EU’s Member States dilemma to the ISIS Women and Minors remaining in Syrian camps
The fall of the Islamic State in 2019 represented the success of the international coalition
that had joined forces to defeat the terrorist group. Currently, European governments face
the dilemma of deciding what to do with women and minors affiliated to ISIS who remain
in Syrian camps and demand their repatriation. The most common position is inaction.
Within the camps, they are exposed to re-radicalisation and psychological trauma that, in
the long run, can pose a more significant threat to global security. Other more favourable
options would include repatriation, rehabilitation, or being brought before a court
This month, the 10th anniversary of the relentless Syrian civil war occurs two years after
the end of the so-called Islamist State ‘caliphate’. It extended through vast territories in
Syria and Iraq at its peak, as seen in the map below. However, by March 2019, the
Kurdish- led armed group, a vital member of the global coalition against ISIS, succeeded
in defeating the terrorist group in its last stronghold, the Syrian town of Baghouz, near the
border with Iraq
It is estimated that more than 30,000 people from at least 86 countries travelled to Syria
and Iraq in late 2015 to join their ranks1. Regarding the EU, Member States estimate that
around 5,000-6,000 foreign terrorist fighters undertook this travel from Europe2. These numbers are unprecedented and provide an idea of the power of attraction that ISIS
wielded abroad.
Albeit the nosedive of ISIS epitomised an outstanding success for the international
community that joined their forces against Islamic terrorism, governments worldwide face
a myriad of complex and demanding challenges nowadays. A certain case is considered
highly critical among them because of the legal discussions and ethical dilemmas that the
situation poses. This is the existence of around 6,902 foreign women and up to 6,577
foreign minors3 endangered in camps in northeast Syria4. The number of Europeans held
reportedly exceeded 1,000, including 600 children5.
This paper intends to analyse the situation of women and children in Syrian camps who
belonged to ISIS, answering the following research questions: ‘What steps should the EU
Member States take for solving the security, legal and ethical dilemmas deriving from ISIS
women and minors detained in Syrian camps?’ This question is relevant since there is
many women and minors from across the globe who joined, were recruited, were taken
or the case of children, born into the group, and seek to be repatriated to their countries
of origin.
In order to find an answer to the research question, the paper follows the following
structure. Firstly, women’s and minors’ situation will be explained from different
perspectives such as the legal, the political and the ethical ones with arguments favouring
and opposing their repatriation to origin countries. Secondly, there will be an examination
of the current dynamics of returnees and the current trials in Syria and Iraq. Lastly, the
material will be consciously assessed to provide a conclusion in relation to the present status of the subject matter under investigation.
In order to guarantee an in-depth analysis of the challenges and answers that the
European governments have at their disposal, the geographical scope of the research
has to be reduced. Therefore, the primary focus lies on EU Member States and the United
Kingdom as most of the most updated data collected to this point belongs to a period
before the completion of Brexit. The reason is that European countries such as Germany,
the UK, the Netherlands, or Belgium were a relevant hotspot of foreign fighters’ emission.
On the other hand, there are the camps established by the Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) across the northeast of Syria to shelter those who had recently lived under ISIS’s
control or were perceived to be the partners, children, and relatives of male ISIS
members. Two of these camps, Al-Hol and Roj, contain most foreign nationals. More than
7,000 children and 3,000 foreign women from about 50 countries in the former6 and at
least 500 women and 1,200 children the latter7.
Finally, the reason to focus this research on women and minors, and thus, excluding
men’s situation, is that found by Rachel Bryson in the British case8. The researcher of the
Tony Blair Institute for Global Change observed that women regularly took children with
them when travelling to join extremist groups abroad whereas men often went alone.
Furthermore, in the few instances of female returnees, often, children are present too.
Therefore, this suggest that the situation of women and children should be considered
from a holistic point of view as their fate is intrinsically intertwined.
