonstrations of discontent that have forced him to soften his ferocious Zero-COVID campaign, President Xi Jinping has briskly regained an international agenda that had been paralysed by the pandemic and the preparations for the Congress. 

Before the Congress he had travelled to Samarkand in September for the Shanghai Cooperation Council meeting, which welcomed Iran, and there he met Putin, testing their "boundless friendship" as their disagreements over the invasion of Ukraine became apparent. "We understand your concerns," Putin summed up. 

After the Party Congress Xi Jinping travelled to the Bali meeting of the G20, a group of countries representing 85 per cent of the world's GDP, where he took the opportunity to meet personally with Joe Biden, among other leaders, and to make clear the red lines of each in order to avoid misunderstandings in a tense relationship in which there is no shortage of problems surrounding Taiwan, human rights, the South China Sea, trade issues, the exclusion of Huawei from the American banking system, limitations on the export of semiconductors, problems with Tik-Tok and a long etcetera. . 

And then, last week, Xi travelled to Saudi Arabia where he held a meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and other Arabs, highlighting China's interest in this region where the impression is spreading that the Middle East has lost importance for the United States and that Washington is abandoning it despite the fact that when Biden went to Riyadh last July he said loud and clear that "we will not leave and leave a gap for China, Russia or Iran to fill... the United States is not going anywhere". That's what Biden said after a tense meeting with Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, but you get the feeling that they don't quite believe it and are looking for a poly-alignment, if you'll pardon the pun, to better protect them in the bipolar world that is coming at us at full speed. He who does not run does not fly, and Saudi Arabia believes that courtesy should not take away from bravery, and that China can help it to better protect its interests in certain areas, for it is not for nothing that it is its main trading partner. In recent months China has imported up to two million barrels of oil a day from Saudi Arabia, almost 25 per cent of its total production. 

But it is not only oil that interests Beijing, as an important part of this bilateral trade is made up of arms, missiles and drones that Riyadh has used in its war against the Houthis in Yemen when, faced with the humanitarian disaster that this conflict has produced, Washington, Saudi Arabia's main arms supplier, has made it difficult for it to use the weapons it sells it in this scenario. China has no such scruples and five years ago authorised Saudi Arabia to manufacture Chinese drones locally to avoid criticism of their end use. The United States is concerned that the development of this relationship with China could lead to China obtaining permission for the use of military facilities in the Arabian Peninsula (there is vague talk of a naval base) as China and Saudi Arabia have already conducted joint military and naval exercises and it should not be forgotten that China already has a naval base in Djibouti. 

Another aspect that should concern us all is the development of the bilateral relationship in the nuclear field. Riyadh warned a few years ago, when Donald Trump pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that if Tehran developed a nuclear bomb "we will do the same as soon as we can". Two years ago China helped the Saudis process local uranium ore into yellowcake, which need not have military applications as it can be used for medical purposes or to produce fertiliser, and indeed Riyadh has so far denied any weapons intentions. But that may change quickly in light of developments in Iran with the stalled negotiations to return to the JCPOA and Tehran's decision to enrich uranium in its centrifuges above the levels permitted by the US Atomic Energy Agency, bringing it dangerously close to military grade. Indeed, Riyadh's nervousness has been demonstrated by a confusing statement on the matter by the Saudi foreign minister on Sunday. Saudi Arabia will not stand idly by if the Iranians acquire nuclear weapons, that much is clear. The point is that the Chinese could play a key role here, as they once did in helping Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons when India did too. There is an obvious analogy between Pakistan and its enemy India and Saudi Arabia and its enemy Iran... and in this case the supplier of the necessary technology could be China, perhaps through Pakistan, which is in dire need of money for its ailing economy. This is another reason why it is by no means desirable for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, because if it does so it will unleash an arms race in the region that is not good for anyone. 

China's interests in the Middle East are oil, trade, infrastructure and possible military facilities in the Arabian Peninsula as the Silk Road extends commercial and strategic interests to other latitudes that need to be protected. It also seeks support in international fora for issues as important to Beijing as the dispute over Taiwan or sensitive human rights issues, for example in relation to the Uighurs of Xinjiang, who are Muslim and about whom the silence of Saudi Arabia, whose sovereign, it should not be forgotten, is the Custodian of the Two Mosques, is very significant. 

The reference in the final communiqué of the visit to the fact that Iran's nuclear development must be peaceful has gone down badly in Tehran, where President Raisi has been quick to call for "compensation" from China, although it is not yet clear what this means as relations between China and Iran are good. Xi and Raisi met in Samarkand last September after Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which China chairs. And that is another flank that China is very interested in guarding.