The COVID-19 and the balance of power
Almost five months after the start of the crisis caused by COVID-19, if you look around you get the impression that everything has stopped. Looking back at those issues concerning the world at the end of 2019, some of which gave the impression that the whole West was on the verge of unpredictable effects, such as the death of General Soleimani, it seems that these have come to a standstill. The affected nations have been forced to adopt drastic measures, and the confinement of the population could be said to have been applied to the countries themselves, shutting them off and isolating them from the international concert in all matters unrelated to the pandemic.
The tragedy of migratory movements across the Mediterranean has 'disappeared' and Daesh's pressure in the Sahel and towards West Africa seems no longer to be such. The 'friction' between Russian and American forces in Syria has completely ceased; the Turkish intervention in the conflicts in Syria and Libya gives the impression of being interrupted; the situation of political instability in Algeria also seems to have been resolved.
This is not the case. Europe has been blocked. An insignificant microorganism has locked up its population and governments have stopped looking outwards to focus on their own inner problem. And this situation has exposed the great weakness of the West, and more specifically that of the European Union (EU). A fragility that covers the most diverse aspects, and which, without a doubt, some have taken good note of.
Europe's somewhat irrational reaction in the first moments of the crisis, the lack of a joint response, the inability to act together, including episodes of fierce rivalry and selfishness, have placed all of us in a delicate position in the face of our enemies. Despite those who do not want to admit it, we do have enemies. Added to all this is the spectacle of constant discussion between the countries of the north and south of the EU, which only deepens this image of disunity. As a result, Europe has become engrossed in its own problems, turning its back largely on external action, and when the time comes to face up again to what it has neglected, it will have to assume the consequences of this lack of vision.
The above leads to a disturbing statement: We assume, without a doubt, that the appearance of the coronavirus causing COVID-19 is not, as some have suggested, a deliberate action. Whether its dissemination was the result of a failure during its manipulation or a completely natural process is a very different debate and one that does offer serious doubts. But in the same way that it can be said that the situation created by the spread of the disease has been taken advantage of and used to gain positions in the commercial and economic confrontation, as well as to try to change the balance of power and influence between China and the US, taking Europe as a battleground, it can be asserted that this blockade suffered by the EU countries, this 'isolation' and the clear weakness of their alliances and their evident disunity when things are really bad, have favoured leaving a free space that others are trying to occupy. Moreover, it has shown a gap to further weaken an actor that was beginning to be more than just uncomfortable and, incidentally, to affect the other big target alliance of China and Russia: NATO.
Firstly, though already mentioned, the main actors in this 'game' must be identified. We can point to China, Russia, the USA and the European Union as such. Among the four mentioned the US and China are the ones who have so far faced the most virulence, focused for now on imposing their story. The striking thing about this confrontation is that despite the fact that both are changing the centre of gravity of their policy towards the Pacific, the battlefield of this clash has been the EU, the third actor in the contest, whose capacity to influence this new 'theatre of operations' is practically irrelevant, as described by Emilio de Miguel Calabia in his latest publication by the Real Instituto Elcano. This is evidently due to the fact that the circumstances of the pandemic and its most devastating effects so far have materialised in Europe, and the dependence at all levels of the Union's economies on the Asian country has made it a prime target to beat as a way of gaining ground on its opponent.
Russia, the fourth protagonist, is playing a discreet role for the moment, limited to dealing with the pandemic inside its borders and taking advantage of some specific moment to beat its closest rival, the EU, sowing the seeds of discord through some action in the field of INFOOPS. Returning to the EU, one might ask, what are these fronts that have been somewhat neglected?
First, the southern front. On the one hand, conflicts in Syria and Libya have been neglected. And particularly in the latter, major developments are taking place in recent days. In both, Turkey's intervention has not ceased, and the mercenary movements sponsored by the Ottoman country are a serious problem, as the news on the movement of some of these to European soil is more than disturbing. On that southern front, we have the Sahel, the big key to the stability of the EU. Daesh is not only regaining strength in Iraq, but continues its expansion throughout the Sahel and West Africa, trying to establish itself throughout the region as a hegemonic jihadist movement by taking away Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)'s traditional stronghold, which has led to open armed conflict between both groups. All this is happening while operation EUTM Mali has suspended all activities due to the threat of COVID-19 and just when jihadist pressure in northern Mali is growing exponentially, as it is happening in countries like Burkina Faso and even at risk of spreading to the Ivory Coast.
For the eastern front, we have two main focuses which are more relevant to NATO's concerns but are key to the EU, and we cannot forget that most EU countries belong to the Alliance, so anything that affects one of the two entities will inevitably affect the other. These two are the Baltic republics and Ukraine. In both, Russian pressure has not ceased, especially in the latter, where in the Donbas region fighting continues between the forces of the former Soviet republic and pro-Russian elements.
Finally, we have the south-eastern front, where Daesh is regaining strength, especially in Iraq. The war in Libya has escalated and fighting in Syria continues. And in these two countries everything is evolving with the 'invaluable collaboration' of Turkey.
