The war in Ukraine, lessons learned (2)

A few days ago I published a paper on this subject in which, like many analysts, I referred to what happened in Ukraine as a conflict. However, given the continuity over time, the increasing involvement of more and more endogenous and exogenous elements and artists in the fighting and in more and more different theatres, as well as the hardening of confrontations of all kinds, I believe that the term "conflict" has been surpassed by far and that in Ukraine -as long as the negotiations do not fully bear fruit- it has reached the category of "war"; some authors even elevate it to the recently dusted off concept of "total war".

To begin to understand why things are going on in Ukraine, we must go back a few years when the KGB spy lieutenant colonel Putin returned home from East Germany with his tail between his legs, defeated in every respect, to find a USSR in chaos, melting at times like a sugar cube in a glass of hot milk.

Gone were the years of propaganda and the fictitious splendour of Russian military power; a fame that the West voluntarily helped to magnify because it was in the interests of the Americans to keep the flame of the threat in Europe burning in order to continue dominating and living on the continent, applying all kinds of influences and because, to counteract the fear that this phenomenon produced, a great deal had to be spent on defence, mainly with American equipment.

Russia's remaining army was old, obsolete, demoralised, poorly trained, full of drunks and corruption and, above all, poorly armed. These were all true, and they became clear when they tried to fight the war in Afghanistan (1978-1992), which they invaded thinking it would be a military stroll, and later in the first war in Chechnya (1994-1996).

Two conflicts and failures, from which everyone, but fundamentally the Russians with Putin at the head, drew numerous lessons learned; the first and most important being that, for their armies to be effective and feared in the air-land field, they should equip them with a powerful and capable armament; tanks of great power, long range and endurance on the ground; a large artillery force based on long-range guns and accurate missiles; and an aviation force capable of maintaining air dominance in all conditions with good, safe planes and helicopters.   

Those who saw these needs also added that, once the desired weapons had been obtained, they should be tested in real war actions to check their effectiveness and toughness and thus be able to analyse their effects on the ground and against the enemy's resistance.

At the same time, these real exercises should be used to train the generals, strategists and middle commanders of the elite units in the use of the new means and how to get the most out of them.

Seeing the need, Putin took a look at the world around him, and found an old acquaintance and ally, Bashar al-Assad, the satrap president of Syria, who was in dire straits, caught in a serious pincer between the Syrians themselves fed up and rising up against him and the notorious Islamic State (IS), which had taken root and fructified too much in their lands.

Under the pretext of fighting Daesh and responding to an invitation from an ally of his to help him maintain his country, it came swiftly and quickly to his support with the blessings and approval, or at least the rude silence, of an International Community (IC) that is increasingly accommodating and apathetic to being splashed by 'foreign' conflicts, more or less distant from its borders.

Syria was, therefore, the biggest and best training ground for the Russian armies, their new-generation weapons and maximum power; they soon understood that the maximum number of their generals and general staffs would have to rotate through that place of learning and real combat to learn how to deal with an enemy, conventional or not, which always offered maximum resistance, despite the intense fighting and dreadful bombardments prior to them, and even, some of them, in a NBC environment. 

Once their armament was tested and ready, as well as their command cadres to lead the fighting and win the war. Everything was ready, so it began with accurate, almost bloodless strikes, to gradually eat away at Ukraine, starting with three important pro-Russian areas, which were practically free of charge and with hardly any international reaction.

In view of this situation, he felt safe, but cautiously decided to wait until, depending on the development of various convoluted world events underway, the zenith of weakness of the IC and its bodies was reached.

After many, too many dizzy spells and some hesitation, he felt it was time to launch a 'blitzkrieg' against an enemy many times inferior, with a president he considered weak because he had been a comedian until he rose to power and a population that, for the most part, cheered him on, spoke Russian and even used his flag and publicly called on him to come to their rescue.

His first major military mistake was that he made a frankly bad study of some of the factors directly influencing the decision. Fundamentally, in terms of the difficulty of the terrain in this climate, the scarcity of rail and overland communication routes, the still insufficient logistical possibilities if it dragged on, the civilian population's capacity for resistance and high morale, and the fact that his previous deceptive movements and actions were not going to be able to deceive American intelligence, which, despite the fact that it had recently accumulated some serious errors, on this occasion, could get it right.

