XIII HLM: when comprehensive cooperation dismantles confrontational biases
- The international diplomatic context: Resolution 2797
- The consolidation of a modern and cross-cutting partnership
- The economic reality: an unprecedented volume of trade
- The fourteen agreements: tangible substance
- The response to critics: biased narratives and spurious motivations
- The Popular Party's shift: anomalous opposition
- A relationship for the future
Far from the biased speculation and alarmist narratives that some political and media sectors have deliberately and self-servingly constructed in the wake of the blow dealt to them by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2797, this summit demonstrates that both countries are moving forward with strategic clarity towards a co-production partnership that mutually benefits Spanish and Moroccan citizens, as well as the stability of the entire Euro-Mediterranean region.
What happened at this HLM is not ‘premeditated secrecy’, as the national tabloid press has once again tried to portray. Nor is it in any way a Spanish ‘surrender’ to Moroccan pressure. It is simply the mutual recognition of a fundamental reality: that the geographical, historical and cultural proximity between Spain and Morocco must inevitably translate into concrete opportunities for economic development, shared security and lasting regional peace. The signing of fourteen international agreements on tax, judicial, agricultural, energy, educational and security cooperation is not the result of capitulation, but of symmetrical negotiations in which both parties contributed their respective interests and needs.
The international diplomatic context: Resolution 2797
It is essential to remember that this 13th HLM is being held in a transformative international context. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2797, adopted on 31 October 2025 with the support of powers such as the United States, France and the United Kingdom, establishes Morocco's proposal for autonomy as the basis for negotiations to resolve the Western Sahara dispute. This unprecedented support is not a diplomatic coincidence nor does it reflect any pressure on Spain, but rather international recognition that the Moroccan proposal represents the most viable, serious and realistic way to achieve a just and lasting solution to the conflict. This will happen once the parties accept it, sit down to negotiate and develop the content of the proposal with a view to turning it into a kind of Statute of Autonomy which, incidentally, will discredit the ‘fallacy of the three pages’ with which the aforementioned sensationalist ‘influencer’ has long sought to confuse the public, who are less familiar with the details of this dispute, by confusing a more superficial preliminary text (the proposal) with a more consolidated one (definitive autonomy), which will be fleshed out after negotiation.
Nasser Bourita, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, was categorical on this point during the summit: ‘No one has ever said that self-determination is the same as a referendum.’ This seemingly simple statement contains a fundamental legal and political truth that critics deliberately seek to obscure. Self-determination can be exercised in many ways, and the solution of broad autonomy within Moroccan sovereignty, now being promoted by the UN, is a form of legitimate self-determination that has been successfully adopted in other regional conflicts.
In its official statement during the summit, Spain said it ‘welcomed the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2797’ and fully supported ‘the work of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to facilitate and hold negotiations based on Morocco's autonomy proposal’. This is not a forced concession, but a strategic decision based on a rigorous analysis that this solution offers greater guarantees of stability than perpetuating a conflict that has been entrenched for half a century. It also consolidates the new position adopted by the Spanish government in 2022.
The consolidation of a modern and cross-cutting partnership
What has been staged in Madrid is not a relationship of submission, but the strategic maturity of two states that recognise their interdependence in an increasingly fragmented world. Spain has once again highlighted the depth of the reforms undertaken by Morocco under the leadership of King Mohammed VI. The new development model, advanced regionalisation, the national strategy for sustainable development and new social projects are not rhetorical showcases, but real transformations that position Morocco as an exceptional factor of stability in the region.
Morocco, for its part, recognises Spain's international influence at regional and international level, as well as its decisive role within the European Union in strengthening Euro-Mediterranean relations. Both countries have reaffirmed their ‘willingness to further broaden the horizons of their solid and fruitful bilateral relationship, adapting it to current global challenges’.
This joint declaration, with its 119 points of collaboration, is not just empty words. It is a specific roadmap on important issues such as education, culture, sport, scientific research, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, the environment, the fight against climate change, clean energy, energy transition, infrastructure and security.
The economic reality: an unprecedented volume of trade
Critics who deliberately argue that there is bilateral opacity or secrecy ignore the fundamental economic data. Trade relations between Morocco and Spain reached a record volume of €24 billion in 2024, reflecting a level of economic integration unprecedented in bilateral history. Spain has been Morocco's main trading partner since 2012, and Morocco has established itself as the main destination for Spanish investment in Africa.
This is not the result of a subordinate relationship, but of genuine structural proximity: value chains complement each other, industries reinforce each other, and development trajectories converge. There are nearly 1,000 Spanish companies established in the Kingdom, generating employment for both Spanish and Moroccan citizens. The Moroccan community in Spain is the largest among foreigners, with 335,000 people who are now the largest contributors to Social Security.
The business forum held during the summit, organised by the Spanish Confederation of Business Organisations (CEOE) and the General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises (CGEM), with the support of both governments, has identified new investment opportunities in innovative and sustainable sectors. This is pragmatic diplomacy at its best, putting the material interests of citizens at the centre.
The fourteen agreements: tangible substance
The fourteen international agreements cover fundamental areas: tax and judicial cooperation, digitisation of administrations, teaching of the Arabic language and Moroccan culture in Spanish schools, agricultural and fisheries cooperation, social protection, combating hate speech, feminist diplomacy, cooperation between diplomatic schools, and joint scientific research on the geodynamics of the Strait. Added to this is the creation of centres of excellence dedicated to research, innovation and technology transfer in strategic sectors.
This framework is complemented by agreements on rail and air transport, port infrastructure, renewable energy, water and desalination, urban development and housing, higher education with cooperation between universities, cultural heritage and archaeology, film and audiovisuals, and vocational training. The 2030 World Cup, to be held jointly in Spain, Morocco and Portugal, is recognised as a unique opportunity to consolidate deep integration beyond the sporting arena.
