Very complicated scenario in Ukraine

In the early hours of the morning of the 24th, what for many analysts was no more than a piece of evidence waiting to materialise became a reality.

Russian troops that for months had been taking up positions along the border within the territory of Russia and Belarus crossed the border after a previous heavy attack with cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and air assets that hit strategic targets across the entire length and breadth of Ukrainian soil.

After two weeks of war, it would be useful to analyse some facts and try to outline some scenarios, because, although much of what has happened, despite the "astonishment" of many, falls within the normal parameters of a military conflict, there are other aspects that have caused, if not surprise, then a certain amount of astonishment. And some others have gone completely off script.

First of all, and to try to offer an analysis that is as comprehensible as possible, it is necessary to determine what the object of this military action is: what are the strategic objectives set by the Kremlin. This is the first point of controversy, as the military objectives are often confused with the strategic ones.

Russia, and in particular Putin and his core leadership, in their worldview, feel attacked and threatened by the West. This, which from our side of history is incomprehensible, is not so in their eyes. And their feeling is that despite the fall of the communist regime, with the loss of power and prestige that this entailed for what until then had been a superpower, at no time has the Western bloc treated them as an equal; on the contrary, it has not relented in its efforts to control and subjugate their country. This sentiment, real and true in their view, clashes head-on with the conviction that Russia has not ceased to be the great nation that was once an empire, that helped liberate Europe from Nazism and that for more than 40 years led one of the two blocs into which the world was divided.

And a major part of this sense of affront and threat is represented by NATO and more specifically its eastward expansion. NATO is not seen by Russia as the defensive organisation that it is, but as an alliance of powers whose primary purpose is to maintain control over Russia and prevent its resurgence at all costs. Thus, the fact that several countries that were part of the Soviet Union and share a border with Russia are part of the Alliance is a reality that causes consternation in the Kremlin.

Hence, the mere possibility that Ukraine might follow the same path set off alarm bells in Moscow and set in motion the machinery that has led to the events we are now witnessing.

The conflict that began in 2014 in the Donbass and was followed by the occupation of Crimea was only the first phase of a perfectly prepared plan to prevent Ukraine's rapprochement with NATO by all means.

Therefore, in this current phase, the strategic objective mentioned above is none other than the "liberation" of the two self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in their entirety, i.e. marking the Dnieper River as the western border, the establishment of a land corridor linking Crimea with Russian territory and extending this to the Transnistrian region, thereby linking all the regions that Moscow considers Russian in nature and in law.

And to achieve this strategic objective, it needs to attack the centre of gravity, and this is none other than Kiev, but not by understanding the Ukrainian capital as a physical entity, but as the symbol of what we have known until now as Ukraine, eliminating in one way or another (physically if necessary) the government or at least its visible head and forcing the election of an executive that is in tune with or at least condescends to Russian interests. In this respect, Kiev is the nerve centre of the resistance and of Ukraine today, and its surrender is very much a psychological blow. So much so that it has been confirmed that elements of the well-known PMC (Private Military Company) Wagner have been present in Kiev for weeks with the mission of locating and eliminating President Zelenski.

It is at this point that it is appropriate to talk about military objectives. Although the territorial aspiration is limited to a very specific area, from this point of view it makes perfect sense that in the early stages of the occupation targets were attacked throughout the country. The intention was simply to degrade the capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces as much as possible by attacking their command posts, transmission centres, air bases, logistics centres and critical infrastructure. The purpose of these attacks was twofold. On the one hand, to facilitate the entry of ground forces by preventing Ukraine's ability to react and, on the other, to reduce the country's military capabilities as much as possible so that it would not pose a threat to Russia (given the reaction, determination and preparation of the Ukrainian armed forces, it can be argued that if the invasion had been delayed by two years it would have been militarily unfeasible), and on the other, to send a clear message to all the bordering countries that Russia considers to be in the same situation as Ukraine.

It is in this first phase that an important point should be stressed that will necessarily influence the further development of the conflict. For the Kremlin, a key factor in this "special operation", to use its own name, was speed.

