The Syrian hornet's nest, unanswered questions
Without a doubt, our attention, at least for the time being, should be focused on the definitive eruption of the Syrian conflict. This is a vivid example of what we have described on numerous occasions, a conflict that had its moment of interest in its early days and which over time had fallen into oblivion, if not oblivion, then ostracism, despite the fact that it has never ceased to be active and despite its extreme cruelty.
The main characteristic of the sequence of events that have led to the fall of Bashar Al-Assad's regime is the speed at which events have unfolded, and, at the very moment I am writing these lines, various sources are already talking about the first talks between the rebel factions and some external actor (who probably bears more responsibility for what has happened than is at first glance apparent) to form what they call a transitional government.
What is happening in Syria deserves our full attention, as the stakes are high and the possible consequences for Europe are also high depending on how the situation evolves. Syria is one of the theatres where various powers have for some time been settling their differences in an attempt to gain the necessary influence to pursue their objectives and entrench their interests.
With an added danger on this occasion - or two, rather. One is the nature of the forces opposing the Assad regime and the serious danger that we are witnessing the re-emergence of a Daesh even stronger than the one that terrorised the world less than ten years ago. The other is one of those issues that has been entrenched for decades and is a permanent source of instability for several countries in the region. We refer to the Kurdish problem.
Everything in Syria is very confusing, and a serious analysis of what has happened and why now would be very risky. Few scenarios are as complex in the current landscape. However, we can already define certain questions to which we must find answers in order to understand what is happening.
The first and fundamental one is ‘why now?’ This question is key when we are referring to a conflict that began back in 2011, in the framework of what was called the ‘Arab Spring’. We are talking about almost fourteen years of a war that began when protests, similar to those that swept through various countries in the region, degenerated into violence on both sides and repression by government forces led to the progressive militarisation of the opposition within months of the start of the altercations as Syrian army deserters and armed civilians formed rebel groups to defend themselves from government attacks. In these early stages, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), made up mainly of defectors, emerged as one of the most prominent armed opposition forces.
Outside interference was not long in coming, and even then international involvement quickly transformed the conflict into a complex proxy war. Regional and international actors such as Russia, Iran, Turkey, the United States and several Persian Gulf monarchies sided with one faction or another and began to supply arms, equipment, funding and sometimes even training. Each and every one of them seeking to further their own interests and creating strange alliances, sometimes ‘unnatural’, but which in that particular context and place made sense.
The coincidence in time with the period of maximum apogee of Daesh, which also took advantage of the situation in Syria to achieve something unthinkable until then, the establishment of a caliphate in a real territory, even giving it state structures, conditioned the future of the conflict. The threat of Daesh led to the more direct involvement of elements such as the United States, creating in turn totally unexpected and surprising alliances, placing Kurds, pro-Iranian Shiite militias and Americans on the same side and on a plane of collaboration. Even Russia collaborated in the defeat of Daesh, although it did so by attacking this group as well as the rest of the rebel groups, and it did so in order to strengthen the regime of Bashar Al-Assad.
By 2019 Daesh had been driven out of most of the areas under its control, although it cannot be said to have been defeated. By then, however, the picture of the conflict was completely different.
From that moment on, and after a period of turmoil, the Damascus regime strengthened its position and more or less successfully regained the initiative and at least partial control of the country. The various rebel militias, jihadists, moderates, Kurds, etc., as well as US and Russian special forces and the Turkish army in the north have continued to operate, each in pursuit of their own objectives.
Until a little more than a week ago, when everything took an unexpected turn. And that turn cannot be accidental, which brings us to the second and eternal question: ‘who benefits from this situation?’ Although perhaps we should question it differently: ‘who is it hurting?’
Leaving aside Bashar Al-Assad himself, which is self-evident, we must look to Russia and Iran. If all goes as it seems most likely, Russia not only loses an ally in the area and a capacity for influence in a region of vital geostrategic importance, but it loses a key air base and, more seriously, the only port that allows it to maintain a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean. Its fleet located there also cannot return to Russia across the Bosporus, so it will lose the ability to act on both sides of a key point in the event of a generalised conflict.