On the 26th of February 2021, the UK Supreme Court ruled that the 26-years-old
Shamima Begum could not restore her British citizenship, which the government stripped
in 2019 under the argument of maintaining the safety and security of UK citizens. She
fled Britain as a schoolgirl to join Islamic State in Syria, and due to the court decision, she
will not be able to re-enter the UK. While waiting for the verdict, her infant son died in the
hospital of the Roj camp. The minor’s British citizenship had previously been denied by
the government, which ignored the request of Begum’s family to bring the baby to the
UK9.
This case serves to illustrate how women's condition usually affects the life of their
children and vice versa. However, this does not conclude ultimately that the international
and public consideration of their cases is the same. Issues regarding their role in
terrorism, citizenship, human rights, prosecution or repatriation work differently for them
as it will be presented in the forthcoming section.
Islamic State-affiliated women’s portrayal in media has oscillated between victims taken
or duped by their husbands as naive ‘jihadi brides,’ or active security concerns10. Both
approaches may be accurate. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
(CTED) alerts that the messages on social media often tapped into a narrative of alleged
disrespect shown to Muslim women in Western societies sowing hatred amongst it11.
Some also were mesmerised by the idea of getting married to an ISIS fighter. Others
were forced by their radicalised family members or sought to escape abusive lives at
home.
Due to the great variety of reasons for ISIS affiliation, women’s role on these groups
remains largely unclear ranging from slaves to perpetrators recruiters, propagandists, and supporters12. Nevertheless, the CTED also notes that women who at first were victims,
in some instances, become perpetrators to improve their situation or as a result of
indoctrination to radical ideas. Following the same idea, Carola García-Calvo, Principal
Investigator of the Program on Violent Radicalisation and Global Terrorism of the Elcano
Royal Institute, has warned against underestimating the role of women in the global
jihadist movement. “Starting in 2012, the Islamic State makes an explicit appeal to women
to mobilise, to unite. It was time to colonise the territory, not only to consolidate the
territorial gain but also to expand their project. And women responded", she explains13.
It seems evident that governments cannot plan any return if there is no accountability of
women's actions undertaken in Syria or Iraq. Nonetheless, national judicial systems face
two fundamental challenges. On the one hand, the lack of legislation necessary to
prosecute foreign fighters14. On the other hand, the absence of evidence for women’s
involvement in the terrorist group15. Hence, for the purpose of deciding whether to
repatriate a woman or not, the main concern of governments is to ensure the necessary
tools to effectively assess women’s responsibility (if any) for crimes committed under ISIS
should due process need to be guaranteed.
Experts have also pointed out that one of the main challenges is what has been called “a
black hole of evidence”16. It was common for active fighters to communicate and boast
on social media about their exploits, thereby creating evidence that can be used against
them17. On the contrary, females usually have non-combat roles, making it more difficult
to collect evidence in their cases than in one for a male combatant. Besides, as support
acts, in the event of being declared guilty, these crimes carry shorter sentences than
those related to combat actions. In practice, these constraints would suggest that returning women may face very little, if any18, time in prison which also acts as a deterrent
for governments to repatriate them.
Regarding both challenges, in the last few years, an increasing number of European
countries have worked on updating their criminal codes with the object of improving the
judicial response to women‘s contribution to terrorist groups. In this way, support acts
such as travel with the intent to join a terrorist organisation abroad, to provide or receive
terrorist training, and to fund a terrorist organisation are currently considered a crime19.
Among them, in 2015, Spain penalised the displacement to a territory dominated by
terrorist groups. Still, Europol has warned that this has not been the case in all EU
Member States, a fact that opens up important security gaps on the European continent20.
Finally, remorse shown by some women retained in Al-Hol and Roj camps in contrast with
those who still reaffirm their commitment to ISIS or jihadism more broadly should not be
disregarded. What resulted from interviews carried out by humanitarian workers and
researchers is that many of them claim to be repentant of joining ISIS and display their
willingness to face justice in their home countries for the crimes they could have
committed21. As a matter of fact, reports show how women in the camps that adhered to
ISIS’ extremist ideology are harassing and threatening those who have neglected their
affiliation to the group22. The distinction between radicalised and non-radicalised women
could provide the opportunity for a safer repatriation. For instance, after living in these
camps for a prolonged time, authorities in the centre have monitored and observed them,
gaining knowledge on their personalities and backgrounds. Also, individual assessment
has been undertaken by authorities and non-governmental organisations that can help to
catalogue and distinguish women’s stances23.
