Haqqani Afghanistan. Year 1
One year into the second Taliban regime, the country has undergone so much change that it is now in a deep economic, humanitarian, health, education and security crisis. Calls made to the Taliban leadership by the international community in late August 2021 to build a modicum of trust, such as establishing an inclusive government where all of Afghanistan's religious and political communities are represented, were rejected by the Taliban, which has meant a year of institutional paralysis despite statements by its leaders, most of them aimed at seeking international recognition and investment, so far with little success.
Introduction
On 15 August 2021, the Taliban took Kabul, earlier than some experts expected, as the government army collapsed after the fall of major Taliban-held cities such as Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kandahar. The victorious entry into Kabul, contrary to popular belief, was carried out without firing a shot and the Taliban and the Badri 313, the Haqqani paramilitaries, quickly spread out in the most emblematic places in the city, such as Kabul airport. The withdrawal of the Western powers was hasty and in some cases chaotic, given the speed of the Taliban's entry into Kabul, which US security officials1 anticipated in early September.
Thus began the second Taliban regime, preceded by the Doha accords in February 2020, signed between Taliban leaders and the US government, committing both to a peaceful solution for Afghanistan, including the withdrawal of NATO and US forces from Taliban-controlled areas of the country. Provided that the Taliban rejected al-Qaeda's activities in the territories under their control, which proved unlikely on 31 May this year, when Ayman al-Zawahiri, the terrorist organisation's top leader, was killed in a flat in Kabul. Against the backdrop of the Doha agreements, the US completed its withdrawal from Kabul on 30 August, thus beginning year 1 of the second Taliban regime.
The Taliban regimen and its government
From the start of the regime, Taliban leaders were quick to claim that their government had evolved from that of the first Taliban regime (1996-2001) and that it would be "inclusive "2 , recognising the ethnic, religious and political variety of the country, but the subsequent reality made it clear that the Taliban were not willing to share power, least of all the Haqqanis, whose senior members in the Ministries of Interior and Refugees would control internal security, intelligence and the theoretical return of thousands of Afghans.
The Taliban initially played with ambiguity about how they would act on such sensitive issues as freedom of education and women's access to it. But doubts were soon dispelled, with the top leader of the Taliban movement, Hibatullah Akhundzada3 , making it clear in a communiqué that the Taliban regime would be governed by Sharia law as the supreme religious law, under a radical Sunni interpretation, which would undoubtedly restrict individual and collective freedoms and the rights of Afghans, especially women.
The theoretical openness that was outlined in the words of important Taliban spokesmen such as Zabihulla Mujahid on 17 August 2021, two days after the entry into Kabul, was a mirage that clashed with Shari'a law, "Our women are Muslims, they will be happy to live under the framework of Shari'a" and that the media will be "free and independent" under the framework of Shari'a law4.
Small peaceful demonstrations soon followed in the capital, led by Afghan women demanding that their rights to education and work not be taken away. The Taliban regime banned such demonstrations, and when necessary repressed them harshly, and Sirajuddin Haqqani's ministry even ordered the arrest of their leaders, with the corresponding risk to their physical integrity5.
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, aware that it was no longer in the international spotlight as in the first weeks after its entry into Kabul, let the months go by without any hope of opening up. The declarations of the main members of the Taliban government went on to call for international recognition and the request for funds from the main international organisations so that the regime would not fall into economic chaos, but the reality was in itself very worrying, either in the social aspect where women, as we have seen, were totally marginalised from public life, with a country in bankruptcy or in the health aspect where serious health situations had to be treated in Pakistan6 or India due to the shortage of specialist personnel in Afghanistan, or in the political aspect where the Taliban closed the two chambers of political representation with the excuse of the budget deficit that afflicted the country, since the reduced Taliban budget did not take into account the two chambers, Taliban government spokesman Innamullah Samangani said in May 2022, leaving the door open to reconsidering the reopening of the chambers in the future.
Haqqani Afghanistan. Year 1
The Haqqani family controls the Ministries of Interior and Refugees as we shall see below, as well as the intelligence services.
Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani is the powerful man in charge of internal security while pulling the strings of the intelligence and counter-intelligence service, appointing provincial governors7 . In October 2021, he ordered the resumption of passport issuance, which has been halted since the Taliban army entered Kabul. Thousands and thousands of Afghans wanted to go abroad in view of the precarious situation in the country. The passport continued to read "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan" and not "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan", possibly because of the possible objections that the receiving countries might raise against a regime that was not internationally recognised and that to this day is still not recognised by any country in the world.
