Proliferation on the rise in the Middle East

The establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East is one of the perennial proposals that the United Nations has been making since the 1960s. Despite the success of other such initiatives around the world, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the establishment of a NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean or the Treaty of Rarotonga for a corresponding zone in the Pacific Ocean, the reality is that progress in this regard in the region has been negligible and insignificant.

However, at the last UN General Assembly, Resolution 75/33 was passed urging "the parties directly concerned to give serious consideration to taking the practical and urgent steps required to give effect to the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East". As we can see, New York is not throwing in the towel, but the prospects for the success of such a treaty for the Middle East seem improbable to say the least, given the unprecedented arms race in which the region is immersed, where Israel could cease to be the only regional power with nuclear weapons.

Even with such bleak prospects for non-proliferation and disarmament, a number of facts in this regard make at least the debate on nuclear weapons in particular and the use of other weapons of mass destruction in the region relevant. The Bashar al-Assad regime's use of chemical weapons in Syria, the growing tensions generated by the (un)signed nuclear deal with Iran, and the ongoing attacks and hijackings of ships in the Gulf and in the Strait of Hormuz attest to this.

Indeed, the Trump administration's unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA (the P5+1 nuclear deal with Iran) and the re-imposition of new sanctions on the Islamic Republic over a series of alleged breaches has seen Iran return to its nuclear programme. Following this announcement, Iran announced that it would break its commitment to enrich uranium above 3.67 per cent to 20 per cent, which is relevant insofar as this percentage constitutes the threshold beyond which the amount of energy needed to reach 90 per cent purity levels - the ideal for nuclear weapons production - is drastically reduced, paving the way for a Persian nuclear bomb.

But the main concern of Israel and its other allies is not so much that Iran possesses nuclear weapons to enhance its bargaining power and leverage over the region, but also the fact that the Ayatollahs' regime has proven to have developed a sophisticated and advanced ballistic missile programme that could deliver the respective warheads both from Iran and from any part of the territory held by its proxies; see Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthi rebels in Yemen or Syria.

In this regard, over the past month, Iran has carried out a series of demonstrations of its military muscle to reassert its power after a series of attacks in Syria, Iraq and, especially, Saudi Arabian oil installations. These demonstrations consisted of a series of military manoeuvres, both naval and in one of the country's inland deserts, where Zulfaqar, Zelzal and Dezful missiles of the Fateh-110 family were used, with a range of between 700 and 1,000 kilometres, which cover the entire territory of all the Gulf States and Israel. At the same time, Iran's state news agency has revealed a number of underground bases along the country's coastline that serve as storage and launching pads for its arsenal, which deserves to be contextualised in a pre-war Gulf climate. Israel and Iran are engaged in a spiral of attacks targeting not the territory of either country, but the cargo and oil tankers crossing the Strait of Hormuz or off the coast of Yemen on a daily basis. Since the beginning of the year, regional media have reported numerous attacks and reprisals, and there are fears that these actions will either move to the mainland or escalate into a small- to medium-scale conflict elsewhere in the region.

Thus, it is significant that Israel added a new missile shield - known as Arrow 3 - to its air forces in 2018 to act as a rearguard in the event of a possible failure of the Jewish state's armed forces. The growing climate of instability and turmoil in which the Middle East is currently mired - if this is not, unfortunately, its natural state - makes the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the region a pipe dream. It would be necessary to proceed with a formula that, while not denuclearising Israel - since judging by its foreign policy Israel would not agree to such a process - would guarantee a succinct and gradual reduction of its arsenal; also establishing a system of control over its possible use. Ultimately, it would be necessary to manage Israel's existing nuclear warheads and prevent Iran at all costs from accessing their production so that regional disputes are settled through diplomacy and other means that do not threaten global security.

However, the focus of the major powers and the UN Security Council should not be exclusively on nuclear weapons, as the use of other weapons of mass destruction in the region is a well-documented fact and, likewise, the degree of development of the means of delivery for these weapons - i.e. ballistic missiles - is worrying. Therefore, despite the recent announcement of the return to negotiations between the US and Iran to resume the JCPOA -which brings with it a glimmer of hope for the recovery of stability in the region- the cooperation agreement between China and Iran, the measures approved by the Persian parliament to free itself from the controls of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the opposition of the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to a nuclear agreement with Iran only undermine any effort to avoid an arms escalation with uncertain but probably catastrophic results. What is certain is that amidst all of this nebula of misunderstandings, threats and nerves, the only thing we can say with certainty is that proliferation is on the rise in the Middle East.