Does narco-jihad exist in the Sahel?
Unlike the dynamics of narcoterrorism that we can observe in some South American countries, the involvement of Jihadist groups in drug trafficking is questionable, particularly in the Sahel. In Afghanistan and Pakistan there are indeed links between opium trafficking and the Taliban linked to al-Qaeda since the 90s, but this permissiveness towards opium is due to its importance in the economy and because it is not consumed by Muslims but by the Kafirms (non-believers). However, the cultivation of hashish is strictly forbidden, as it was consumed by Muslims. This particular exception does not appear in other branches of the jihad, such as in the Sahel, where drug trafficking is prohibited.
Although the drug trafficking route in the Sahel passes through some regions controlled by Jihadist groups, such as in northern Mali, the relationship between these groups and smugglers is not clearly defined. The theory of drug-jihad in the Sahel began following the arrest of three Malians in 2009 for narcoterrorism in the United States. They claimed that there were links between AQIM, the FARC and the cocaine cartels. Despite the lack of evidence, since that time links have been sought between AQIM, MUJAO or Ansar Dine and the trafficking networks in the Sahel.
Jihadist groups were formed in Mali from 2012, coinciding with the Tuareg revolution, although AQMI had been operating in the region since the beginning of 2000. It should be understood that the smugglers, some members of the MNLA, and some members of the terrorist groups, particularly MUJWA and Ansar Dine, have been known for years and in some cases belong to the same Tuareg or Arab tribes. Therefore, when the Tuareg revolution began in 2012, many traffickers supported the state, Jihadist groups or a Tuareg armed group depending on their previous relationship with them. On the other hand, the traffickers needed government officials in the area with which they had good relations. When many of them left the area, some traffickers continued to support the state as they had property in Bamako, but those who no longer needed them, because the areas were controlled by the MNLA or Jihadist groups, decided to support the latter.
However, most Jihadist groups disapprove of drug trafficking. Both AQIM and Ansar Dine from 2012 have issued several fatwas against drug trafficking. In fact, in 2012, jihadists burned several shipments of cigarettes and hashish in Gao. The only relations that have been established between the two groups have been for logistical support to combat the Serval operation of 2013, which paradoxically forced them to work together. As mentioned above, this support was provided because of the tribal/family connections that existed between the two groups.
One of the main sources of funding for Jihadist groups in the Sahel is the money obtained from ransoms. Between 2006 and 2012 AQIM received 60 million euros in hostage rescues. This tactic was copied by all the groups that subsequently emerged such as Al-Morabitoun, Ansar Dine or Katiba Macina. From 2013 onwards, we can see a change in the narrative of Ansar Dine and AQMI as they become more permissive of those jihadists who escort drug convoys or who directly traffic in drugs. This tolerance stems from the economic crisis the Jihadist groups were experiencing owing to the cost of operations against Serval and the MNLA, and the money from the ransoms was no longer sufficient. Many of these alliances of convenience were broken once the northern revolution ended following the Algiers agreements in 2015.
The only clearly demonstrated links between the drug traffickers and Jihadism are through the "cocaine baron", Chérif Ould Attaher (Tahar). Ould Tahar, a member of the Arab Azawad Movement, is a Lemhar Arab from Tilemsi, the region closest to Niger, who was involved in drug trafficking before, during and after being the number two in MUJAO. Ould Tahar joined MUJAO for ideological reasons, but also for defensive reasons, to defend himself from the MNLA, formed by Tuareg Idnans who are the Lemhar's commercial rivals. Ould Tahar is known for being an untouchable drug baron in the Sahel; his political relations allowed him to unload Colombian planes directly into Gao. Ould Tahar is also responsible for several kidnappings in Niger. Belmokhtar Mokhtar, the leader of AQIM, had very good relations with him, but there are no links between them on a commercial level. Ould Tahar has recently been the protagonist of several negotiations between the Malian state and terrorists, such as that of Sophie Pétronin and Soumaïla Cissé.
At present Ould Tahar has not joined the coalition of terrorist groups JNIM, and there is therefore no link between this group and its operations. Nor is there any evidence that anyone at the top of JNIM is involved in its financing or its activities with any drug trafficking network. Even so, some members of its secondary circles and sympathisers are known to be involved in drug trafficking operations. Members of Tuareg armed groups or government forces are also found within these secondary circles, so the boundaries between these activities have never been watertight.
It cannot therefore be said that Jihadist operations in the Sahel are financed by drug trafficking or that they share logistics or operational capabilities, as some European and American governments claim. Combating drug trafficking will not put an end to Jihadism, nor vice versa.