In October 2021, when Sirajuddin made his first public appearance at the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, at a ceremony to remember the suicide bombers against international and Afghan forces, he called them "heroes of Islam". The event was attended only by Taliban figures and dozens of relatives of the suicide bombers.
But Sirajuddin Haqqani, while praising the violence unleashed to come to power by his suicide bombers, was also capable of making conciliatory statements directed at the US and the British CNN journalist Christine Amanpour witnessed this in her interview with him in May this year, in which Sirajuddin rarely looked her in the eye, and in which the journalist took the opportunity to ask him about his relationship with the US, saying "In the future, we would like to have good relations with the United States".
Haqqani also sent out a contradictory message regarding women's education, saying that they were not opposed to the education of women, whom the regime allowed to go to school only up to the age of twelve but after that age must stay at home as the secondary schools had been closed, and that they were looking for a solution for them from that age onwards, especially with regard to clothing8.
The truth is that women's rights have been badly affected since the entry of the Taliban. Not only in education, but also in employment and social matters. Afghan women know better than anyone else that although they work, the working conditions in which they have to do so are pitiful, as they often do not even have a guaranteed salary, and their field of work is reduced to health and education, thus materialising in this country the gender gap in its maximum expression.
While Sirajuddin Haqqani was theoretically advocating a solution to the issue of women's access to secondary education, on 5 March this year a ceremony was held in Kabul to celebrate the departure of the first class of 377 Taliban police officers, men and women according to some agencies, but as can be seen in the photos and videos of the ceremony published by various media, in principle all men9.
Sirajuddin could be photographed on this occasion, given the discretion that accompanied his previous appearances where his face could not appear in any media. During his speech, he said that the regime was committed to the Doha agreements, but the point where he said that the Taliban would not allow individuals or groups, including al-Qaeda, to use Afghan territory to threaten the security of the US and its allies, This was blown to bits on 31 May this year when, in a CIA-led operation10 , an MQ9 Reaper drone armed with two Hellfire missiles located the home of al-Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri in a residential neighbourhood of Kabul and fired at it, killing him on the spot.
All this not only called into question the Doha agreements, it also called into question the very security deployed by Sirajuddin's ministry, for if they knew that al-Zawahiri was residing there, there was a serious security breach by his ministry in not putting sufficient means in place to prevent the CIA from reaching the al-Qaeda leader. If, on the other hand, they did not know who was residing in that building, it would call into question the intelligence service itself, which would not have detected that al-Zawahiri was living there. So far, Sirajuddin has not appeared publicly to give explanations, but the Taliban regime did in a statement in which it said that it strongly condemned the US invasion of its territory and that they did not know that Al Zawahiri was in Kabul.
On 29 July this year, two days before al-Zawahiri's death, Sirajuddin gave an interview11 to the Indian channel New18. Asked about the security guarantees to be given to Indian diplomats and businessmen, he replied that they have established peace in the country and that there should be no fear of economic investment, also ensuring that diplomatic institutions in Afghanistan are secure. This from an interior minister who has seen his capital city targeted by numerous Afghan Daesh attacks that have claimed the lives of more than 200 people in Kabul alone in one year.
All of the above makes it difficult for there to be a satisfactory dialogue between the interlocutors of the Taliban regime and members of powerful international institutions, since the current Afghan reality and the constant requests of members of the regime clash with the wishes of European personalities that any type of aid should be conditional on a minimum of political normalisation, all supported by an inclusive government, a situation that is so far unlikely to be promoted by the Taliban. When we speak of interlocutors, we must refer to legal interlocutors, and the paradox is that Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is wanted by the FBI as a global terrorist with a reward of 10 million euros, can hardly be a valid interlocutor.
Sirajuddin could not attend meetings with US administration officials, but his younger brother Anas Haqqani12 , who is not under arrest warrant, could. Anas does not hold any ministerial position, but is a senior adviser to his brother's Interior Minister, and is therefore his brother's voice in meetings at the highest level on any important departmental issue. Anas was already one of the main actors on the Taliban side in the meetings in Doha and then, in the days after the entry into Kabul, he became one of the main elements in the negotiations with members of the former government to address the issue of the handover of power, namely with the former President of the High Council for National Reconciliation, Abdullah Abdullah.
If Anas has demonstrated anything during his many meetings in the regime's first year, it has been his all-round character, meeting with the Badri 313 at Kabul airport, hosting the Afghan cricket team13 of which he and his brother are fervent admirers, and meeting with his interrogator when he was arrested years ago and imprisoned for five years by the former government. But it is his poetic side that also attracts attention, a well-known social network witnessing this characteristic.