As for Iran, the regime of the ayatollahs loses its great ally in the region, its isolation, which we have spoken of so often as a consequence of the Abraham Accords, will be much greater, and its ability to join forces against Israel will also be affected. Likewise, the fall of the Damascus regime is a severe blow to Hezbollah, which loses its main route and source of supply of material and weapons, weakening its position in Lebanon even further, something that undoubtedly benefits Israel.
Israel is similarly taking the opportunity to expand its security zone in the Golan Heights area while at the same time striking hard at the entire Syrian military infrastructure to ensure that its vast arsenal does not fall into the wrong hands.
Turning to the consequences for Russia, some are already celebrating, looking at it from the perspective that anything negative that happens to the invader of Ukraine is good for Ukraine. But this is not the case. As noted above, it is a strategic and moral blow, but without any effect on the conflict in Ukraine. However, the fall of al-Assad may have serious consequences for Europe. Therefore, at least for the time being, we should not celebrate anything. And this brings us to another question, Russia will be harmed, but ‘at what cost’?
We commented at the beginning that this was not the time for an in-depth analysis of what is happening in Syria, among other reasons because, although the fall of Al-Assad seems to be the conclusion of everything, this is only the beginning of a new situation that is totally unknown and of which we do not know the outcome. And so we consider it more interesting to leave a few questions in the air, one of which cannot be ignored: ‘Who is behind all that is happening?’
It is surprising, to say the least, that militias that until recently acted independently, when they were not directly attacking each other, suddenly operate in such a coordinated and effective way. Once again, as in other scenarios, we must remember that nothing in these matters is the result of chance, and what is happening right now in Syria has required meticulous and intense planning, an aptitude that the different rebel groups do not have on their own. To this must be added the intelligence-gathering and intelligence-gathering capabilities necessary for such planning. At this point they may have relied on elements of the Syrian services who have decided to defect or outright betray the regime, but there is always someone behind such actions.
Whatever the case, we will get answers in time. However, by the same token, given the direction events are taking, we cannot be at all optimistic.
We could be witnessing the emergence of a new failed state almost on Europe's doorstep, similar to what is happening in Libya, with the aggravating factor that, on this occasion, those who seem likely to gain the greatest share of power are radical militias close, some to al-Qaeda, and others to Daesh, with the danger of establishing a new caliphate.
In certain quarters, the HTS (Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham), the Levant Liberation Organisation, the group that has led the defeat of the SAA, is being labelled as ‘moderate’ in a clear image-washing campaign, but the group's record, especially in its treatment of the Druze and Christian minorities, tells a very different story. It is undeniable that Bashar Al-Assad was a bloodthirsty satrap and what is being uncovered in the regime's prisons only corroborates this, showing that the Syrian reality was far worse than we imagined. But it is also true that HTS has a very clear agenda of its own and that, despite attempts to convey a sense of normality, the statements of its leader, Abu Mohammed Al-Jawlani, are not at all reassuring.
And, in a way, we have the feeling that we are witnessing a familiar scenario - or did the Taliban not do the same in the first months after their return to power in Kabul? This situation is more than likely to lead to mass movements of migrants, as it did in 2014. The lack of control will facilitate, in the same way as in Libya, an increase in the flow of weapons of all kinds, not only to the Sahel, but also to all kinds of criminal organisations. And in this section we cannot forget the huge arsenal of chemical weapons held by the current Syrian regime.
And to round off the situation that is gradually emerging, on the one hand we have an interventionist Turkey, ready to consolidate its role as arbiter and regional power, which sees this as an unbeatable opportunity to take over territories it has traditionally considered its own and extend its influence and control over others it considers key to its security. On the other side are the Kurds, whose influence in northern Syria and Iraq was key in the fight against Daesh and who will be the first to suffer from Turkish interests.
As we can see once again, the picture is not encouraging, with jihadists (some say moderate) negotiating to establish a new government in Syria, a country on the verge of collapse and a more than possible Libyan-style civil war, a foreign power like Turkey trying to take over part of the territory, various interests trying to influence one or the other, and a people, the Kurds, once again used and abandoned to their fate but who are clear that they are not going to stop fighting.
And while we are asking questions, we must ask ourselves the final one: ‘what does the European Union have in mind?’ Because if there is one thing that is certain in all this, it is that whatever happens, it will not affect Russia, the United States or others. The consequences of what happens in Syria will be felt in Europe. We just have to sit and wait.