La Moncloa and the Moroccan Sahara: a diplomatic strategy of silence (1)

1. Sánchez's letter and the necessary adjustments
2. Plural government and diplomatic consistency
3. The dissenting voice in Sánchez's government
4. From the ‘Resistance Manual’ to the strategy of silence

The change, apparently technical, redefines the way Spain accounts for the presence of its language in the southern provinces of the Kingdom of Morocco. 

Prior to its 2025 edition, the Cervantes Institute presented the population of Western Sahara separately from Morocco in its reports on Spanish in the world. The new methodology, by integrating statistical information on Western Sahara into the total for Morocco, represents not only a logical technical adjustment, but also a political and symbolic gesture of administrative normalisation of this territory within official Spanish cultural references, which has two main consequences at the diplomatic level: 

1. Recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara, in the sense that the inclusion of Spanish speakers in Western Sahara in the figures corresponding to Morocco in an official document of a state institution could be interpreted as tacit recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over these provinces.
2. Impact on international perception, insofar as this change in methodology, which consists of including this region in the figures for Morocco, and considering the global reach of this report published by the prestigious Instituto Cervantes, may have an impact on international perception of the Moroccan Sahara and influence the political positions of different international actors.

The change undertaken by the Cervantes Institute, which reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation (MAEUEC), is another significant step forward, three years after the inclusion of the Spanish school ‘La Paz’ in Laayoune in the list of educational centres managed by the Education Office of the Spanish Embassy in Rabat. For decades, the centre – the successor to the former Spanish Cultural Mission, established after Spain's withdrawal in 1975 – did not appear on the map of Spanish educational centres in Morocco. On the Council's current website, the school appears as part of the Spanish education system in Morocco, with its address, telephone number and institutional contact details, in the same way as the educational centres in Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier, Tetouan, Larache, Al Hoceima and Nador. This is therefore an update of great symbolic value that consolidates the administrative integration of the capital of the Moroccan Sahara into the Spanish educational network in Morocco, something that Spain had avoided for almost five decades, as well as representing practical consistency with Spain's new political position after 2022.

Sánchez's letter and the necessary adjustments

This development coincides with the Spanish government's change of position following the letter sent by President Pedro Sánchez to King Mohammed VI in March 2022, in which he described the Moroccan proposal for autonomy as ‘the most serious, credible and realistic basis’ for resolving the conflict. This new era of mutual trust is beginning to be reflected in specific areas such as education and culture and certain economic activities, where the necessary adjustments suggest a silent reconfiguration of the administrative framework that had left the Moroccan Sahara in institutional limbo for half a century.

Another relevant gesture in this same context is that the MAEUEC digital portal makes country files available to media professionals and the general public, containing basic data, the political situation and bilateral relations with Spain. In the case of Morocco, the twelve regions of the country are presented, including the two regions of the Moroccan Sahara: Laayoune-Seguía El Hamra and Dakhla-Oued Ed Dahab. This inclusion is essential to understanding how Spain, through the Diplomatic Information Office (MAEUEC), informs the international community about the geography and territorial unity of Morocco, presenting Western Sahara not as a separate area, but as provinces integrated into the Moroccan state.

Just as Spanish speakers in the Sahrawi territory are now included in Morocco's global census, and the Laayoune School now appears on the map of Spanish educational centres in Moroccan territory, the two Saharan regions are fully included in the regional map of the Kingdom of Morocco. Thus, language, education and geography become discreet vectors of diplomacy, allowing progress to be made in the implementation of political agreements.

Treating Spanish speakers in the Sahara as an integral part of the Moroccan population in the Cervantes Institute report, including the La Paz School on the map of Spanish schools in Morocco, and presenting the Sahara regions as fully integrated into the Moroccan national territory are significant gestures that reflect a policy of gradual and discreet adaptation on the part of Pedro Sánchez's government. However, the question arises: will Spain continue to pursue this strategy of gradual adjustments, advancing step by step in administrative normalisation, or will it find in UN Security Council Resolution 2797 sufficient reason to accelerate the process of institutional adaptation of its diplomatic position? Will the Spanish government's next gestures be merely symbolic and administrative, or could they mark a decisive change in the diplomatic arena? 

Plural government and diplomatic consistency

The answer to this question requires us to first recall the plural nature of the government coalition led by Socialist leader Pedro Sánchez. The existence of this plurality is indeed a true reflection of the diversity that characterises Spanish society, but it also raises legitimate questions in terms of governance about the coherence of Spanish foreign policy towards Morocco's territorial integrity, particularly when comparing the positions adopted by the ministries led by the PSOE with those taken by the ministries led by Sumar, both of which are bound by a programme agreement that does not set out any provisions regarding the issue of the Moroccan Sahara.

It should be remembered in this context that the programme agreement between the PSOE and Sumar to form a progressive coalition government mainly addresses social and labour issues, but also includes relevant aspects of foreign policy. In its section entitled ‘A Spain open to the world and with its own voice on the international stage’, the agreement sets out the broad guidelines for the government's foreign policy. Within this joint framework, commitments are established that both parties must respect, focusing their attention on key issues such as the European Union, the conflict in Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East and Palestine, migration management, and international cooperation. However, there is a notable absence of any reference to Morocco, the Maghreb or the Sahara conflict, which highlights a deliberate omission of a geopolitical area that is fundamental for Spain, but also for regional stability.