However, the longer they remain in these camps, the more heightened the risk of
recidivism and re-radicalisation. This could be perceived as a missed opportunity for
countries to take concerted and necessary action to show their responsibility in global
security and well-being by implementing deradicalization and rehabilitation programs to
reintegrate these women once again into society. Otherwise, their permanence in the
camps represents a latent danger whose outcome is uncertain
By international standards, there is a consensus that children recruited to non-state
armed groups should primarily be regarded as victims, not as perpetrators25.
Nonetheless, ISIS children were portrayed several times as a ‘ticking time bomb’. The
reason is that for many years, the terrorist group has trained and employed them as spies,
cooks, bomb-planters, and suicide bombers, raising concerns about their ideological
indoctrination. Following this trend, Europol indicates they may pose a “future threat”25.
On this basis, a criterion to determine children’s potential menace should be based on
age. For instance, Red Cross advocates that the aforementioned situations apply to those
minors who are now over 13-14 years old. They were brought by their parents when they
joined ISIS or were already living in the territory where the caliphate was proclaimed and
thus, quickly integrated into the group's sphere of influence. Though, when it comes to
infants and children under 12 years old, it should be assumed that they do not represent
a danger for society and bear higher potential for rehabilitation26.
Apart from national security concerns, EU Member States are cautious about repatriating
children because article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights refers to the
right to family life. Thus, ISIS parents whose child has been repatriated could appeal to
this right and ask for repatriation. Indeed, it has been recorded that some women in the
Al-Hol camp are hiding orphans or passing them off as their own children, if their attachment to a child could hinder national governments from abandoning them.Acknowledging this, most European countries have decided to repatriate orphans solely and/or implemented DNA testing addressed to avoid deceptions27.
Still, even this option might not be available for those born in the caliphate as the only
document they possess is an ISIS-issued birth certificate unrecognised by any State’s
Government28. Neither for those whose parents are nationals of a country that has
introduced legislation to refuse the automatic assignment of citizenship to infants born to
Islamic State-affiliated parents. These actions leave or could have left hundreds of
children statelessness which ultimately means that no country carries any legal
responsibility for their fate29.
States should consider the medium to long term repercussions of leaving the ISIS children
to languish in camps in dangerous situations, facing disease, harsh conditions, witnessing
violence and at risk of suffering abuses. According to some authors, being raised in a war
zone can be a critical contributing aspect to the decision of adolescents and young adults
to join armed groups30. In addition, repeated and direct exposure to conflict characterised
by hostility, violence, and unresolved endings produce a toxic environment that thereby
challenges the child’s capacity to achieve and maintain emotional security, which
eventually increase the child’s vulnerability to developing psychopathologies31.
Therefore, their swift repatriation allows treating at-risk children before they develop any
major psychosocial or behavioural difficulties. Otherwise, they will be able to pose a more
significant threat to Western countries in the future as opposed to their threat now,
including the commission of terrorist attacks.
In Europe, the predominant stance regarding repatriation is the opposition to the return
of foreign fighters, regardless of age and gender and the recent resolution of the EU’s
Parliament which called to allow given repatriation processes. The primary concern
among policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike is that returning foreign fighters will pose
a significant security risk, through the direct perpetration of terrorist attacks, recruiting
others into action, and the logistical and/or material support offered to the perpetration of
strikes32. The last decade of intermittent terrorist attacks and a continuous immigration
flow have shifted the European public opinion toward the closure of national borders.
However, this does not mean that there have been any returnees at all. For instance, Italy
repatriates and allows the return of its foreign fighters. Belgium repatriates’ children but
leaves mothers in the camps, whilst Denmark and Ireland return women and children
together33.