We therefore have a scenario with a European Union that is somewhat 'immobilized' by the consequences of the pandemic, suffering not only the social and political consequences of the pandemic, because it is clear that the COVID-19 crisis will have collateral effects on the internal policies of the member countries, but also on the economic ones, both because of the costs involved in fighting the disease and because of the practical total paralysis of its productive and business fabric, which, in a perverse domino effect, is already causing levels of unemployment unknown until now, and an increase in the debt of many countries, especially Spain, Italy and France. The immediate result of this is a new confrontation within the EU on how to tackle the problem, putting the 'rich' countries of the north in opposite positions to the less favoured countries of the south. No matter what the reasons of one or the other, it doesn't matter how legitimate the arguments are. The significant thing is the result, and this is nothing but more division, which is a burden for the European project.
The chances of the EU successfully dealing with a new migration crisis caused by the escalation of the conflicts in Syria and Libya are minimal. Such a problem would only lead to more disunity. If the situation in the Sahel deteriorates to the extent that it ends up affecting the Maghreb countries, the consequences for the EU would be, as in the previous case, dire, and would result in a lack of cohesion. Therefore, it is worth asking, could the EU bear such an extreme scenario? And, if it were to materialise, who would benefit? Or what real effects would it have at a geopolitical level? The answer to the first question is relatively simple, and such a situation would almost certainly have irreparable consequences for the European project.
The answer to the second, and especially the third, is more complex, but extremely disturbing. Such a scenario would not only affect the EU. It has already been mentioned that most of the EU countries are members of NATO, so a break or a deterioration in the relations of the member countries would affect the Alliance. And it would affect it in such a way that it would be unable to react or to do so in a timely manner to any crisis. It is no secret that within NATO countries have different threat perceptions, and of course different interests and areas of concern. This has even led to questions being raised about the response of all members to a hypothetical invocation of Article 5 in certain cases. If such a thing were to happen, it would mean the end of the Atlantic alliance. At least as we know it today. This would mean a golden opportunity for that fourth actor in the background, Russia, which could consider, for the first time and from a realistic point of view, to fulfil its pending aspirations, which are limited to the Baltic republics, the enclave of Kaliningrad, Transnistria and the consolidation of the Donbas Republic, at least as far as Europe is concerned.
A divided Europe, with a large number of countries suffering a deep economic crisis, which in turn has relocated a large part of its companies' production precisely to China, and whose industry depends as much on the components produced by the Asian country as it does on its technology, is a very weak and easily paid piece. And it should not be forgotten who holds the largest foreign exchange reserves and who has the capacity to take control of companies in strategic sectors, buying at a discount what others sell in the face of the need to make cash. Yet we can go even further.
If the need to react to the virus led to a sometimes-embarrassing competition between supposedly allied countries and members of the same supranational structure to acquire medical material, the race to acquire the vaccine against COVID-19, once it is available, ventures no less starkly. This will undoubtedly lead to more disunity and confrontation. Then the solution to the disease may be one more weapon that someone, engaged in the struggle to establish itself as the new world power, uses to further its purpose.
The United States has long since ceased to have Europe as its central axis, and as mentioned at the outset, its gravity centre has shifted towards the Pacific area. This is where it has collided with China, which has been increasing its influence in the area and reinforcing its positions for years, even creating a belt of fortified artificial islands that serve as advanced bases for its air and naval forces. One small detail to get an idea of the struggle is the recent US creation of the so-called New Marine Littoral Regiment, a series of small, highly agile and deployable units equipped with anti-ship missiles on highly mobile platforms designed to occupy small islands or points on the coast to attack hostile vessels. This force has been created for the Pacific.
China's action in Europe must be understood as a way of depriving the US of its natural allies and at the same time strengthening its economic position, increasing the dependence of the EU and ensuring that it perpetuates itself. Apparently, in the face of this situation, Russia would only benefit, and in a way it does. But one detail has been overlooked. Russia is engaged in expansion into the Arctic. And it is not only the natural resources hidden under the ice that are at stake, but the possibility of creating what might be the most important trade route on the planet. That route would run through the North Pacific, involving the Slavic country in the struggle for a new centre of gravity. Thus, a few days ago, it was announced that the Russian Navy has assigned three ships equipped with the new version of the 'Kalibr' cruise missile, with the capacity to attack both land and sea targets of its Pacific fleet. These platforms will complete a reinforcement of 15 new ships assigned to that fleet. Could Russia's support in gaining control of the area be the compensation for getting the chance to cover their aspirations in the old Europe on a plate?
As you can see, there are many cross interests, and the stakes are high enough to justify the clashes we are witnessing. Whether these will increase in intensity or shift from the cognitive or economic domain to more traditional ones is difficult to know, but the risk is there. What cannot be denied is that a simple virus may have triggered the greatest shift in the world's balance of power since the 19th century.