Russia's armed forces, while fearsome, are not without major problems and shortcomings. This has also been demonstrated. The need for a rapid operation was based on several factors: first and foremost, economics. Sustaining an operation of this scale is very costly, and Russia is not exactly at its best after two years of pandemic and the endemic factors that have gripped the Russian economy. So speed was tantamount to minimising cost. On the other hand, the campaign of what is known as STRATCOM, that is, the information campaign that accompanies any military operation to "sell" what is being done both to the world and to your own population. In Russia's case mainly to the latter. The longer the conflict drags on, the more chances there are that the Russian people will have a chance to learn the reality, to face the truth: that their nation has started a war by invading a sovereign country without any prior aggression. And this is important because Moscow was counting on the fact that the Western reaction would mainly be a round of sanctions, sanctions that would be suffered by the population as opposed to the population. Therefore, the longer the conflict drags on and the tougher the sanctions and their consequences, the more the Russian people will suffer. And if this is coupled with a more accurate understanding of what is happening, the combination could be explosive.

The loss of credibility with the international community is something the Kremlin had already discounted from the equation, as a swift campaign would allow any other event of sufficient importance to push the invasion of Ukraine into the background.

This speed was also important, tactically, for a reason that, as will be seen, is closely related. The initial attacks were carried out with what is known in military terminology as "PGM" (Precision Guided Ammunition). These devices were intended to eliminate most command and control centres, command posts, transmission nodes, ammunition depots, air bases, etc. while causing as little collateral damage as possible. But Russia has a serious problem. Its stockpile of such ammunition is limited, and its guidance system is not as accurate as that of its Western counterparts, so the effectiveness of such strikes can be considered limited. This fact has had a notorious influence on the course of events, as day after day the invasion forces are forced to make much more restricted use of this type of ammunition, reserving it for very specific and high-value targets, while at the same time the increased use of unguided munitions increases collateral damage, which exponentially reduces the supposed image of a "limited operation" that was still left not only in the eyes of the international community, but also in the eyes of their own public opinion. In addition, this use of more conventional munitions when it comes to air power forces aircraft to adopt flight profiles that make them more vulnerable to air defence, especially to the hundreds of MANPADs (man-portable anti-aircraft missiles) that the Western community is supplying them with. Proof of this is the increasing number of shoot-downs they are suffering.

Similarly, the way in which the ground forces proceeded caused some surprise in military circles, as their progression was far from their doctrine of employment, not making prior and massive use of artillery fire (surely with the intention of causing the least number of civilian casualties and damage to the infrastructure of the territory they were trying to control). The progression of the units in columns, mainly astride communication routes, made them easy targets for ambushes and the Ukrainian defensive system, the great need for logistical support that a force of this size requires, and especially when it comes to armoured and mechanised means as these lines have lengthened, has become a nightmare and a drain on the Russian forces.

The Ukrainians seem to have planned their defence in a very intelligent way, supporting it at specific points that have so far prevented Moscow from linking up the main axes of progression intended to pocket the Ukrainian forces and seize the territory it was aiming for.

Here special mention should be made of the cities. The Russian army has sought to avoid entering and fighting in densely populated urban centres. The reason for this is none other than the high cost in resources and lives that can be incurred by engaging in combat in built-up areas where armoured assets are highly vulnerable, the defender always has the initiative, and the number of troops needed to control a city would make an already difficult campaign untenable. And this lesson was painfully learned by Russia in Grozny during the first Chechen war.

That is why, in the case of Kiev, they have chosen to try to surround it, something they have not yet managed to do, and to besiege it, depriving it of basic supplies and services until the government's will to fight is broken. The actions that have been carried out inside have been ad hoc operations either by previously infiltrated members of the aforementioned PMC Wagner or by special operations teams. These operations have targeted high-value targets, and of course sought to locate and eliminate President Zelenski, in the hope that such a blow would cause the country to capitulate.

So far the shelling of the capital is a far cry from what has happened in cities such as Kharkiv or Mariupol. Here the situation is very different. Both are within the zone that the Kremlin intends to keep under its control, and must therefore be occupied without remedy. And the way to minimise the number of own casualties and facilitate progression through their streets is none other than to accompany the siege with permanent artillery and aviation attacks to reduce resistance, regardless of the damage caused or the casualties inflicted. A system as effective as it is brutal.

