The war in Ukraine, geo-strategic consequences
Time is passing inexorably without much change on the various fronts opened by Russia in Ukraine, as well as slowly or not at all in the international arena. This is happening without bearing in mind that, in modern warfare, long periods of little or no progress, despite a lot of war activity, are not a factor that can help tip the scales from one side to the other.
The daily reports, opinions and war reports follow one after the other, but the overall situation, with a few honourable exceptions, seems to be stagnating. Some say that Putin is reorganising his forces to strike the final blow, others that it is very difficult to carry out the obligatory replacement of units that have been exhausted or worn out by the fighting, that they are no longer useful to continue the fight with full effectiveness and, although there are also more and more people who are starting to think that it will be very difficult to continue the fight with full effectiveness, more and more people are beginning to believe in the incipient possibility that the Ukrainian forces, with the occasional support received from abroad, are doing a lot of damage to the Russian army - which is highly overestimated at home and abroad - and which, in turn, is beginning to show itself incapable of eating its prey, even if it varies in intensity and scenario.
But the truth is that nothing is entirely untrue and there is some truth in each of the points made in the previous paragraph.
In view of or as a consequence of this war - erroneously and incorrectly named and worse conducted by Russia - despite the great differences in initial capabilities in all military fields and the corresponding armaments, Russia is beginning to look like the big loser in the end; although not definitively in the military field, in other, relatively more important, fields.
Many of us believe that peoples who do not study and analyse their history properly are likely to make the same mistakes as their ancestors. It is not the first time that this has happened to the USSR or Russia, which, when they find themselves economically stagnant, as if it were a holy war, launch themselves into increasingly costly wars that end badly for their interests.
The situation today is not very different from when Stalin took the decision to intervene in the Korean War in 1950. It was also the case for a faltering USSR in 1979, when it made a big mistake in invading Afghanistan. This suggests that from now on Russia will have to be much more wary of the costs and potential repercussions of intervening or forging overt military aggression, especially when its economy is not very buoyant, just as it is bound to correct a number of its own mistakes or major military shortcomings.
Errors that, in order to be corrected, must be fully accepted because they mark the path to the failure of its military operations, despite being a country that possesses enormous nuclear power and is the third country in the world, in competition with India, that spends the most on defence to modernise its equipment and armaments.
Although much has already been said and written about these, it is worth reviewing them briefly: a deficient system for studying the factors that influence the decision (mainly regarding the environment, armament, enemy and terrain); an autocratic, pyramidal and excessively rigid military leadership in the planning and execution of operations; little or no will to win on the part of the troops; the fact that most of them are forced recruits when the sophisticated armament requires a higher degree of education, training or professionalisation of the troops; the lack of any real intermediate employment (non-commissioned officers) to train and push subordinates; the fact that they are not prepared to overcome the capabilities and dangers of new technologies and that, in general, their weaponry and transport equipment is quite obsolete and the logistical chain is still ancestral, lamentable and clearly deficient.
Factors that have diminished the agility, capability and endurance of its military, especially when faced with an exalted people in arms, the Ukrainians, who, knowing and aware of their adversary's shortcomings, have been evolving in the opposite direction and receiving training and precise support in specific and efficient weaponry -mainly from the United States- for a period of more than seven years, without Russia giving much importance or consideration to this fact.
The economic, commercial and international isolation effects and consequences in the form of sanctions that could deny Russia both the export of its products and free access to a multitude of elements that make up the vital technology for the production of modern weapons and other equipment, including dual-use equipment, should be analysed and assessed.
This could lead to Russia's impoverishment - it will fall by as much as 15% this year - and a decline in its international prestige and technological capabilities, making it relatively easy for all its allies or friends, including China, to come to see Moscow as a less capable ally. At the same time, neighbours who now fear it will begin to see it as a less ferocious wolf that it is possible, with some outside help, to defeat. In any case, Russia's economic setback is highly probable and could be very bloody or even definitive.
Testing the effectiveness of each and every one of the aforementioned sanctions in reducing the capabilities of a dangerous and very annoying neighbour will in the future lead the International Community (IC) to perfect the system of imposing them, as well as to greater speed and less hesitation in their application.
In this specific case, although it can also be extrapolated to many other scenarios, a new and very powerful and effective weapon has appeared in the economic and subsistence aspect; I am referring to the control of the supply of products necessary to obtain energy, minerals and other types of products that affect subsistence. This is a double-edged weapon, which can be used in both directions and whose control and exploitation can jeopardise the actions of other factors and actors.
