Unrelenting tension between Algeria and Morocco
The two countries, Morocco and Algeria, continue to engage in a political and diplomatic tug-of-war in the regional and international arena, seeking support and establishing alliances and agreements for their regional policy. The dispute between the two North African geopolitical rivals over the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara has reached dangerously aggressive levels. Both Rabat and Algiers have the Sahara issue and the geopolitical rivalry between them as a top priority of their political-diplomatic apparatus. They devote tens of millions of euros annually to this duel.
On the African stage, while Morocco has in recent years focused a political offensive on the African continent based on the implementation of major infrastructure projects and mutually beneficial economic and trade agreements between the Alawi kingdom and African capitals, it has also developed a line of aid and cooperation in health matters in connection with the fight to contain COVID-19. For its part, Algeria has mobilised all its old political and ideological levers on the continent established with the veteran and longstanding leaders of the anti-colonial struggle or their successors.
Morocco has succeeded in reversing a good part of the African countries that had recognised the Republic proclaimed by the Polisario Front in the 1980s, while Algeria has put all its weight behind the internal bodies of the pan-African organisation, especially the African Union Commission and the Peace and Security Council.
Although the AU recognises the Polisario Republic (SADR) as a "founding state of the AU", only 12 of the 50 independent states that make up the AU explicitly recognise it. Twenty other African states have withdrawn their recognition of SADR.
Two cities, Dakhla in the Moroccan-administered part of the Sahara and Tindouf in the Algerian part, are currently battling to become platforms for economic and trade relations with Africa. Dakhla has everything to gain, given its geographical location, the infrastructure under construction, port and motorways, and the financial attraction it is enjoying. Tindouf is no more than a project, as it lacks infrastructure, and only has the route that will link it to the town of Zuerat in Mauritania, where it will connect with the mineral train that runs to Nouakchott.
In the fight against terrorism in Africa, whether of a religious or ethnic nature, Algeria has offered its military and security services expertise to help countries, especially those of the Sahel and the West African region, to fight this scourge; however, the failures of larger armies than Algeria in this fight, such as the French, as well as of various military coalitions mobilised by the UN or independently, undermine the positive effects of such aid.
Morocco, for its part, has focused its counter-terrorism policy on socio-economic and ideological aspects. In addition to security aid, Rabat has offered African countries that are victims of the terrorist scourge its experience in training imams and religious leaders, in economic micro-projects for marginalised populations, and in the construction of schools and clinics; a policy that is more beneficial and expected by the affected populations.
The Latin American scenario offers the same background of ideological ties (on the Algerian side) and economic and commercial projects (on the Moroccan side). The two countries are trying to take advantage of the political changes taking place in the American subcontinent following the elections to gain support. Algeria has managed to bring the new governments of Peru and Bolivia closer to its positions in defence of the self-determination of the Sahrawi population; Morocco hopes that the governments of Uruguay and Ecuador, in the hands of liberal and right-wing parties, will soon decide to break off relations with the Polisario Republic (SADR).
In this equation of the pulse in Latin America, Cuba plays a symbolic and dragging role. Morocco's new policy towards the pearl of the Caribbean, inaugurated with King Mohammed VI's trip to the island and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Havana and Rabat, has an important vector of mutually beneficial relations. Morocco has opened up to new projects in Cuba, in infrastructure, clean energy, transport, health, culture and sports, which facilitate Cuba's strong entry onto the international economic scene, thanks to the dynamism and pragmatism of its ambassador in Havana, the socialist Bughaleb el Attar, who follows the directives of the Moroccan royal palace. The difficult balance between ideology and development is increasingly in favour of the latter. Cuba continues its traditional policy of support for the Polisario, but only in the training of university students, doctors and health professionals, far from the military commitment of the early days of the conflict.
Morocco has been granted observer status in several Pan-American, South American, Central American and Caribbean organisations, and wants to take advantage of these bodies to implement a policy of economic, commercial, political and cultural ties. Rabat believes that breaking out of isolation is a 'sine qua non' condition for minimising the support that the Polisario and Algeria have in the subcontinent, whose epicentre is still Venezuela. Caracas' influence in many southern cone capitals is essentially due to financial aid and the supply of cheap oil. Algeria on its own barely maintains its influence.
There is a third scenario in Europe, where it is clear that while Morocco is treated by the EU and pan-European bodies (Parliament, Commission, Central Bank, etc.) as a "reliable partner", it is not. ) as a 'reliable partner', with which all the plans on the table in bilateral relations are positive, although Brussels remains critical of the Rabat regime in certain respects, in terms of rights and freedoms and more sensitive issues such as immigration and drug trafficking; Algeria is viewed with a certain degree of mistrust, due to its lack of respect for human rights, repression of peaceful opponents, and the chaotic internal situation with dozens of high-ranking political and military leaders in prison, with a presidential policy that is still vague, despite being a major supplier of fossil fuels to the Old Continent.
This pulse-pounding on European soil will come to a head, though not decisively, at the end of September when the European Court of Justice will take a position on the Polisario Front's application on the inclusion of the Sahara territory in trade agreements between Morocco and the EU. The Court is expected to rule, albeit somewhat convolutedly, that the two territories, Morocco and the Sahara, are distinct and separate. However, the Court's ruling is not binding, and the European Commission is not obliged to amend the texts of the Agreements; it is believed that it will simply include in the texts of the Agreements a clause stating that such trade agreements must benefit the populations of the region, and receive the 'placet' of the elected institutions, which can be interpreted as those of the Polisario in Tindouf, or the Moroccan administration in the Sahara Territory, where elections have just been held with a high turnout.
Morocco is not waiting for the European Court to adopt its ruling, however, and is pursuing its policy of binding liaison with European institutions and bodies. The Moroccan Employers' Confederation (CGEM), the Moroccan EuroCham and the Business Europe group have just adopted a 'Pact for the modernisation of trade and investment between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco', which aims to facilitate economic and trade relations, while putting pressure on pan-European bodies not to adopt restrictive clauses linked to Western Sahara. The President of Business Europe, Pierre Gattaz, considered that the Morocco-EU Association Agreement signed in 2000 should be adapted to the needs of the 21st century and the digital economy.
This agreement is seen as a step forward for Morocco's relationship with the EU, to the detriment of Algeria's relationship with Brussels, which is not at its best.