Referendum and elections in Italy, lessons to be learned

Finally, between the 20th and 21st, the elections postponed by the coronavirus were held, affecting a total of seven regions and some 1,000 town councils, as well as the "referendum" on the "taglio" or reduction in the number of MPs. And all of these, without any particular surprises, allow us to draw interesting lessons that we will try to analyse below. 

Let us begin with the "referendum" whose objective was to reduce, from the following legislature, the number of members of the current Italian Parliament, which is not only bicameral, but also has the particularity, not seen in any other country around it, that the two Chambers (the Upper and Lower Houses) have equal legislative capacity. Thus, when at the end of May 2018 the Five Stars Movement and the League signed the so-called "government contract", one of the conditions imposed by the first formation on the second was that the lower house should be increased from the current 630 members to 400, and that the upper house should in turn be reduced from the 315 members who were elected to it to just 200.

Despite the fact that the League broke the "government contract" in August 2019 with the intention of going to early elections, as is known the PD offered itself to the Five Star Movement to be its new coalition partner and, although it had voted against the aforementioned "taglio" up to that point, it accepted that it should be included in the new pact with which it would face the rest of the legislature.  

So this reduction in the number of national MPs, which after being voted on five times between the two chambers had to be submitted to a "referendum" as it constituted a fully-fledged reform of the entire Constitution (the current Italian Magna Carta establishes, specifically in articles 56 and 57, the specific number of members who must belong to both chambers), was voted on by the Italian people between Sunday 20 and Monday 21. The turnout was high (54%) due to fears of the spread of the coronavirus, and the response of the Italians was resounding: yes to the reduction by 345 members of the current Parliament, which was supported by almost 70% of the population.

Can this "referendum" be considered as a victory of the Five Star Movement? Formally yes, because they have been the driving force behind the "taglio" since they came to power in June 2018. But in practice, bearing in mind that this very peculiar group once again suffered the umpteenth electoral debacle in the elections of the seven regions, which is not surprising bearing in mind that the party does not even have a leader (the former leader, the current foreign minister Di Maio, resigned over eight months ago), what actually took place was a very resounding slap in the face by the Italian citizens towards their political class as it was basically very costly, fairly inefficient and prone to corruption.  

And all this despite the fact that in recent weeks, bearing in mind that in the last vote in Parliament (October 2019) there had been sufficient unanimity among its members to accept this reduction, part of the political forces had attempted to mobilise, indirectly, the vote against the "taglio": this had been done by part of the PD and also by a few "heavyweights" of the League. But the three men who had been involved in negotiating the "taglio" (first Luigi di Maio and Matteo Salvini, and then Nicola Zingaretti) held firm to the "yes" vote, despite the temptation for Salvini to make a full-blown defeat of the Five Star Movement possible. But it seems that the Italians decided to act on their own, and their response could not have been more forceful: for them, there are too many politicians in the country, so as soon as they had the chance to say it, they did so emphatically.

The main lesson to be learned is that, however faithful Italian citizens may be to their call to the ballot box, disaffection towards the political class is deeply rooted among people in all corners of the country. In terms of the lessons learned from the elections to the governments of seven regions, two issues became clear. The first is that it is very difficult to break the political tradition of electoral feuds: it is just as difficult for the left to impose itself in Lombardy and Veneto as for the right to do so in Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany or Campania.

It is true that in the case of both Veneto and Campania the effective management of the coronavirus by their governors must have had its effect, but also that the candidates for re-election in regions like Puglia (we are referring to Emiliano, leader of the PD) have benefited from the electoral tradition in the area under his rule. Moreover, it seems clear that there is nothing worse for trying to win an election in Italy than sending someone from the EU institutions: Fitto, the candidate of the centre-right in Puglia, and Ceccardi, also the head of the centre-right but in Tuscany, share the status of MEPs, and both lost very clearly. The people of both regions have shown that "paratroopers" from the European Union's legislative assembly are not welcome.

Finally, a third election in this triple call for elections is that the current government coalition was able to save face in key elections for the country's future: the fact that the centre-right was only able to take over one region (Marche) is a success. But that same coalition should not forget that, beyond having managed the "health emergency" very successfully, the current government has been fortunate in that these elections have been held when the effects of the standstill on the national economy, which took place over months, have not yet been really felt. 

In this connection it would not be surprising if, before the end of his presidential term (which will take place at the end of January 2022), President Mattarella entrusted Prime Minister Conte with the task of forming a new government in which, on the one hand, the best that the country has at its disposal to undertake major structural reforms was present; and, on the other, the coalition should really be finished greasing itself up instead of being a mere sum of Five Stars and PD with a LeU that is not very present (it has only one minister, the head of Health, Roberto Speranza) and with Matteo Renzi's Italia Viva operating on its own.  

Thus, in relation to the former, the economic area should be reinforced, giving entry to people of importance in the world of finance: this would be the case, for example, of the ex-economist-head of the International Monetary Fund, Cottarelli, in whom Mattarella already showed his confidence by entrusting him with forming a government in May 2018 in case the Five Stars Movement and the League did not finally reach an agreement (this was not necessary because, as we pointed out earlier, the so-called "government contract" was eventually signed between the two parties). Meanwhile, in relation to the latter, Matteo Renzi, who has nothing to do today in the event of early elections, must become fully involved in the government action by entering the executive himself or increasing the presence of members of his party in the new government, as a way of ensuring that its very important votes in the Senate (almost two dozen at present) are in harmony with those provided by Five Stars, PD and LeU, the latter formation where its most prominent man (former PD Minister and former PD Secretary General Pierluigi Bersani) should also think about being part of a new Executive. 

As we have said, the second Conte government has been able to save face against the centre-right offensive, but two fundamental issues cannot be ignored: Salvini and company already control fifteen of the country's twenty regions, and survey after survey the centre-right continues to lead the centre-left by almost ten points. So all it takes is for the economic recovery to start running aground for President Mattarella to have no choice but to call early elections.

Matteo Salvini, although in his lowest hours since becoming the most popular politician in the country two years ago, has not said his last word and will try to make up for the social malaise that the coronavirus will continue to generate by giving free rein to the populism and ultra-nationalism that characterise his political action. So, as we say, these elections can be considered as a truce for the government: as a moment of relief for an Executive that has been wearing out for many months, but the legislature still does not have, at all, a guarantee that it will end in early 2023. Only time will tell. 

Pablo Martín de Santa Olalla Saludes is Senior Researcher at the "Civismo" Foundation and author of the book Italia, 2013-2018. Del caos a la esperanza (Liber Factory, 2018)