The conflict itself, the sanctions imposed on Russia and Putin's subsequent threats against various European countries have made it clear that the West's enormous and almost absolute dependence on Russia for fuel, oil derivatives, gas, minerals of all kinds and grain imports will almost disappear in a short period of time, and that other sources such as the United States will benefit to Russia's detriment, which will undoubtedly have a harsh effect on its economy in the short and medium term.
Russia has achieved the opposite of Putin's intended effects in terms of sowing discord and divisions within NATO and the EU. Although it has succeeded in imposing 'the value of nuclear deterrence' so that allied or member countries do not individually or collectively intervene in the war, although it has also unintentionally, through some political contagion or jealousy, increased the conviction of most of the above to curtail their personal interests in support of the cause and/or to invest more in defence.
With respect to the value and effect of nuclear deterrence, there is a danger that, in the near future, countries such as North Korea, Iran and others will be tempted to upgrade their nuclear capabilities to ensure that they do not come under attack.
On the other hand, given that plans to invest in defence are not instantaneous but multi-year, and some, such as Spain, have nuanced very long-term plans, there is a risk that if Russia finally ends up with its tail between its legs, many may forget their good intentions in this regard.
One fact that is clearly evident is that the EU lacks the capacity to influence conflict resolution politically and militarily, even if it occurs within its own borders. This may serve as a spur to try to correct such shortcomings that subjugate it to near irrelevance in the security sphere.
For its part, NATO's upcoming summit in Madrid, which was originally intended to be a quiet meeting to spend a good time taking advantage of the good weather at the time and the propitious atmosphere with no major issues to deal with, will possibly turn into one of the most important summits in its history due to the need to redefine its Strategic Concept, the conditions and limits to possible enlargements and even whether or not to maintain the current policy of using nuclear weapons (known as the "dual-key posture", which bases their use only on deterrence or defence) and whether or not to increase the Alliance's own nuclear capabilities. The composition of Spain's government and its supporters, largely pro-Russian or Putin sympathisers, is not exactly the best scenario in which to put these issues on the table with due guarantees.
Another of the geo-strategic consequences of the aforementioned alliances is the selective enlargement of both organisations with the entry or accession of countries in Russia's neighbourhood; an issue that is taken for granted and with a certain degree of urgency.
China has many more interests with the rest of the world than with Russia; since the latter annexed the Crimean peninsula in 2014, it has been saved by its obscurantism and apparent neutrality; but everything points to the fact that, in the near future, they will have to choose one side or the other, and the Chinese are eminently commercial, so Russian isolation may increase exponentially.
The success achieved in this conflict with more or less covert US material, intelligence and training aid to Ukraine could serve as a spur and example for the resistance of other countries threatened by Russia, China or North Korea and which in one way or another are under the US umbrella; at the same time, the clearly unexpected possible success of David against Goliath could serve as a wake-up call for those who threaten or aspire to expand, relying on the difference in capabilities in their favour.
In terms of ways and means of exercising and practising leadership by modern political leaders, there is a certain return to the past. The visible and trust-inspiring leadership of Ukrainian President Zelenski - who seems to have become a World War II Winston Churchill - as well as his clear messages to Ukrainians and to any parliament that would listen, have generated confidence among Ukrainians and much more external support. By contrast, Putin's solitary and fallacious style and his endless lies and bloody actions undermine his credibility and that of Russia as a whole.
In conclusion, regardless of the outcome and final moment of this war, it can be affirmed that the individual IC bodies will have to rethink their composition, organisation, tasks and missions, especially for the UN and the EU, which have shown themselves to be of little or no use, and that Russia will lose out in international and economic terms if all the sanctions and restrictions planned and on the drawing board are put into effect. This situation could be the cause and reason for internal problems of some or much relevance even for Putin himself, and his potential fall could lead to a new crisis of major global significance.
For their part, Ukraine and the Ukrainians, who are bearing the brunt, often alone, are currently finding that most of their important cities are badly damaged or completely destroyed, their economy, industrial, agricultural, mining and transport capacities in a state of total disaster or destroyed; the country will therefore need a major, urgent and powerful recovery plan if it is not to end up like Syria.
Equally, plans will be needed for the return of most of the nearly five million refugees and internally displaced persons. These are costly and complicated issues that, for the moment, no one is talking clearly about and should already be part of the as-yet-unknown international aid plans.
Finally, it seems that by focusing so much international attention on this conflict and its resolution, the IC has abandoned interest and concern for the activity, development and expansion of the Islamic State both in the Middle East and on the African continent; To this must be added the coinciding and forced termination, in some cases, of most of the peace missions or the instruction and training of indigenous forces in and around the Sahel to fight this terrorist group, despite the many messages that the jihadist community continues to send with its eyes and thoughts on Europe.