Jihadism and violence in the Sahel (I)

In recent years, armed groups pursuing transnational politico-religious objectives have proliferated, taking advantage of the lack of state presence along the Mali-Burkina Faso border.

But that is only part of the problem. The lack of control, the absence of the state in vast regions and the scarcity of a future for thousands of young people has also facilitated the proliferation of criminal groups whose main activity is illicit trafficking of all kinds. Sooner or later, these groups will end up in contact with religious groups, when they are not directly absorbed by them, given that their activity is highly lucrative and the jihadist groups need to finance themselves.

But the other side of the coin is that this association does not happen in all cases, or at least not peacefully, leading to struggles and clashes for control, either of the activities or of the territory, which adds much more instability to an already problematic area, and mainly affecting, as always happens in these cases, the civilian population.

Given the complexity of the conflict, the lack of any real education about it, which leads to misinterpretations, and the importance of the consequences that affect us fully, it is interesting to take a look at the ins and outs of the conflict, focusing on its main actors.

The turning point in Burkina Faso's attitude towards these groups was marked by a deadly attack in January 2016 in the heart of Ouagadougou, the country's capital, claimed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This marked the beginning of the Burkina Faso authorities' confrontation with the violent extremist organisations that had long been operating on its territory along the border with Mali. It was the Ansarul Islam group that was responsible for the escalation of violence. Their actions were triggered by a growing sense of social injustice among ethnic Fulani pastoralists, to which the group's members belong. But who are the Fulani?

The Fulani are the largest nomadic group in the world, with a presence throughout West and Central Africa, from Senegal to the Central African Republic. They are often associated with other ethnic groups, such as the Hausa, with whom they have long coexisted. Some refer to them as Hausa-Fulani, but they are different groups.

The Fulani are nomadic herders who travel hundreds of kilometres with their herds in search of pasture. They are always armed as a way of protecting their livestock and often clash with farmers, who accuse them of damaging their crops and failing to control their animals.

For their part, the Fulani accuse the Fulani of indiscriminately attacking them and stealing their livestock, so they always claim to be acting in their own defence and that of their livelihood. This is the clearest example of how the same causes of conflict that provoked wars thousands of years ago are still valid in the 21st century, and that no simplistic solution or answer can be given to a problem that superimposes ancestral causes, religious motivations and economic interests of the contemporary age.

It is interesting to note here that, at least on the African continent, disagreements over the use of essential resources such as agricultural land, grazing areas and water between pastoralists and local farmers are considered to be the major source of conflict.

The Fulani ethnic group includes Islamic extremists and, according to the Global Terrorism Index 2023, Fulani extremists are the fourth most lethal group in the world.

In two major waves of violence in 2023, the group invaded 160 villages and killed more than 500 Christians. In addition, two thousand homes and twenty-eight churches were destroyed, resulting in the internal displacement of thirty thousand Christians who had to flee for their lives, mainly to Nigeria and Burkina Faso.

The drivers of conflict in Burkina Faso are multiple and the violence is a symptom of much deeper and long-standing problems. Competing power structures keep the country fragmented, and the various centralised governments have done little to address the widespread rifts between the government and local communities and between communities themselves.

The aforementioned Ansarul Islam, whose name means ‘defenders of Islam’, is a Salafist jihadist group founded by Ibrahim Malam Dicko. Dicko was a Fulani commander linked to Ansar Al-Din who was arrested by French forces in Mali in 2015 and subsequently released. The group remains active in Burkina Faso and Mali. Its appearance on the scene dates back to December 2016 when it claimed, in a communiqué dated 22 December and signed by Imam Ibrahim Malam Dicko, the Nassoumbou attack carried out on the 16th of the same month. Twelve soldiers from an anti-terrorist unit of the Burkinabe army were killed in that action. Their bases are in the border forests of the Mondoro area between the two countries. 

After the first attack, Ansarul Islam multiplied its violent actions to promote ‘authentic’ Islam and restore the Fulani kingdom of Macina founded in the early 19th century by Seku Amadu. Their actions included attacks on security posts, attacks on policemen and threats against teachers and ‘bad Muslims’.

Today, Ansarul Islam is largely composed of Fulani fighters and carries out attacks in northern and eastern Burkina Faso, as well as operating across the border in Mali. It is believed to be in close contact with members of Katiba Macina, as well as with Almansour Ag Alkassoum (before his death) and his fighters. He is also increasingly active along Burkina Faso's border with Niger. When Malam Dicko died in 2017, he was replaced by his brother, Jafar Dicko, as leader.

From 2019 onwards, the activities of other armed groups increased exponentially. These included the al-Qaeda-affiliated Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) and its rival, Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP). 2022 was the deadliest year ever recorded in Burkina Faso, with a total of 1,135 terrorism-related deaths.

In this context, armed groups and criminal networks have proliferated, justifying their activity on the basis of socio-political and economic grievances. In this scenario, the military has been unable to deal effectively with both symmetric and asymmetric threats. Moreover, terrorist groups have exploited feelings of neglect and marginalisation to pit local communities against the central state, which they hold responsible for their marginalisation.

Two successive military coups in the space of nine months, the expansion of violent extremist groups, and a worsening humanitarian crisis show the destabilising consequences the conflict is having for Burkina Faso. The legitimacy of the state has been challenged on multiple levels and its capacity to govern has reached breaking point as the spiral of insecurity has become more entrenched and escalating. 

In the absence of formal mechanisms for channelling demands by social actors or the population itself to voice grievances, the use of violence has become an important tool of political pressure in the relationship of local communities with state institutions. 

Violence in Burkina Faso may be highly localised, but the transnational dimensions of this conflict make it complex to manage. The pursuit of jihadist groups across national borders means that Burkina Faso is surrounded by instability. Conflicting approaches among actors fighting to end the conflict have resulted in little progress, while JNIM and ISSP continue to strengthen their footholds and insecurity-driven social divisions continue to grow.