In terms of security, both countries are formalising joint initiatives in the fight against terrorism, security at major events, and cooperation in defence through multilateral mechanisms. A High Commission on Industrial Cooperation is established. Morocco is recognised for its leadership in African development cooperation and for the successful hosting of the International Conference on Financing for Development in Seville, where the Seville Commitment was adopted.
The response to critics: biased narratives and spurious motivations
It is necessary to be explicit: some sectors have insidiously constructed apocalyptic narratives about this summit, even before it took place, systematically publishing speculative articles about ‘invasions’ of the Canary Islands, ‘deceptive offers’ from Morocco, and ‘pressure’ on Spain to cede sovereignty. These narratives are unfounded and serve very specific political interests — and, let's not kid ourselves, personal and financial interests.
The truth is that these attacks have intensified since UNSC Resolution 2797, modifying the narrative with increasingly belligerent rhetoric. The reality is that this UN resolution has knocked this group out, and when one of its main pillars of argument—if not the most important one—that of international law resolutions, has begun to crumble against its interests, the headlong rush of these actors is unprecedented in its rudeness, exaltation and sectarianism, with a frenetic pace of publication in their media space or on their own social networks. They were already well known for their ability to manipulate reality by generating hatred and division, aware of their anti-Moroccan influence within a large niche of followers. But Resolution 2797 has caused their animosity to escalate to unprecedented levels.
With regard to the criticism of the absence of the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, it is necessary to refute the falsehoods spread in the days leading up to the HLM. The truth is that there has been no snub, exclusion or veto by the Government, but simply standard diplomatic protocol that has been in place for decades. The High Level Meetings were established by the 1991 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation as bilateral summits at state level, without consideration of regional participation. Since the first HLM in 1993, none has included representation from these territories. Foreign relations are the exclusive competence of the Spanish State, an internationally recognised principle. The inconsistency of those who protest is striking. Without going any further, Fernando Clavijo, President of the Canary Islands, who travelled to Rabat in October 2024, met with Nasser Bourita and publicly stated that ‘the Canary Islands Government fully supports the Spanish Government's policy’ on Western Sahara, praising Morocco's ‘ongoing efforts’ in migration management, going so far as to say that ‘without Morocco, the migration situation in Spain and the EU would be untenable’.
These protests were amplified by certain voices of dubious credibility, presenting this supposed veto of autonomous territories as ‘suspicious’, conspiratorially suggesting that their presence at previous HLMs was customary and their exclusion was novel, perhaps taking advantage of the consumer's lack of knowledge of the protocol of these summits. The reality is that there is no ‘sacrifice’ of these territories, but rather active protection of them through effective bilateral cooperation. Politicising this protocolary absence is simply malicious misinformation.
The Popular Party's shift: anomalous opposition
It is surprising, though regrettable, to see how the Popular Party has taken a rather peculiar stance on the issue of the Sahara and its relations with Morocco, something we have already analysed in another article. In July 2022, the PP voted against a motion that sought to roll back the government's new position on the Sahara, obtaining 252 votes against, including those of the PP. This constituted tacit support from the PP for Morocco's autonomy plan. What came next is well known: a change of leadership in the party (Feijoo replacing Casado), an unexpected electoral defeat in 2023, and a shift towards a harder line aimed at minimising the rise of VOX. This led the PP not only to vote in favour of similar motions presented by pro-independence parties against the new Spanish position on the Sahara, but also to promote and present them themselves, speaking of ‘sudden changes’ or ‘Copernican shifts’. The truth is that, in view of their track record on this issue since 2022, these terms could well be applied to themselves.
But in relation to the RANs, the history during Mariano Rajoy's government is instructive. His government participated in the 2012 and 2015 HLMs, making generic references to ‘consensus-based and mutually acceptable political solutions’ without explicitly rejecting the autonomy plan. The Rajoy government's position was similar to Sánchez's current one: implicitly recognising that the autonomy plan is a viable path to a solution. The only difference is that the word ‘autonomy’ was not included, but the rest sounds familiar. In fact, rumours emerged at the time that the government of then-President Rajoy might officially support the plan. It did not, but it did not stray far from doing so.
In short, the PP's change of position after the 2023 elections, when they unexpectedly lost the chance to govern, reflects not a change of principles, but a political calculation. It is, quite bluntly, tactical opposition motivated by electioneering rather than genuine conviction. Something that they never had at party level on this issue, as it was always a residual matter for them.
A relationship for the future
What happened in Madrid on 4 December 2025 is not capitulation, secrecy or the sacrifice of Spanish interests. It is the recognition by two mature governments that prosperity and security in the Mediterranean and Atlantic region depend on serious, multidimensional cooperation based on mutual benefits.
UN Security Council Resolution 2797 has internationally validated that the Moroccan autonomy plan is the most serious, realistic and credible basis for resolving the Western Sahara dispute. This is not a decision taken by Spain alone, but by the international body with the highest authority on matters of peace and security. Morocco has committed, through Nasser Bourita, to working ‘with all parties for a just and lasting solution’, and that promise must be supported.
2025 heralds a new era in Spanish-Moroccan relations. An era in which both countries are moving towards a strategic partnership of co-production, where the economic benefits are tangible, where security is shared, where education and culture forge lasting ties, and where regional stability is the common benefit.
The XIII HLM is not a hidden agreement, it is a clear declaration of intent. Those who seek to torpedo this project, whether for electoral gain or to construct alarmist narratives to maintain their relevance and personal gain, have agendas that have little to do with the real well-being of Spanish and Moroccan citizens and more to do with their own.