The war in Ukraine, lessons learned (3)

Forty days after the beginning of the invasion, a time in which many things have happened and almost none of them as expected, we seem to be facing a position in which, after disasters, desolation and death, once the cards have been laid on the table and both sides have been exhausted by the intense fighting and the problems of feeding the battle, there is no choice but to engage in a tough and perhaps dangerous negotiation.

Of course Putin has not won this war, nor has Zelenski; it has been a war of attrition; for the moment short in time, but too crude, fratricidal and quite inhumane on the ground and in human reality.

A war in which the under-educated, under-armed and rather poorly led, overwhelming, majority Russian forces have once again faced the harsh reality of the high combat morale of the adversary, who, around an unusual leader, defends his territory with everything, if necessary.

Ukraine, alone and more or less abandoned by the cynical, accommodating and quasi-silent International Community (IC) and with a few resources that have been trickling into its hands, has been able to take advantage of other forms and methods of combat offered by its will to win at all costs and new technologies; aspects that have proved as or more effective than David's slingshot in bringing down Goliath.

Simple, low-cost, home-made drones, or drones bought from Turkey and operated at close range, have been able to destroy high-tech battle tanks with a good degree of self-protection. The invasion of networks by genuine amateur hackers has not only served as an intelligence tool, but has also compromised Russia's command and control networks and the detection, movement control and supply systems of large state-owned and private companies involved in its military logistics.

Russia has still not learned to analyse decision factors properly, either before the start of the conflict, in the early stages of the invasion, or now in order to bring about major changes in its strategy just a few days before the heavy fighting begins.

Russian logistics remain a major handicap; they have learned nothing from their painful and disastrous interventions in various complicated conflicts. It was their undoing and will be their undoing for much of this conflict, if it ends up with the scales tipping against them. This has crippled the war machine's food supply and left the stomachs of its troops empty. Forced to eat out-of-date rations, they have had to resort to local exploitation, with the risks of sabotage and poisoning that this entails.

The foreign expeditionary forces deployed for combat as mercenaries have served to establish a policy of revenge, brutality and difficult cleansing or expulsion from the country in the future.

The scorched earth policy has very large and serious immediate and also medium to long term consequences, as many of the cities have been razed to the ground, full of mines, traps, and corpses in individual and mass graves everywhere, which, on the one hand, will seriously endanger mobility in the area and, on the other, healthiness as soon as the weather changes to warmer temperatures.

The massacres of civilians seen yesterday in towns abandoned by the Russians are the result of their poor military training, disregard for humanitarian law and individual and collective despair or anger at being forced to withdraw, without military pressure to do so, when it cost them so many casualties to conquer them. 

Massacres and war crimes, known in Russian military jargon as 'zachistka' since it was used on a massive scale in Chechnya, cannot be hidden and should be tried by international tribunals, although I doubt very much that one day Putin, the man most responsible, will sit in a dock to answer for these charges.

The almost total destruction of several entire cities has provoked the mass emigration of their citizens, who may change their minds about their initial desire to return as soon as possible, which will result in a great loss of the best and most prepared Ukrainian society.

Rebuilding the country will not be easy; on the contrary, it will be very expensive and Ukraine will not be able to afford the costs involved. To think that it will be Russia that will be obliged by the IC is at the moment somewhat fallacious or utopian. Undoubtedly, both the US and the EU will have to pay for various recovery and near-total reconstruction plans for the country, because its industry and communications have also been extremely hard hit.

Zelensky's repeated and eloquent speeches - supported by massive videoconferences - to parliamentarians of the West's most important countries have not served to move any individual or collective conscience; at most, to bring about more, cautious and better combat materiel support; but not at all to advance Ukraine's political and alliance pretensions.

The CNN effect in the form of live monitoring of the fighting, actions and decisions taken during this war has been exploited by both sides for good intelligence on the open networks (OSINT); so much so that, at times, it has been necessary to stop a lot of information, truthful or not, being released by all the world's media, news outlets and networks.

The IC continues to suffer from a severe lack of pre-planning, synchronisation, deployment of rapid, capable and effective means, as well as adequate standards and procedures for the extraction, accompaniment, treatment, handling, transfer of responsibilities and final accommodation of the refugees that this type of warfare produces on a massive and uninterrupted basis.

Once again, the refugee issue has fallen back on political decisions, on the means and the limited or very limited support capacities of the bordering countries to accept uncontrolled avalanches of people, both very young and old. This is aggravated in this case by the fact that they arrive en masse with hardly any really useful male accompaniment, due to the general mobilisation of Ukrainian men. Situations overwhelmed from the outset, which have led, despite warnings, to trafficking in women and the promotion of prostitution even in countries far removed from the conflict.

The primary and natural tendency to collect and send by any means, without order or order, used clothes and all kinds of household goods, provisions and useful products for the refugees has once again flooded the camps or reception centres; it has minimally reached those who can use it and, finally, it is a nuisance or, what is worse, a future business for the second hand of those who have not suffered the consequences of the war.

The final outcome of the conflict will depend on the capacity, willingness to pressure and synchronisation of the great powers that support one side or the other, with special attention to China and India, as well as the percentage and value of the objectives achieved when they actually sit down to negotiate.

Once again, Turkey's intermediary role in this conflict is noteworthy; a role that began years ago with the Russian hand in the Syrian conflict. This seems to be an attempt to increase Erdogan's international standing and, in part, to displace the US, traditionally hegemonic in these matters. Israel's ambiguity since the beginning of the conflict and the refusal of 'Arab friends' to support Biden's attempts to alleviate the effects of high fuel prices are rather surprising.

Incredibly, Russian troops, without being forced to do so, have been exposed to the serious health risks caused by areas contaminated with high levels of nuclear radiation, when they enter and remain there for long periods of time and without the appropriate individual and collective protective equipment.

It is shameful that, while all this is going on, and particularly on the part of the EU, with honourable and anecdotal exceptions, raw materials such as crude oil, gas and even minerals such as aluminium continue to be bought from Russia, mainly due to Germany's greed and need to avoid stopping its production.

Regardless of the degree of NATO and EU involvement and military intervention, this war has served to once again raise our ears and raise the level of attention because the wolf is still out there, knocking on our doors, anxious to eat weak and defenceless prey.

As a result, an Alliance that was on the verge of being almost dismantled or becoming a residual, is regaining momentum, as will be seen at the upcoming Madrid Summit, where it will be reflected in the fact that it must necessarily change its tone, intensity and timbre and regain its radicalism. Many countries have already declared their firm intention to greatly increase their defence spending.

The same is true within the EU; once again it has become clear that the Union's capacity for influence and military intervention outside its borders and in defence of its members is almost nil, and that the efforts and initiatives so far in this area have only been patches to keep us entertained and even deceived with something that has never served any purpose.

However this war ends or remains, Russia will be greatly diminished in its capacity for international relations, exchange and recognition in every conceivable sphere: political, economic, industrial and social.

Internally, the protests, initially a minority, however much they may be concealed and silenced, may lead to a major change in Russian society and, consequently, in its political leadership.