The previous movements near the borders went on for too long and led to excessive activity and fatigue in terrible conditions, while a determined and camouflaged accumulation of military aid to Ukraine by the US was taking place, with which to slow down, at least, the first Russian impulse.

The loss of surprise and with it the loss of speed and freedom of action; not having made massive use of its aviation - apparently due to a lack of training of its pilots given the previous fuel shortage, distrust of its anti-aircraft artillery and fear of the Ukrainian air defences that had been greatly improved by the shipments of specific material from abroad - broke the physical resistance capacity and, above all, the morale of the too-young Russian soldiers, who brought their dress uniforms on their rucksacks, to parade over Kiev in just a few days.  

Russia's weak and questionable logistical capacity to maintain combat over long periods of time and at great distances, and the unusual reaction of the Ukrainian population to maintain control of their communications thanks to the defensive material they received, quickly forced them to change their initial plans and seek external support - there is talk that they are working with China - a point that will soon be verified.

In any case, in view of the above, the changes in initial plans have turned the already unachievable blitzkrieg - they have been fighting for 22 days - into a long war of attrition, like Aleppo, where the defender acquires a great combat capacity due to the difficulty and psychosis for the attacker of not being able to move freely among the rubble, traps and dangerous stalks that the big cities have become.

In spite of this, as Putin does not want to give in, it seems that he is preparing to fight in most of these bastions with all kinds of artillery resources and aerial bombardments to destroy the cities and then enter in force with ground units; fundamentally, on the basis of special Chechen, Syrian and other Middle Eastern troops, brought in exprofeso and trained in this type of combat for many years.

Putin and his strategists know that the fewer non-combatant civilians in the rubble, the better for the defender; hence, contrary to his recently published doctrine, he is trying, by all means, not to let non-combatants out of the cities, denying or attacking the possible safe corridors; thus, by keeping them in cages, they will undoubtedly hinder the military operations of the defence.  

They are too heavy a burden to be kept safe, fed and provided with medical care, especially at a time when all resources are needed for those who bear arms. They are also a point of concern on a personal level for the combatant because he is not assured of the protection and safeguarding of his immediate family.

With respect to foreign military aid to Ukraine, there has been excessive publicity and many clues to locate the entry points of the various types of external support. This helps to know their size and quality in advance and facilitates actions aimed at destroying them before they are distributed to the combatants.

The lukewarm and almost schizophrenic military posture of NATO and the EU with respect to Ukraine has been limited to only sending certain types of weapons, not always cutting-edge or really necessary, because apparently there is still no official 'shopping list' in this regard. This situation means that support is provided unilaterally or bilaterally, and often on the basis of each contributing country's own surplus reserves, which in reality provides the Ukrainians with somewhat limited real aid.

Entering into a long-term conflict is a serious problem for Russia, because it is a fact that 'conquering, occupying and holding' a vast territory with many millions of people to be watched over, fed, cared for and employed is not the same thing.

On the other hand, to control a territory and population of such characteristics one hundred percent, with civilians armed to the teeth, requires a very large occupation contingent - larger than the one it currently has - that is well prepared against acts of sabotage.

In any case, in view of the above, the changes in initial plans have turned the already unattainable blitzkrieg - they have been fighting for 22 days - into a long war of attrition, like Aleppo, in which the defender acquires a great combat capacity due to the difficulty and psychosis for the attacker of not being able to move freely among the rubble, traps and dangerous stalking that the big cities have become.

The use and abuse of fake news in this war, by both sides, is great and pathetic; misrepresented information, as well as being used to justify one's actions in the eyes of national and international opinion, serves to boost the morale of the forces.   

The extensive use of cyber and electronic warfare to disable radar systems, drone flights and many command and control communications can paralyse fighting for hours or even cause it to fail completely.

The use of weapons banned by international agreements or conventions, such as cluster munitions, thermobaric or vacuum bombs and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), does not set a good precedent for Putin and his generals. There are already initiatives to declare these actions as war crimes or crimes against humanity.