How can we explain that the agreement between the PSOE and Sumar, which facilitated Pedro Sánchez's investiture for a third term from 2023 to 2027, silences such a relevant issue as the Sahara conflict? There is no doubt that this omission reflects a profound difference between the two parties, which have failed to agree on a coherent government approach to this sensitive issue. While the PSOE, faithful to the diplomatic shift of its leader, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, in 2022, supports the Moroccan approach and prioritises maintaining stability and promoting Spain's relationship with Morocco, Sumar insists on continuing to support Algeria's separatist agenda, as evidenced by its parliamentary and ministerial initiatives.

The dissenting voice in Sánchez's government

The socialist ministers in their respective departments seem to fully assume their political responsibility in treating the Sahara as an integral part of Morocco. However, this position clashes head-on with the approach adopted by Sumar's ministers, whose positions are therefore markedly divergent. This discrepancy cannot be understood without taking into account the absence in the coalition agreement between the PSOE and Sumar of any commitment or common rule of conduct on the Sahara issue. By failing to establish a minimum agreement on this key issue, the door is left open for each party to act as it pleases, which can result in a fragmented foreign policy and a lack of unity on an issue of such geopolitical importance for Spain, Morocco and the region as a whole.

Ministers belonging to the left-wing Sumar movement allied with Pedro Sánchez's PSOE, such as Ernest Urtasun (Culture), Sira Rego (Youth and Children) and Yolanda Díaz (Labour and Social Economy), have effectively adopted pro-Polisario positions or supported initiatives, involving their ministerial departments in a dynamic of tension that calls into question the coherence and unity of the government's foreign policy. The information available to date shows no visible public effort to ‘call them to order’ or urge them to preserve the cohesion of the government coalition on the Sahara issue, which suggests that silent internal tensions persist in this regard, but without escalating further.

The Minister of Culture, Ernest Urtasun, does not limit himself to guaranteeing his department's support for ‘cultural’ events organised by the Polisario Front, such as festivals or exhibitions that the separatist group frequently uses in the Tindouf camps or on Spanish territory to promote its propaganda on the identity of the ‘Sahrawi people’. In April 2024, he clearly apologised to the representative of the separatist front in Spain, stating that the Ministry of Culture, considering Western Sahara to be a separate and distinct territory from Morocco, wished to correct an ‘error’ in an official Ministry document that referred to El Aaiun as a Moroccan city; He pointed out that this was an unfortunate mistake that had occurred months before his arrival at the Department of Culture. In a letter addressed to a senator from the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG), the minister undertook not to repeat ‘the error’ of considering the capital of the Sahara to be Moroccan: ‘I inform Your Excellency that there is a firm commitment to ensure that this situation does not recur, as was expressly stated to the representative of the Polisario Front’. This apology represents, in addition to a shameful submission to Polisario blackmail, a gross institutional alignment with separatist propaganda hostile to Morocco's territorial integrity.

In July 2024, the Minister for Youth and Children, Sira Rego, was also not content with receiving a delegation of Sahrawi children participating in the ‘Holidays in Peace’ programme, a Polisario propaganda device presented as a humanitarian action that allows children from the Tindouf camps to spend the summer in Spain, at her ministry's headquarters. During this reception, which was supposed to be a mere formality of courtesy, the minister held an official session with political speeches, in the presence of separatist leaders and members of the State Coordination of Associations in Solidarity with the Sahara (CEAS), which advocates for ‘the self-determination and independence of the Sahrawi people’. The presence of minors at this meeting raises serious ethical questions about the political use of children, as has always been the case with the ‘Holidays in Peace’ programme, accused of politicising Sahrawi children by exposing them to separatist ideology. The minister's gesture, in receiving the CEAS and the Polisario for the first time at the ministry, therefore raises important questions about the coherence and unity of Spanish policy on the issue of the Moroccan Sahara. While the Spanish government officially expresses its support for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, this initiative generates dissent within the executive and represents an act of provocation against Spanish-Moroccan friendship.

The Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Labour and Social Economy, Yolanda Díaz, who continues to hurl virulent insults at Morocco while proclaiming her support for the Sahrawi people's struggle for independence, perfectly illustrates the comedy of these discordant voices within the Spanish executive. Let us consider just one example concerning the State Public Employment Service (SEPE), an autonomous body attached to the Ministry of this left-wing leader, which provides an application on its website dedicated to the online communication of employment contracts. This platform allows registered employers and professionals to declare contracts using a country code system, ranging from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe, assigning each nation a specific code. If Morocco has its own code (504) in this application, no one knows what on earth the code 732 attributed in this application to “another” country called Western Sahara could be used for. Which employers would be required to report contracts using this mysterious Sahrawi code?

From the ‘Resistance Manual’ to the strategy of silence

With other similar examples that could be cited, it is clear that the ministers of the far left do not seem willing, until the end of the government's term, to renounce their obstinacy in swimming against the tide by institutionally promoting the separatist thesis, to the detriment of Morocco's territorial integrity and in total contradiction with the official line of the government, which supports the status of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. Although Sumar's ministers have no foreign policy powers, their cross-cutting portfolios have an international dimension, which reveals a worrying inconsistency in the effectiveness of the Spanish government's foreign policy, especially on an issue as sensitive as the territorial integrity of Morocco. 

In the remainder of the current legislative term, will Pedro Sánchez, faced with persistent disagreements with Sumar, resort to any of the techniques of resilience and perseverance outlined in his book Manual de resistencia (Resistance Manual), in which he shows how to win primaries against the party apparatus, how to succeed in a motion of no confidence, how to overcome internal and external adversities, how to resist media and economic pressure, or rather how to manage alliances and coalitions? It is likely that La Moncloa, in order to resist Sumar's blackmail, is experimenting with techniques far more sophisticated than those developed in the Manual de resistencia. Perhaps a new manual is being written for this third term of office, one entitled Estrategia del silencio (The Strategy of Silence).