Albeit states might not take the step needed to repatriate them, some foreign fighters and
their families have been able to make their way back. Europol publishes the percentages
of returns since the beginning of the Syrian conflict34. For instance, the return rate of
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, and Italy have oscillated between 20 % and 30 %,
while the Netherlands and Spain have recorded roughly 18 % returning. In contrast,
Germany and the UK seem to have experienced the highest proportions of their foreign
fighters returning around 33 % and 45 % respectively. These returns include women and
minors.
However, numbers also indicate that although women are estimated to have made up
17 % of those foreigners who travelled to join ISIS from Western Europe, they only make
up about 8 % of those who are recorded as having returned by July 201935, an incentive
that could stimulate further assistance for eventual repatriations. Some of the factors
believed to contribute to the lower rate of return among women are the surrender of their
passports to ISIS figures of authority, the fact that they cannot travel without a male
guardian and that they are more threatened by smugglers. Consequently, while organised
repatriations provide the path to monitoring, prosecuting, and rehabilitating foreign fighters and relatives, uncontrolled and free returns increase the risks regarding national
security as their personal circumstances remain unknown.
In the meantime, as the population in camps increases, making it unbearable, Iraq is
bringing thousands of people in controversial court proceedings before the absence of
any action of foreign countries to repatriate and prosecute their citizens36. Following its
steps, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, established after the
defeat of ISIS and led by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) has announced that
they will also put them on trial37. None of these proceedings should be desirable for
European governments. Regarding Iraqis, this country applies the death penalty for a
range of offences such as murder, treason, espionage, rape, kidnapping, terrorism, war
crimes and drug trafficking. Alone in 2018, 616 foreigners were judged and convicted of
Islamic State membership, receiving varied sentences of up to life in prison or even the
death penalty38. An astonishing 466 of these were women, 108 minors, and only 42 of
these men39.
Concerning the upcoming trials in Syria, the Kurdish authorities do not constitute a
recognised international legal entity. This, in turn, increases concerns regarding its legal
capability to prosecute and open the aforementioned legal processes.
In summary, while no repatriation is taking place, EU Member States fail to provide justice
to their nationals at home. In this way, the governments are denying them some
fundamental rights such as the opportunity to defend oneself in a court of law, the right to
be taken promptly before a judge or an equivalent authority to order their release and
have a trial within a reasonable time. All of them are considered central to the proper
functioning of the justice system. As the philosophers Govier and Boutland remark, a
country knowingly leaving its citizens exposed to the dubious judicial treatment provided
by a third country is neglecting its duties40.
As explained in the introduction, this paper sought to provide an answer to the question:
‘What steps should the EU Member States take for solving the security, legal and ethical
dilemmas deriving from ISIS women and minors detained in Syrian camps?’ It is a
significant challenge to provide a solution to this dilemma as a wide range of impasses
influence the path which can be taken, yet what is ethically correct and the politically
desire rarely coincide.
Ideally, the best government response would be to repatriate all their nationals to be
brought to a court of justice or integrated into a rehabilitation program. However, this is
unlikely to happen. Right-wing ideologies are spreading in the European continent,
characterised by xenophobic and anti-immigration speeches41. As a result, the possibility
of the realisation of an attack that happens to be carried out by a repatriated subject is a
chance that no politician would like to face. Furthermore, Europeans have witnessed with
fear how vans colliding with pedestrians, a student beheading his professor, and
stabbings taking place on streets and on the metro. Public opinion wavers every time
these events are on television and media because they see this happening to ordinary
people which stirs emotive sentiment. Hence, complete rejection of these repatriations
taking place is understandable.
However, governments should not be swayed by public opinion and should not be
dictated by fear and terror. Among their responsibilities is to provide solutions to current
problems and challenges, to forecast the future and avoid potential dangers and threats.