With regard to WMD, there is too much abuse of announcements about the possibility of their use by the Ukrainians in what are known as 'false flag' actions, which my good friend and colleague Raul Suevos defines as 'those that consist of carrying out an action, generally in one's own camp, with forces or elements that appear to belong to the enemy'. 

In this context, Russia has even lodged complaints with the UNSC accusing Ukraine of the possibility of using all kinds of WMD, including dirty bombs. These allegations have no basis in fact, except that the Russians must have certain data on the undestroyed or undisrupted chemical and biological weapons left in Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR. 

Many have called it a big mistake for Putin to have threatened NATO and the EU with the use of his nuclear weapons, even going so far as to put those units on pre-alert. Contrary to that theory, I believe this subtle threat was a great mistake on his part.

The Russians and the West should not be willing to engage in what is known as 'Mutually Assured Destruction', the irrevocable situation that would arise if, after the first such explosion by either side, both sides were to respond indiscriminately to the massive use of such weapons; a very strong reason to believe that they will never be used, unless Putin finally sees the possibility of losing the war and/or losing his mind, like so many satraps in history.

But Putin also knows that WMD, and more specifically nuclear weapons, are not only offensive or defensive weapons; they have a very important role in 'deterrence'; and in this case, it is safe to say that the threat of their use has been enough to deter NATO and the US from entering or intervening in direct combat with them.

But not only that, it has created such international panic that even NATO, in a manoeuvre that may well be right, but which shows a great deal of nerve and a total lack of shame or confidence in an Alliance that should be serious and reliable, has forced Zelenski to declare that Ukraine will never join it. This gives Putin the first of his objectives on the shopping list, which he presented as demands not to go to war and, apparently, still continues to maintain.

In a war of resistance at all costs and desperation, the defender must use all the means at his disposal and this is where the so-called trickery or deception measures play a very important role, with which positions and fortresses that are not really positions and fortresses are simulated to confuse the enemy and also with the use of trickery, taking advantage of the effects and capabilities provided by the terrain itself or after a natural or forced modification by the hand of man.

In this case, and this is not the first time in the history of the place or in other European confines, the phenomenon known in the world as 'hydraulic warfare' and there as 'Rasputitsa' has been exploited or forced, which consists in the ease with which the terrain becomes impassable, even for chains, when it is naturally wet by rain, thaw, or flooded by the hand of man. It becomes a sticky mud, paralysing all movement of columns of tanks, trucks and logistics.        

China can support Russia in arms and even intelligence, but if it does so, it will suffer serious economic consequences because its trade with the rest of the world is many times greater than its bilateral trade with Russia. Its ambivalent role is yet to be deciphered.

On the success or failure of this operation and on the IC's final action or stance depends not only Ukraine's survival as a free country with a tendency towards full democracy; it could become the spur or, on the contrary, the brake on other examples that appear on the horizon and that from time to time thunder with a certain intensity (Taiwan, India-Pakistan, Iran-Iraq, the Arctic, the China Sea and other minor conflicts in the Middle East).

With actors like Putin, it is worth remembering the fact that despots and tyrants often end up in schizophrenic or borderline insane situations; so it is almost impossible for them to heed any recommendations from anyone, not even their closest circle.

The first bad omens I announced when I started writing about this war seem to be coming true.  Yesterday, Zelenski, anticipating what may come, showed to the world -through his video conference with the US Parliament- after his last and accurate attempt and speech as president of Ukraine -although totally useless according to Biden's response- clearly frustrated, deceived and abandoned by the IC in general and by the US in particular.

Countries and organisations that have been encouraging him and even sending him weapons under the table and that after so much feigned international 'solidarity' and great national heroism, in the balance of results he has achieved: to have entered the list of countries with the option of joining, sine die, the EU on the positive side; but on the negative side, being left alone and isolated except for the last protocolary visit of three Eastern European presidents, thousands of dead and wounded behind it, more than three million Ukrainians scattered around the world and far from their broken families, a people in arms, a country almost destroyed, the economy is broken and we will see how it all ends after the negotiations, which I assume Putin, after so much wear and tear and problems created for him and his people, will try to force the repressive machine, as he will not be satisfied with sweets or trinkets and will want much more than he has obtained so far, which will most likely fill his basket of demands or something more.