Russia, the EU and the Sahel: from backyard to main gateway
To understand the role that the Wagner Group has played in Russia's foreign policy interests, one cannot ignore the continuity between Russia's historical and contemporary objectives, as well as Moscow's growing interest in promoting scenarios of what has been termed "hybrid warfare", a term that is not without debate and would merit an ad hoc study.
The starting point for analysing Russian strategy is the so-called "Primakov Doctrine", named after former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. Although Primakov specialised in the Arab world for the KGB during the Cold War and in the SVR and Foreign Ministry afterwards, his policies apply to sub-Saharan Africa.
This doctrine, developed in the late 1990s, emphasises multipolarity, power projection and the use of internal rivalries and power struggles as means to achieve its goals. As early as 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, Putin underlined the importance of this doctrine when he pointed out that Russia should reassert itself on the international stage and challenge the existing world order by re-engaging in areas that Moscow had abandoned in the 1990s.
This 'return' to the African continent undoubtedly has a strong economic component, although this is not the only motive. Russia needs access to Africa's important natural resources by targeting countries with weak governments but rich in valuable materials such as oil, manganese, uranium and gold. Russia's modus operandi is very particular. Instead of receiving a pre-agreed fixed consideration for its assistance to these governments, Moscow seeks payment in the form of unlimited access to natural resources, the signing of commercial contracts or the use of facilities, usually with dual-use possibilities, such as airbases or ports. In this way, access to these resources is guaranteed, while at the same time a geopolitical benefit is gained by occupying strategically significant points.
Both the economic benefits gained and the increased presence in key locations contribute to the achievement of broader strategic objectives and in turn allow them to be used as a springboard for further expansion in the region.
When discussing Russia's approach to the African continent we tend to focus on those countries where Moscow has gained extensive influence, such as the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, Niger and Libya. However, while these are important cases with major geopolitical implications, they alone cannot explain Russia's 'return to Africa'. Russia's current foreign policy is based on the concept of 'multipolarity', which encompasses the idea of helping other regions to become autonomous, inherently antagonistic poles of power; all with the ultimate aim of avoiding the hegemony of a single superpower, although the concept itself leads to a major power, in this case Russia, exerting its influence over these other autonomous and inherently antagonistic power centres with the West.
As it did during the Cold War period, the Kremlin defines its foreign policy in global terms and sees the African continent, both because of its demographic characteristics and its enormous economic projection, as a lever for its own growth. But its vision is not free of a point of view that can be considered paternalistic. The great potential of African nations provides them with the necessary leverage in foreign policy, which can be increased with Russia's support in matters of global interest. Thus, Russia's engagement with African middle powers becomes more relevant in the current global context. First, Russia uses its contacts with the so-called 'Big Five' - Egypt, Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa - with a clear propaganda purpose to deny Moscow's isolation and to further its claim that the new 'multipolar' world order it advocates is an emerging reality. Second, in the face of diplomatic isolation, international sanctions and the loss of European markets, Russia needs to seek new partners and consolidate existing ones to replace lost markets and, more importantly, especially for its war industry, to facilitate sanctions evasion.
When it comes to analysing the Wagner group's role in Africa, the perception of Russia's strengths and weaknesses on the continent is often distorted. Wagner has not been and is not an isolated or independent actor. Its actions in Africa have always relied on the backing and direction of Russian diplomatic, military and intelligence services in order to operate, and the group's activities have given Moscow a new reach in Africa. All this bearing in mind that the company founded by the late Prigozhin has never formed the basis of Russia's involvement in the region, which has always included, and with far greater weight, the official and "traditional" presence of commercial, diplomatic and military interests. In other words, the Wagner Group is important, but only one aspect, or rather, it is a tool at the service of Moscow and Russia's presence in Africa.
Russia's absence from Africa from 1991 to the 2000s was due to a lack of political, economic and military engagement between Russia and African countries. This withdrawal was due to internal and external factors that led to a significant deterioration in economic, political and diplomatic relations. Among the factors that contributed to this decline were the loss of ideological stimulus, economic instability and political turmoil (Filatova & Makarychev, 2012). Internal problems caused by the immediate aftermath of the end of the USSR and the Cold War, and political instability prevented interaction with African countries, which affected the maintenance of relations forged during the Soviet era. This situation deprived African countries of a reliable partner (Carmody, 2017). It also meant a significant economic loss, especially due to the reduction of Russian trade, estimated at eighty percent between 1990 and 2000. At the same time, the then emerging giant China did not miss the opportunity and its trade increased by seven hundred percent (Demidov 2010). It also resulted in increased diversity and competition among world powers, with China and other countries filling the gap (Doroshenko, 2019).
From 2000 onwards, Russian foreign policy under Putin underwent a major transformation, seeking to strengthen Russia's international relations and sovereign interests at all levels. Known as the "Awakening of the Bear's Roar", this period attracted global attention and influenced global decision-making. Under Putin, Russia has made every effort to regain its international standing by promoting a multipolar world without a single superpower.