Sirajuddin and Anas, as we see, have considerable weight in the Taliban regime during their year 1, missing their uncle and Minister of Refugees Khalil Haqqani, a prominent historical member of the Haqqani Network (HQN), whose first public appearance after the entry of the Taliban into Kabul was at the Haqqani mosque in Kabul, made at the capital's mosque on 20 August, surrounded by Badri 313 bodyguards, addressing his followers in a clear message to the US and the previous government, saying "Afghanistan is now free because it is free from Western imperialism, it will be safer and there will be no corruption".14
Khalil has been in frequent contact with UNHCR this year. The Minister for Refugees in October 2021 emphasised the need for transparency in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and coordination between his office and UNHCR for the security of the mission in the country, women NGO partners and UN employees. Later in June 2022 in a meeting with UNHCR representatives in Kabul, he expressed concern about the mistreatment of refugees who have fled to other nations in the wake of the conflict.
But Khalil held a press conference in Kabul on 31 May 2022 in which he called for the return of intellectuals, politicians and businessmen15 to open a dialogue table, a request that is difficult to implement. Afghanistan is currently the second largest refugee country in the world, with more than five million Afghans scattered mainly between Iran, Pakistan and the rest of the world. The vast majority of Afghans who fled will probably never return to Afghanistan given the economic paralysis and lack of freedoms in the country due to the Taliban regime. Many hundreds of thousands would rather be in dire conditions in Iran than return to their country, where the future is bleak due to the Taliban's lack of openness.
On the other hand, there are members of the Haqqani family who remain in the shadow of the three main leaders and are also wanted by the FBI as global terrorists, for example a brother of Sirajuddin and Anas named Aziz Haqqani or Sirajuddin's brother-in-law Yahya Haqqani.
Also the leader and general of the Uzbek anti-Taliban militia, Rashid Dostum, years ago Vice-President of the Government of Afghanistan under Ashraf Ghani, mentioned in February 2021 that Saifuddin Haqqani, according to Dostum the son of Sirajuddin, was together with the grandson of the founder of al-Qaeda in the district of Ghormach and Bala Murghab in northern Afghanistan16.
Conclusion
The Taliban regime entered with expectations that have not been fulfilled, as was to be expected with Shari'a law as the supreme order. Throughout this year, we have been able to see how the different leaders and spokesmen of the regime have asked for recognition and international support, but without the slightest intention of making the slightest opening, which has put an end to the patience of the international community, that despite the meetings they have had with them, they have not been able to convince the Taliban of the need for their government to be inclusive, an essential but difficult condition for the Taliban leaders to fulfil, since it is hard to imagine that they, and especially the high-ranking Haqqanis, would allow a woman or a member of the Shiite community to be a minister in their government.
But if the Taliban are anything compared to the first regime, they are more media-friendly. There has been no shortage of interviews with their leaders in which they respond with a load of good intentions when in reality they do not plan to make any social or political openings.
Fear has once again taken hold in Afghanistan, not only of the Afghan Daesh, which has been shown to take every opportunity to kill Shiites en masse from the Hazara17 ethnic group or members of the Taliban army, but also fear of the Taliban's internal security, which does not allow women to demonstrate courageously and demand the rights they had under the previous government, breaking up any demonstrations that do take place by shooting them down.
In view of the above, the international community does not seem to have any intention in the short term to intervene more deeply in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime, especially the EU, which is preoccupied with another issue, namely the economic and energy consequences of the war in Ukraine. Even with economic intervention, the EU knows in advance that there will never be a representative democracy in Haqqani Afghanistan, and the only thing that can be hoped for from this theocratic Shari'a-ruled government is that it will one day allow women and members of the Shi'a community to enter, which would be a step towards establishing a minimum of international trust. However, one should be concerned that the main threat to the regime in the first year has been the Afghan Daesh, which will not miss an opportunity to attack its Taliban enemies and even drive them from power.
As for the Haqqani's proximity to al-Qaeda, the death of al-Zawahiri may open a new phase in which the new leader of the terrorist organisation, whether in the Maghreb (AQIM) or the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), will either maintain his proximity to them or focus his attention on other safe territory for him, depending on the harmony that may have existed between him and the members of the network (HQN).
Luis Montero Molina is a political scientist and Sec2Crime contributor.
Bibliografía
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