Thus, realistically, the least that it is expected is that they do not bury their head in the
sand waiting for this problem to die down, giving this is unlikely to happen. While EU
Member States do not act and address the situation properly, thousands of people remain
in the Al-Hoj and Roj camps risking being radicalised and sowing the seeds of hatred
against the country that abandoned them. The more significant hazard is not the individual
but the collective, living in harsh conditions and exposure to violence, diseases, and
death. Thus, the question is not one young boy being a ticking time bomb or a woman, a future terrorist. The threat is submerged in the camps as a whole.
Humans have an instinct to survive, and these families will endure impossible conditions
to do it. Should we not act now, we might regret it in the coming future. As emphasised
by the journalist and writer, Pilar Cebrián, the delay on the repatriation “may be the
preparation for the 2030 caliphate”42.
Marisa López González
Master in Geopolitics and Strategic Studies
Researcher Intern at the International Observatory of Terrorism Studies @sisulopez
References:
1 JASKO, Katarzyna, KRUGLANSKI, Arie W., RIJAL bin Hassan, Ahmad Saiful and GUNARATNA, Rohan. "ISIS: Its History, Ideology, and Psychology", START, Handbook of Contemporary Islam and Muslim Lives, 5 December 2018. Disponible en: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73653-2_30-1
2 United Nations Security Council. "Ninth Report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations activities in support of Member States to counter the threat," S/2019/612, 31 July 2019. Available at: https://undocs.org/es/S/2019/612
3 COOK, Joana and VALE, Gina. "From Daesh to "Diaspora" II: The Challenges Posed by Women and Minors After the Fall of the Caliphate", The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, July 2019. Available at: https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ICSR-Feature-From- Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-II-The-Challenges-Posed-by-Women-and-Minors-After- the-Fall-of-the-Caliphate.pdf.
4 Data are estimates due to the difficulty of obtaining accurate numbers because of the lack of official counts. Moreover, experts such as Thomas Renard, a researcher at the Egmont Institute, a think-tank located in Brussels, warn that these estimates are probably underestimated and that there are more cases than those collected, given that those with dual nationality or those who have lost their nationality are sometimes excluded. On the other hand, the data collected are for 2019, so the figures could have changed significantly as cases of escape from the camps are on the rise.
5 RENARD, Thomas and COOLSAET, Rik. "From bad to worse: The fate of European foreign fighters and families detained in Syria, one year after the Turkish offensive", Egmont Security and Policy Brief No. 130, October 2020.
6 "Syria: Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects' Families", Human Rights Watch, 23 July 2019. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/23/syria-dire-conditions-isis-suspects-families
7 ELLENBERG, Molly and SPECKHARD, Anne. "Perspective: Can We Repatriate the ISIS Children?", Homeland Security Today, 7 July 2020. Available at: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter- areas/counterterrorism/perspective-can-we-repatriate-the-isisis-children/.
8 BRYSON, Rachel. "For Caliph and Country Exploring how British jihadis join a global movement", Tony Blair Institute for Global Challenge, London, September 2017. Available at: https://institute.global/sites/default/files/inline-files/For-Caliph-Country.pdf
9 CHULOV, Martin, PARVEEN, Nazia and RASOOL, Mohammed. "Shamima Begum: baby son dies in Syrian refugee camp", The Guardian, 9 March 2019. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk- news/2019/mar/08/shamima-begum-confusion-after-reports-newborn-son-may-have-died.
10 COOK, Joana and VALE, Gina. Op.cit.
11 "Gender dimensions of the response to returning foreign terrorist fighters", United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), February 2019.
12 Ibid.
13 REQUENA, Pilar. "El regreso de las jihadistas españolas: ¿una amenaza para la seguridad nacional?" RTVE, 23 November 2019. Available at: https://www.rtve.es/noticias/20191123/regreso- yihadistas-espanolas-amenaza-para-seguridad-nacional/1992434.shtml
14 HOFFMAN, Adam and FURLAN, Marta. "Challenges posed by returning foreign fighters", The George Washington University, March 2020. Available at: https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Challenges%20Posed%20by%20Returning%20Fore ign%20Fighters.pdf.