Russia's geopolitical return to Africa that we are witnessing over the last decade, especially accentuated since 2021, is aimed at challenging Western hegemony and increasing its influence in Africa, driven by a variety of reasons. Russia's tensions with the US and its allies and the conflict in Ukraine have strengthened its Russia-Africa relationship, and it is clear that the African continent has been of particular interest to Russia's foreign policy.
Created in 2014 as a private organisation, the Wagner Group has carried out numerous international military activities, with its involvement in the Ukrainian war being particularly relevant. The group, despite popular belief, is less like a traditional private military contractor and more a tool in Russian President Vladimir Putin's military arsenal. Through its deployment in the Central African Republic, Mali and now Niger, Wagner has gained an important foothold in sub-Saharan Africa and has been a key tool in furthering Russian foreign policy, a policy that in Africa, in addition to providing Russia with access to critical natural resources, prevents Europe from accessing these resources, it occupies the space left by the EU's ineffective policy and takes control of an area where the main flow of all illicit trafficking to the old continent is controlled, with all that this means.
Russia's growing presence in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa has boosted its foreign policy objectives in the region, allowing Moscow to advance three key goals: achieving Russia's recognition as a great power through global geopolitical repositioning, undermining Western interests by building a Russian sphere of influence, and enhancing Russian soft power.
Although Russia is not the only external actor in Africa, the current policy orientation adopted by the Kremlin towards sub-Saharan Africa is clearly interpreted in the direction of attempting to fragment and destabilise the Western presence on the continent, not without the invaluable assistance of the nefarious policies of the former regional colonial power and the erratic or lukewarm action of the EU.
Since the early 2020s, Russia has steadily expanded its influence in Africa. This development represents a departure from Moscow's traditional historical approach to the continent, which had focused on economic cooperation and technical assistance. Russia's new involvement in Africa is characterised by a particular focus on conflict zones and government crises since the 2010s, especially in the Sahel region, where there is also growing anti-French and anti-European sentiment. This should prompt reflection within the EU. A key feature of this change is the growing relevance of the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organisation that poses an increasing challenge to state-building and democratic governance in the countries where it operates. The debate over whether this group fits the traditional concept of a private military company (PMC) or whether it is a state actor has been on the table for quite a few analysts; however, the majority perception is that Wagner does not fit the parameters of a typical PMC. Private military companies are generally considered non-state entities that provide military and security services to legal entities, individuals and some states. These companies may also act in the interest of the state or in support of its assets and operate outside their home country to assist in the pursuit of that state's military and political objectives without its direct involvement.
Although Wagner presents itself as a private organisation, it not only represents one of the most developed methods of exerting Russian influence on the continent, but is also closely linked to the Russian state on a strategic level.
Leaked internal documents from 2019 revealed Wagner's plan to exert influence in Africa, and one of the group's goals was to "strong-arm" Western powers out of the region and disrupt pro-Western political movements, something which by the looks of things they are achieving with a more than acceptable level of success.
The group's strategy is to offer a package of services that appeals to autocratic leaders, involving the employment of paid troops to help secure territorial control, to fight jihadist groups operating in the region in an expeditious manner, and all with the support of political strategists who can manipulate and shape public debate through social media and disinformation. The quid pro quo is not just commercial benefits for Wagner, but access to natural resources, particularly those related to mining.
It is clear that the group is not a traditional PMC, but a tool in President Putin's unconventional or 'hybrid' military arsenal.
Wagner's activities in Africa exemplify the continuity between Russia's historical objectives envisioned by Primakov and the current Russian foreign policy objectives for which Gerasimov provided an operational strategy, and this combination allows Russia to effectively pursue its renewed interests in the Sahel and sub-Saharan Africa.
The cornerstone for achieving its objectives is the establishment of a pattern of political, military and economic engagement in the countries in which it operates. The group focuses on countries with weak governments and fragile democracies, and responds to requests from their respective governments for security, especially when those governments believe that Western states have not provided adequate support. The formula, it must be acknowledged, is almost perfect, and Europe has not hindered them in any way by offering attractive alternatives. The organisation intervenes to assist Russian-backed local military leaders against rebel groups seeking regime change. In return for its services, the Wagner Group is able to extract resources for its economic benefit and gain access to raw materials and valuable resources, which obviously find their way to Russia. And this is done at the cost of blocking European access to these resources, so it is a double benefit for Moscow.
This model undermines democratic governance and local political elites, and is a perfectly useful asymmetric political and military tool in Russia's interests, especially in the current context. The group has offered Russia a quick entry point into sub-Saharan Africa to establish a presence that would have taken years to build through conventional means such as trade, investment and support for cultural and educational ties. And this presence provides it with the possibility of opening a front on the EU's southern flank that, if necessary, can greatly weaken the ability to support Ukraine in the war unleashed by Russia in February 2022. This may be a harsh statement, but it is hard to understand such blindness when it comes to interpreting the international chessboard and the way in which the main actors are positioning their chips. We have reached a point where every day counts, and steps such as the one taken just twenty-four hours ago, with the withdrawal of our country from the EU mission in Mali, are not exactly in the right direction. Our "back door" has become, whether we want to admit it or not, the main entrance.