This different approach to the above-mentioned populations also tells us two very important facts: Russia does not have the slightest intention of occupying Kiev, while the resistance in two cities in the area, which a priori was considered to be sympathetic to Moscow, has been unexpectedly fierce.

The result of all of the above is, as has already been mentioned, the delay in achieving the objectives set and the prolongation of a war that Russia had hoped to win in less than a fortnight.

On this point, the harsh sanctions, in addition to the boomerang effect they inevitably have on the economy of those who impose them, can feed Putin's rhetoric to his population, since in an environment where he has total control over information, he will undoubtedly use the effects of the sanctions to "sell" the justification for his intervention to a West that is attacking the Russian people.

In view of the above, it is worth considering the possible scenarios we could face:

• A short-lived war: This one has already been overrun after fourteen days of war and losses far greater than imagined.
• Long-term war: The conflict at its current level of intensity is unlikely to be prolonged. Russia can neither economically nor socially afford to sustain such an entrenched war. The current Russian government would soon face growing protests both on the streets and behind closed doors, and this is not feasible. On the other side, by contrast, a country fighting for its territory has much more staying power and resilience.
• A medium-intensity conflict of long duration: The effects for Moscow would be much the same as described above. We would be talking about an occupation of part of a completely hostile territory and facing an insurgency that is increasingly prepared, organised and supported by the international community.An extension of the conflict involving NATO: Putin by now realises that his life as an international leader is over. Whatever his future holds, he will never again be able to sit in any international forum. For this reason, and given the prospect of not achieving the goals he has set for himself and made public, a flight forward is a feasible option, forcing NATO's involvement, as it would undoubtedly justify to the Russian people the need for this war against a European bloc and an organisation that are constantly attacking Russia in one way or another. It is in this scenario that the nuclear card also comes into play. In terms of conventional warfare, Russia has shown that it could do little against an Atlantic Alliance that surpasses it in means, technology and preparedness. But it is also aware that NATO's fear of a limited use of nuclear weapons exists, and is well-founded. Moreover, even if Russia were to take such a step, unless it were an indiscriminate, long-range attack on an ally, there would be a strong reluctance to respond in kind by unleashing the dreaded nuclear holocaust. In this option, Russia is playing on the West's fear and moral restraints. One need only recall the reaction of dread when it ordered to raise the alert level of its "Strategic Deterrence Forces", forgetting that these include conventional elements in addition to nuclear ones.
• A diplomatic solution: If Russia manages to achieve some of its objectives and negotiating leverage without so much effort, pain and chaos being fruitless, it is possible that the pressure Moscow feels from the street due to the effects of sanctions, and the knowledge of the reality of the conflict with the data on real casualties made public, plus the internal pressure that Putin is surely suffering within his own entourage, with the intervention of the appropriate mediators, a negotiated solution may be possible.
• Vladimir Putin out of the equation: It is becoming increasingly clear that not all is well with the Russian leader. Some dissent has been reported, especially in the dreaded FSB, with the dismissal of its chief and some other top officials. A popular uprising is highly unlikely given the effective information control in Russia and the pressure on any opposition leader or movement. But an internal movement within the Kremlin in the face of a drift of events that makes the course of the war or the decisions it intends to take untenable in the eyes of some senior officials, could provoke Vladimir Putin's own "Ides of March", which should not be ruled out.

What is undeniable is that this time the international community and especially the European Union cannot fail. This is the opportunity to demonstrate the unity and unity of opinion of which it is so proud. And that means unwavering support for the legitimate Ukrainian government, no matter what doubts or shortcomings its political system may show. And it is this support and this pressure that lead us to consider the fourth and fifth options as the two most likely. It is a risky gamble, and a terrible one, but the Russian leader has crossed a line and is not one to back down. He would not take an outright failure, it is not in his cards. He needs to get something that he thinks will make him right and something to offer Russia and satisfy his particular ego.

Be that as it may, it won't take long for the question to be answered.