15 "Women and Children First: Repatriating the Westerners Affiliated with ISIS", International Crisis Group, 18 November 2019. Available at: https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/208-women-and-children- first.pdf
16 PROTO, Lucas. "There is nothing more unpopular in Europe than repatriating members of the Islamic State",
El Confidencial, 24 March 2021.
17 GOVIER, Trudy and BOUTLAND, David. "Dilemmas regarding returning ISIS fighters", Ethics & Global Politics, 13(2), 1756562, 28 April 2020. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1756562
18 International Crisis Group. Op.cit.
19 HENLEY, Max, LIGER, Quentin, MÖLLER, Carolin, EAGER, James, OVIOSU, Yemi, MIRJA, Gutheil. "EU and Member States' policies and laws on persons suspected of terrorism-related crimes", Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union (European Parliament). Publication Office of the EU, December 2017. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2861/499667
20 'European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report (TE-SAT) 2020', Europol, 23 June 2020. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-terrorism- situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2020.
21 Human Rights Watch. Op. cit.
22 SPECKHARD, Anne and SHAJKOVCI, Arian. "Who are ISIS fighters in custody and how can they be repatriated?", Homeland Security Today, October 7, 2019. Available at: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/who-are-the-isis-fighters-in-custody-and- how-can-they-they-be-repatriated/
23 International Crisis Group. Op.cit.
24 "Child soldiers and other children associated with armed forces and armed groups", International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva: August 2012. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/icrc- 002-0824.pdf.
25 'Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019 (TE-SAT)', Europol, 27 June 2019.
26 International Committee of the Red Cross. Op.cit.
27 International Crisis Group. Op.cit.
28 ELLENBERG, Molly and SPECKHARD, Anne. Op.cit.
29 "Handbook Children Affected by the Foreign Combatant Phenomenon: Ensuring a Child Rights-Based Approach", United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT). Available at: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism.ctitf/files/ftf_handbook_web_r educed.pdf
30 BRETT, Rachel and SPECHT, Irma. "Young Soldiers: Why They Choose to Fight", International Labour Office; Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Geneva, 1 June 2004.
31 ELLIS, B. Heidi, CARDELI, Emma, BLOOM, Mia, BRAHMBHATT, Zachary and WEINE, Steven. "Understanding the needs of children returning from formerly ISIS-controlled territories through an emotional security theory lens: Implications for practice", Child Abuse & Neglect, 109, 104754, November 2020. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2020.104754
32 HOFFMAN, Adam and FURLAN, Marta. Op.cit.
33 Ibid.
34 United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. Op.cit.
35 Members of the ECFR Council. "Open letter: Call for a controlled return of ISIS foreign fighters - European Council on Foreign Relations" The European Council on Foreign Relations, 26 November 2019. Available at:
https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_open_letter_a_managed_return_of_isis_foreign_fighters/
36 RENARD, Thomas and COOLSAET, Rik. "From bad to worse: The fate of European foreign fighters and their families detained in Syria, one year after the Turkish offensive" EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations, Security Policy Brief, October 2020. Available at: https://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2020/10/SPB130_final.pdf?type=pdf
37 Ibid.
38 CEBRIÁN, Pilar. "They left to join ISIS. Now Europe is leaving its citizens to die in Iraq", Foreign Policy, 15 September 2019. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/15/they-left-to-join-isis-now- europe-is-leaving-their-citizens-to-die iniraq/
39 COOK, Joana and VALE, Gina. Op. cit.
40 GOVIER, Trudy and BOUTLAND, David. "Dilemmas regarding returning ISIS fighters", Ethics & Global Politics, 13(2), 1756562, 28 April 2020. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2020.1756562
41 BAYRAKLI, Enes and HAFEZ, Farid. 'Islamophobia in Europe Report 2019', Turkey: Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), 2020.
42 POLIDURA, Andrea. "Pilar Cebrián: "Delaying the repatriation of European jihadists may be the preparation for the next caliphate in 2030", Atalayar, 5 April 2021.